Overdetermination in a marxian theory of money

O presente artigo focaliza a genérica e abstrata análise monetária desenvolvida por Marx no inicio do Capital. Mais precisamente, pretende-se avaliar em que medida, se alguma, alguns aspectos da análise de Marx sobre o papel bastante contraditório desempenhado pela moeda no processo de circulação simples de mercadorias suportam uma interpretação sobre-determinista do método dialético por ele empregado. Baseando-se no conceito de sobre-determinação introduzido na literature Marxiana principalmente por Louis Althusser, o artigo conclui que o nexo real-monetário prevalecente na circulação simples de mercadorias pode ser concebida como um nexo sobre-determinado, ou seja, um nexo caracterizado por incorporar um regime de constitutividade.

The theory of storage and the volatility in commadity markets

Esse estudo estende a metodologia de Fama e French (1988) para testar a hipótese derivada da Teoria dos Estoques de que o convenience yield dos estoques diminui a uma taxa decrescente com o aumento de estoque. Como descrito por Samuelson (1965), a Teoria implica que as variações nos preços à vista (spot) e dos futuros (ou dos contratos a termo) serão similares quando os estoques estão altos, mas os preços futuros variarão menos que os preços à vista quando os estoques estão baixos. Isso ocorre porque os choques de oferta e demanda podem ser absorvidos por ajustes no estoque quando este está alto, afetando de maneira similar os preços à vista e futuros. Por outro lado, quando os estoques estão baixos, toda a absorção dos choques de demanda ou oferta recai sobre o preço à vista, uma vez que os agentes econômicos têm pouca condição de reagir à quantidade demandada ou ofertada no curto prazo.

On the welfare costs of business cycles in the 20th century

Lucas (1987) has shown a surprising result in business-cycle research, that the welfare cost of business cycles are relatively small. Using standard assumptions on preferences and a reasonable reduced form for consumption, we computed these welfare costs for the pre- and post-WWII era, using three alternative trend-cycle decomposition methods. The post-WWII period is very era this basic result is dramatically altered. For the Beveridge and Nelson decomposition, and reasonable preference parameter and discount values, we get a compensation of about 5% of consumption, which is by all means a sizable welfare cost (about US$ 1,000.00 a year).

On the welfare costs of business-cycle fluctuations and economic-growth variation in the 20th century

Lucas (1987) has shown a surprising result in business-cycle research: the welfare cost of business cycles are very small. Our paper has several original contributions. First, in computing welfare costs, we propose a novel setup that separates the effects of uncertainty stemming from business-cycle fluctuations and economic-growth variation. Second, we extend the sample from which to compute the moments of consumption: the whole of the literature chose primarily to work with post-WWII data. For this period, actual consumption is already a result of counter-cyclical policies, and is potentially smoother than what it otherwise have been in their absence. So, we employ also pre-WWII data. Third, we take an econometric approach and compute explicitly the asymptotic standard deviation of welfare costs using the Delta Method. Estimates of welfare costs show major differences for the pre-WWII and the post-WWII era. They can reach up to 15 times for reasonable parameter values -β=0.985, and ∅=5. For example, in the pre-WWII period (1901-1941), welfare cost estimates are 0.31% of consumption if we consider only permanent shocks and 0.61% of consumption if we consider only transitory shocks. In comparison, the post-WWII era is much quieter: welfare costs of economic growth are 0.11% and welfare costs of business cycles are 0.037% - the latter being very close to the estimate in Lucas (0.040%). Estimates of marginal welfare costs are roughly twice the size of the total welfare costs. For the pre-WWII era, marginal welfare costs of economic-growth and business- cycle fluctuations are respectively 0.63% and 1.17% of per-capita consumption. The same figures for the post-WWII era are, respectively, 0.21% and 0.07% of per-capita consumption.

On the welfare costs of business-cycle fluctuations and economic-growth variation in the 20th century

Lucas(1987) has shown a surprising result in business-cycle research: the welfare cost of business cycles are very small. Our paper has several original contributions. First, in computing welfare costs, we propose a novel setup that separates the effects of uncertainty stemming from business-cycle uctuations and economic-growth variation. Second, we extend the sample from which to compute the moments of consumption: the whole of the literature chose primarily to work with post-WWII data. For this period, actual consumption is already a result of counter-cyclical policies, and is potentially smoother than what it otherwise have been in their absence. So, we employ also pre-WWII data. Third, we take an econometric approach and compute explicitly the asymptotic standard deviation of welfare costs using the Delta Method. Estimates of welfare costs show major diferences for the pre-WWII and the post-WWII era. They can reach up to 15 times for reasonable parameter values = 0:985, and = 5. For example, in the pre-WWII period (1901-1941), welfare cost estimates are 0.31% of consumption if we consider only permanent shocks and 0.61% of consumption if we consider only transitory shocks. In comparison, the post-WWII era is much quieter: welfare costs of economic growth are 0.11% and welfare costs of business cycles are 0.037% the latter being very close to the estimate in Lucas (0.040%). Estimates of marginal welfare costs are roughly twice the size of the total welfare costs. For the pre-WWII era, marginal welfare costs of economic-growth and business-cycle uctuations are respectively 0.63% and 1.17% of per-capita consumption. The same gures for the post-WWII era are, respectively, 0.21% and 0.07% of per-capita consumption.

