6 resultados para Thumb
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
Consumption is an important macroeconomic aggregate, being about 70% of GNP. Finding sub-optimal behavior in consumption decisions casts a serious doubt on whether optimizing behavior is applicable on an economy-wide scale, which, in turn, challenge whether it is applicable at all. This paper has several contributions to the literature on consumption optimality. First, we provide a new result on the basic rule-of-thumb regression, showing that it is observational equivalent to the one obtained in a well known optimizing real-business-cycle model. Second, for rule-of-thumb tests based on the Asset-Pricing Equation, we show that the omission of the higher-order term in the log-linear approximation yields inconsistent estimates when lagged observables are used as instruments. However, these are exactly the instruments that have been traditionally used in this literature. Third, we show that nonlinear estimation of a system of N Asset-Pricing Equations can be done efficiently even if the number of asset returns (N) is high vis-a-vis the number of time-series observations (T). We argue that efficiency can be restored by aggregating returns into a single measure that fully captures intertemporal substitution. Indeed, we show that there is no reason why return aggregation cannot be performed in the nonlinear setting of the Pricing Equation, since the latter is a linear function of individual returns. This forms the basis of a new test of rule-of-thumb behavior, which can be viewed as testing for the importance of rule-of-thumb consumers when the optimizing agent holds an equally-weighted portfolio or a weighted portfolio of traded assets. Using our setup, we find no signs of either rule-of-thumb behavior for U.S. consumers or of habit-formation in consumption decisions in econometric tests. Indeed, we show that the simple representative agent model with a CRRA utility is able to explain the time series data on consumption and aggregate returns. There, the intertemporal discount factor is significant and ranges from 0.956 to 0.969 while the relative risk-aversion coefficient is precisely estimated ranging from 0.829 to 1.126. There is no evidence of rejection in over-identifying-restriction tests.
Resumo:
Recentes evidências empíricas sugerem que o consumo aumenta em resposta a um aumento nos gastos do governo. Essa descoberta não pode ser facilmente reconciliada com os resultados dos modelos de otimização dos ciclos econômicos. Para testar tais evidências utilizamos uma versão simplificada do modelo novo keynesiano padrão estendido em Galí, López-Salido e Vallés (2007), para permitir a presença de consumidores Rule-of-Thumb. Mostramos como a interação desses últimos, sob a hipótese de rigidez de preços e financiamento via déficits, pode explicar as evidências existentes sobre os efeitos dos gastos do governo.
Resumo:
The objective of this paper is to test for optimality of consumption decisions at the aggregate level (representative consumer) taking into account popular deviations from the canonical CRRA utility model rule of thumb and habit. First, we show that rule-of-thumb behavior in consumption is observational equivalent to behavior obtained by the optimizing model of King, Plosser and Rebelo (Journal of Monetary Economics, 1988), casting doubt on how reliable standard rule-of-thumb tests are. Second, although Carroll (2001) and Weber (2002) have criticized the linearization and testing of euler equations for consumption, we provide a deeper critique directly applicable to current rule-of-thumb tests. Third, we show that there is no reason why return aggregation cannot be performed in the nonlinear setting of the Asset-Pricing Equation, since the latter is a linear function of individual returns. Fourth, aggregation of the nonlinear euler equation forms the basis of a novel test of deviations from the canonical CRRA model of consumption in the presence of rule-of-thumb and habit behavior. We estimated 48 euler equations using GMM, with encouraging results vis-a-vis the optimality of consumption decisions. At the 5% level, we only rejected optimality twice out of 48 times. Empirical-test results show that we can still rely on the canonical CRRA model so prevalent in macroeconomics: out of 24 regressions, we found the rule-of-thumb parameter to be statistically signi cant at the 5% level only twice, and the habit ƴ parameter to be statistically signi cant on four occasions. The main message of this paper is that proper return aggregation is critical to study intertemporal substitution in a representative-agent framework. In this case, we fi nd little evidence of lack of optimality in consumption decisions, and deviations of the CRRA utility model along the lines of rule-of-thumb behavior and habit in preferences represent the exception, not the rule.
Resumo:
This paper tests the optimality of consumption decisions at the aggregate level taking into account popular deviations from the canonical constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) utility function model-rule of thumb and habit. First, based on the critique in Carroll (2001) and Weber (2002) of the linearization and testing strategies using euler equations for consumption, we provide extensive empirical evidence of their inappropriateness - a drawback for standard rule- of-thumb tests. Second, we propose a novel approach to test for consumption optimality in this context: nonlinear estimation coupled with return aggregation, where rule-of-thumb behavior and habit are special cases of an all encompassing model. We estimated 48 euler equations using GMM. At the 5% level, we only rejected optimality twice out of 48 times. Moreover, out of 24 regressions, we found the rule-of-thumb parameter to be statistically significant only twice. Hence, lack of optimality in consumption decisions represent the exception, not the rule. Finally, we found the habit parameter to be statistically significant on four occasions out of 24.
Resumo:
Decision makers often use ‘rules of thumb’, or heuristics, to help them handling decision situations (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979b). Those cognitive shortcuts are taken by the brain to cope with complexity and time limitation of decisions, by reducing the burden of information processing (Hodgkinson et al, 1999; Newell and Simon, 1972). Although crucial for decision-making, heuristics come at the cost of occasionally sending us off course, that is, make us fall into judgment traps (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Over fifty years of psychological research has shown that heuristics can lead to systematic errors, or biases, in decision-making. This study focuses on two particularly impactful biases to decision-making – the overconfidence and confirmation biases. A specific group – top management school students and recent graduates - were subject to classic experiments to measure their level of susceptibility to those biases. This population is bound to take decision positions at companies, and eventually make decisions that will impact not only their companies but society at large. The results show that this population is strongly biased by overconfidence, but less so to the confirmation bias. No significant relationship between the level of susceptibility to the overconfidence and to the confirmation bias was found.