The BRICS: some historical experiences, growth challenges and opportunities

The acronym BRICS was a fad among the media and global investors. Now, the acronym sounds passé. However, the group of countries remains important, from both political and economic reasons. They have a large aggregate size, 28% of the global GDP and 42% of the world’s population, high growth potential due to the current significant misallocation of resources and relatively low stock of human capital, structural transformation is in progress and one of them, China, is taking steps to become a global power and a challenger to the US dominance. This paper provides a brief overview of the five economies, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. We focus on some aspects of their history, the Chinese initiatives in international finance and geopolitical strategic moves, their growth experience and structural transformation over the last 35 years, trade and investment integration into the global economy and among themselves, the growth challenges faced by their economies and the potential gains to the Brazilian economy from a stronger integration with the other BRICS. In association with its efforts to be a global power, China aims to become a major player in global finance and to achieve the status of global currency for the renminbi, which would be the first currency of an emerging economy to attain such position. Despite the similarities, the BRICS encompass very diverse economies. In the recent decades, China and India showed stellar growth rates. On the other hand, Brazil, Russia and South Africa have expanded just in line with global output growth with the Russian economy exhibiting high volatility. China is by far the largest economy, and South Africa the smallest, the only BRICS economy with a GDP lower than US$ 1 trillion. Russia abandoned communism almost 25 years ago, but reversed many of the privatizations of 90’s. China is still ruled by communism, but has a vibrant private sector and recently has officially declared market forces to play a dominant role in its economy. Brazil, Russia and South Africa are global natural resources powerhouses and commodity exporters while China and India are large commodity importers. Brazil is relatively closed to international trade of goods and services, in marked contrast to the other four economies. Brazil, India and South Africa are dependent on external capital flows whereas China and Russia are capital exporters. India and South Africa have younger populations and a large portion living below the poverty line. Despite its extraordinary growth experience that lifted many millions from poverty, China still has 28% of its population classified as poor. Russia and China have much older populations and one of their challenges is to deal with the effects of a declining labor force in the near future. India, China and South Africa face a long way to urbanization, while Brazil and Russia are already urbanized countries. China is an industrial economy but its primary sector still absorbs a large pool of workers. India is not, but the primary sector employs also a large share of the labor force. China’s aggregate demand structure is biased towards investment that has been driving its expansion. Brazil and South Africa have an aggregate demand structure similar to the developed economies, with private consumption accounting for approximately 70%. The same similarity applies to the supply side, as in both economies the share of services nears 70%. The development problem is a productivity problem, so microeconomic reforms are badly needed to foster long-term growth of the BRICS economies since they have lost steam due a variety of factors, but fundamentally due to slower total factor productivity growth. China and India are implementing ambitious reform programs, while Brazil is dealing with macroeconomic disequilibria. Russia and South Africa remain mute about structural reforms. There are some potential benefits to Brazil to be extracted from a greater economic integration with the BRICS, particularly in natural resources intensive industries and services. Necessary conditions to the materialization of those gains are the removal of the several sources of resource misallocation and strong investment in human capital.

The Brazilian real state market in 2012: robust growth or speculative bubble?

A forte alta dos imóveis no Brasil nos últimos anos iniciou um debate sobre a possível existência de uma bolha especulativa. Dada a recente crise do crédito nos Estados Unidos, é factível questionar se a situação atual no Brasil pode ser comparada à crise americana. Considerando argumentos quantitativos e fundamentais, examina-se o contexto imobiliário brasileiro e questiona-se a sustentabilidade em um futuro próximo. Primeiramente, analisou-se a taxa de aluguel e o nível de acesso aos imóveis e também utilizou-se um modelo do custo real para ver se o mercado está em equilíbrio o não. Depois examinou-se alguns fatores fundamentais que afetam o preço dos imóveis – oferta e demanda, crédito e regulação, fatores culturais – para encontrar evidências que justificam o aumento dos preços dos imóveis. A partir dessas observações tentou-se chegar a uma conclusão sobre a evolução dos preços no mercado imobiliário brasileiro. Enquanto os dados sugerem que os preços dos imóveis estão supervalorizados em comparação ao preço dos aluguéis, há evidências de uma legítima demanda por novos imóveis na emergente classe média brasileira. Um risco maior pode estar no mercado de crédito, altamente alavancado em relação ao consumidor brasileiro. No entanto, não se encontrou evidências que sugerem mais do que uma temporária estabilização ou correção no preço dos imóveis.

Debt management in Brazil: evaluation of the Real Plan and challenges ahead

The Brazilian domestic debt has posed two challenges to policy-makers: it has grown very fast and its maturity is extremely short. This has prompted fears that a default or a compulsory lengthening scheme would be imposed. Here, we analyse the domestic public debt management experience in Brazil, searching for policy prescriptions for the next few years. After briefiy reviewing the recent domestic public debt history, we decompose the large rise in federal bonded debt during 1995-2000, searching for its macroeconomic causes. The main culprits are the extremely high interest payments-which, unti11998, were caused by the weak fiscal stance and the quasi-fixed exchange-rate regime; and since 1999, by the impact ofthe currency depreciation On the dollar-indexed and the externai debt-, and the accumulation of assets of doubtful value, much of which may have to be written off in the future. Simulation exercises of the net debt path for the near future underscore the importance of a tighter fiscal stance to prevent the debt-GDP ratio from growing further. Given the need to quickly lengthen the debt maturity, our main policy advice is to foster, and rely more on, infiation-linked bonds.