Contributions to the Theory of Optimal Tests

This paper considers tests which maximize the weighted average power (WAP). The focus is on determining WAP tests subject to an uncountable number of equalities and/or inequalities. The unifying theory allows us to obtain tests with correct size, similar tests, and unbiased tests, among others. A WAP test may be randomized and its characterization is not always possible. We show how to approximate the power of the optimal test by sequences of nonrandomized tests. Two alternative approximations are considered. The rst approach considers a sequence of similar tests for an increasing number of boundary conditions. This discretization allows us to implement the WAP tests in practice. The second method nds a sequence of tests which approximate the WAP test uniformly. This approximation allows us to show that WAP similar tests are admissible. The theoretical framework is readily applicable to several econometric models, including the important class of the curved-exponential family. In this paper, we consider the instrumental variable model with heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors (HAC-IV) and the nearly integrated regressor model. In both models, we nd WAP similar and (locally) unbiased tests which dominate other available tests.

On the welfare costs of business-cycle fluctuations and economic-growth variation in the 20th century and beyond

The main objective of this paper is to propose a novel setup that allows estimating separately the welfare costs of the uncertainty stemming from business-cycle uctuations and from economic-growth variation, when the two types of shocks associated with them (respectively,transitory and permanent shocks) hit consumption simultaneously. Separating these welfare costs requires dealing with degenerate bivariate distributions. Levis Continuity Theorem and the Disintegration Theorem allow us to adequately de ne the one-dimensional limiting marginal distributions. Under Normality, we show that the parameters of the original marginal distributions are not afected, providing the means for calculating separately the welfare costs of business-cycle uctuations and of economic-growth variation. Our empirical results show that, if we consider only transitory shocks, the welfare cost of business cycles is much smaller than previously thought. Indeed, we found it to be negative - -0:03% of per-capita consumption! On the other hand, we found that the welfare cost of economic-growth variation is relatively large. Our estimate for reasonable preference-parameter values shows that it is 0:71% of consumption US$ 208:98 per person, per year.

The role of the BNDES in the Brazilian development financing: contributions from the paper “towards a legal theory of finance” of Katharina Pistor

This paper aims to verify the main contributions and adjustments that the paper “Towards a Legal Theory of Finance” from Katharina Pistor may bring to the role of the Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) in the Brazilian development financing. In order to do so, I work with two questions in this paper: (i) such theory presents elements which allow analyzing the role of the BNDES and from there, if it is required, adjustments can be made in the governance of the BNDES? and (ii) there are academics and scholars that, together with the theory, also contribute with the improvement of the BNDES role in the development of Brazil?

A theory of weekly specials

Multiproduct retailers facing similar costs and serving the same public commonly announce different weekly specials. These promotional prices also seem to evolve randomly over the weeks. Here, weekly specials are viewed as the strategic outcome of an oligopolistic price competition among multiproduct retail stores facing nonconvex costs. Existence of an equilibrium in mixed strategies is proven. ldentical stores serving the same public will never charge the same price vector with probability one (cross-store price dispersion). Mixed strategies can generate random price dispersion over time in the repeated version of the mode!.

Toward a theory of international currency : a step further

We generalize the two-country, two-currency model of Matsuyama, Kiyotaki and Matsui to resolve two "shortcomings" in their approach. First, we endogenize prices and excb.ange rates. Second, we introduce monetary policy. We then use the model to address the following new questions: How does the fact that a currency circulates intemationally affect its purcb.asing power? Where does an intemational currency purcb.ase more? What are the effects on seignorage and welfare when a currency becomes intemational? How is policy affected by concems of currency substitution? How are national monetary policies connected, and what is the scope for international cooperation?

A Theory of voter experimentation in repeated elections

Nesse artigo, eu desenvolvo e analiso um modelo de dois perí odos em que dois polí ticos competem pela preferência de um eleitor representativo, que sabe quão benevolente é um dos polí ticos mas é imperfeitamente informado sobre quão benevolente é o segundo polí tico. O polí tico conhecido é interpretado como um incumbente de longo prazo, ao passo que o polí tico desconhecido é interpretado como um desa fiante menos conhecido. É estabelecido que o mecanismo de provisão de incentivos inerente às elei cões - que surge através da possibilidade de não reeleger um incumbente - e considerações acerca de aquisi cão de informa cão por parte do eleitor se combinam de modo a determinar que em qualquer equilí brio desse jogo o eleitor escolhe o polí tico desconhecido no per íodo inicial do modelo - uma a cão à qual me refi ro como experimenta cão -, fornecendo assim uma racionaliza cão para a não reelei cão de incumbentes longevos. Especifi camente, eu mostro que a decisão do eleitor quanto a quem eleger no per odo inicial se reduz à compara cão entre os benefí cios informacionais de escolher o polí tico desconhecido e as perdas econômicas de fazê-lo. Os primeiros, que capturam as considera cões relacionadas à aquisi cão de informa cão, são mostrados serem sempre positivos, ao passo que as últimas, que capturam o incentivo à boa performance, são sempre não-negativas, implicando que é sempre ótimo para o eleitor escolher o polí tico desconhecido no per íodo inicial.