Valuation and performance of firms in complex ownership structures : an application to Korean chaebols

We propose several new metrics to describe the complex ownership structure of business groups, and provide simple formulas and algorithms to compute these metrics. We use these measures to describe in detail the ownership structure of Korean chaebols in the period of 2003 to 2004. In addition, we validate the usefulness of our new metrics by showing empirically that they are important for understanding the valuation and performance of group firms. In particular, we show evidence that firms that are central to the control structure of the chaebol (central firms), firms in cross-shareholdings, and firms that are placed at the bottom of the group (i.e., with lower ultimate ownership) have lower profitability than other group firms. The valuation results suggest that central firms and firms in cross-shareholding loops have lower valuations than other public Chaebol firms. The lower valuation of these firms is not explained by variation in measures of ownership concentration and separation between ownership and control.

Um osso para rex: as relações entre consumidor e animais de estimação e as suas influências no ato de presentear

The objective of the present work is to investigate gift-giving behavior between humans and their pets, and whether the relationship between human and pet affects the choice and purchase of these gifts. Theoretical support comes from works by Wolfinbarger (1990) who categorized the motivations underlying gift-giving, Belk & Coon (1993) who observed gift-giving as an economic exchange, Belk (1993) who approached gift-giving as an act of agapic love, and finally Hirschman (1994) who described many forms of relationship between consumers and their pets. The present study is of exploratory character. In-depth interviews were conducted so then the feelings and emotions of the informants, necessary to the analysis, could emerge. It was assumed that agapic, unconditional love, guided the gifts choice and purchase. Nevertheless, interpretation of the records shows that motivations which led the humans to give gifts to their pets were many. The work shows these motivations in a matrix. Records also indicate that it is difficult to establish the threshold between on motivation and the other.

A regulação no mercado de planos de saúde: a ação do consumidor e a estratégia da Agência Nacional de Saúde Suplementar - ANS

The scope of this dissertation is to assess the attitudes of subscribers to private health insurance schemes and the regulatory strategy of the Ancillary National Health Agency -- ANS in relation to their demands. The ancillary health market features various players, each with their own specific interests and priorities. Consequently, the ANS should strive to maintain the balance between the consumers, the economic intermediaries and the State, ensuring that the Agency's powers to establish norms, as well as to regulate and to supervise each be exercised independently. Many people contend that there are elements not currently incorporated into the current services of the ANS which could contribute to its regulatory strategy. This study was conducted from the standpoint of theories applied to State administration for structural analysis of the ANS and its strategies, in addition to a symbolic and rational approach for a better understanding of the consumers involved. A survey was conducted of existing records of the ANS, as well as data collected from direct observation. Analysis of the data obtained led to the conclusion that the consumer can become a close ally in the regulatory activity of the ANS, to the extent that the latter may acquire more in-depth knowledge of aspects contained in the demands of the former.

Competitive equilibria in infinite-horizon collateralized economies with default penalties

Araújo, Páscoa and Torres-Martinez (2002) have shown that, without imposing either debt constraints or transversality conditions, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in infinite horizon economies with default when collateral is the only mechanism that partially secures loans. Páscoa and Seghir (2008) subsequently show that Ponzi schemes may reappear if, additionally to the seizure of the collateral, there are sufficiently harsh default penalties assessed (directly in terms of utility) against the defaulters. They also claim that if default penalties are moderate then Ponzi schemes are ruled out and existence of a competitive equilibrium is ensured. The objective of this paper is two fold. First, contrary to what is claimed by Páscoa and Seghir (2008), we show that moderate default penalties do not always prevent agents to run a Ponzi scheme. Second, we provide an alternative condition on default penalties that is sufficient to rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure the existence of a competitive equilibrium.

Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties

In infinite horizon financial markets economies, competitive equilibria fail to exist if one does not impose restrictions on agents' trades that rule out Ponzi schemes. When there is limited commitment and collateral repossession is the unique default punishment, Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) proved that Ponzi schemes are ruled out without imposing any exogenous/endogenous debt constraints on agents' trades. Recently Páscoa and Seghir (2009) have shown that this positive result is not robust to the presence of additional default punishments. They provide several examples showing that, in the absence of debt constraints, harsh default penalties may induce agents to run Ponzi schemes that jeopardize equilibrium existence. The objective of this paper is to close a theoretical gap in the literature by identifying endogenous borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure existence of equilibria in a model with limited commitment and (possible) default. We appropriately modify the definition of finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002)), to encompass models with limited commitment, default penalties and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. We show that, independently of the level of default penalties, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the existence of an equilibrium that is compatible with the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model. An interesting feature of our debt constraints is that they give rise to budget sets that coincide with the standard budget sets of economies having a collateral structure but no penalties (as defined in Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002)). This illustrates the hidden relation between finitely effective debt constraints and collateral requirements.

Financial disruption as a cost of sovereign default

This dissertation analyses quantitatively the costs of sovereign default for the economy, in a model where banks with long positions in government debt play a central role in the financial intermediation for private sector's investments and face financial frictions that limit their leverage ability. Calibration tries to resemble some features of the Eurozone, where discussions about bailout schemes and default risk have been central issues. Results show that the model captures one important cost of default pointed out by empirical and theoretical literature on debt crises, namely the fall in investment that follows haircut episodes, what can be explained by a worsening in banks' balance sheet conditions that limits credit for the private sector and raises their funding costs. The cost in terms of output decrease is though not significant enough to justify the existence of debt markets and the government incentives for debt repayment. Assuming that the government is able to alleviate its constrained budget by imposing a restructuring on debt repayment profile that allows it to cut taxes, our model generates an important difference for output path comparing lump-sum taxes and distortionary. For our calibration, quantitative results show that in terms of output and utility, it is possible that the effect on the labour supply response generated by tax cuts dominates investment drop caused by credit crunch on financial markets. We however abstract from default costs associated to the breaking of existing contracts, external sanctions and risk spillovers between countries, that might also be relevant in addition to financial disruption effects. Besides, there exist considerable trade-offs for short and long run path of economic variables related to government and banks' behaviour.