Lender liability in the Consumer Credit Market

In many countries consumer credit legislation provides for the extension of liability for product failure to the …nancial institution that advances credit to the consumer. In particular, lender liability is imposed on those credit grantors who closely operate with the supplier of the good. This paper provides a rationale for lender-responsibility in the consumer credit market. It shows that, when judicial enforcement is ine¢cient or there is risk of seller liquidation, lender-liability helps to protect consumers who systematically underestimate the probability of product failure and overestimate the extent to which they can obtain compensation.

A Teoria do fortuito externo: um novo estudo

Apresentação histórica dos conceitos de caso fortuito e força maior. Avanço doutrinário em relação aos sistemas de responsabilidade civil. Responsabilidade civil subjetiva e responsabilidade civil objetiva. Perda de importância do elemento subjetivo culpa. Teorias explicativas das situações de caso fortuito e de força maior. Objetivista e subjetivista. Posição adotada pelo legislador. Equiparação dos efeitos de caso fortuito e de força maior. Evolução do estudo do direito consumerista. Fortuito interno. Evolução. Fortuito externo. Rompimento do nexo de causalidade. Externidade. Principais características.

The power of the purse : what do the data say on US federal budget allocation to the states?

This paper provides new evidence on the determinants of the allocation of the US federal budget to the states and tests the capability of congressional, electoral and partisan theories to explain such allocation. We find that socio-economic characteristics are important explanatory variables but are not sufficient to explain the disparities in the distribution of federal monies. First, prestige committee membership is not conducive to pork-barrelling. We do not find any evidence that marginal states receive more funding; on the opposite, safe states tend to be rewarded. Also, states that are historically "swing" in presidential elections tend to receive more funds. Finally, we find strong evidence supporting partisan theories of budget allocation. States whose governor has the same political affiliation of the President receive more federal funds; while states whose representatives belong to a majority opposing the president party receive less funds.