A demanda por dividendos: uma justificativa teórica

A demanda por dividendos em um ambiente no qual sobre estes incidem mais impostos do que sobre os ganhos de capital é discutida. A motivação básica para tal fato, e que os acionistas são incapazes de certificarem-se de que os lucros retidos serão reinvestidos pelos diretores da melhor possível. Neste artigo discute-se o caso geral onde o diretor é avesso ao risco, mas resolve-se apenas o caso onde este possui aversão ao risco constante, por simplicidade.

Signalling and arbitrage

Given a competitive signalling game, we study a transformed game which includes the natural enrichment of contractual opportunities in a market. We show that subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes in the new game which satisfy certa in competitive hypotheses induce sequential equilibrium outcomes in the original game which satisfy the Cho-Kreps extended intuitive criterion. Arbitrage opportunities in the transformed game achieve results similar to refinements of sequential equilibria in the original game.

The Bayesian Foundations of solution concepts of games

We transform a non co-operati ve game into a -Bayesian decision problem for each player where the uncertainty faced by a player is the strategy choices of the other players, the pr iors of other players on the choice of other players, the priors over priors and so on.We provide a complete characterization between the extent of knowledge about the rationality of players and their ability to successfulIy eliminate strategies which are not best responses. This paper therefore provides the informational foundations of iteratively unàominated strategies and rationalizable strategic behavior (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984». Moreover, sufficient condi tions are also found for Nash equilibrium behavior. We also provide Aumann's (1985) results on correlated equilibria .