The power of the purse : what do the data say on US federal budget allocation to the states?

This paper provides new evidence on the determinants of the allocation of the US federal budget to the states and tests the capability of congressional, electoral and partisan theories to explain such allocation. We find that socio-economic characteristics are important explanatory variables but are not sufficient to explain the disparities in the distribution of federal monies. First, prestige committee membership is not conducive to pork-barrelling. We do not find any evidence that marginal states receive more funding; on the opposite, safe states tend to be rewarded. Also, states that are historically "swing" in presidential elections tend to receive more funds. Finally, we find strong evidence supporting partisan theories of budget allocation. States whose governor has the same political affiliation of the President receive more federal funds; while states whose representatives belong to a majority opposing the president party receive less funds.

Contributions to the Theory of Optimal Tests

This paper considers tests which maximize the weighted average power (WAP). The focus is on determining WAP tests subject to an uncountable number of equalities and/or inequalities. The unifying theory allows us to obtain tests with correct size, similar tests, and unbiased tests, among others. A WAP test may be randomized and its characterization is not always possible. We show how to approximate the power of the optimal test by sequences of nonrandomized tests. Two alternative approximations are considered. The rst approach considers a sequence of similar tests for an increasing number of boundary conditions. This discretization allows us to implement the WAP tests in practice. The second method nds a sequence of tests which approximate the WAP test uniformly. This approximation allows us to show that WAP similar tests are admissible. The theoretical framework is readily applicable to several econometric models, including the important class of the curved-exponential family. In this paper, we consider the instrumental variable model with heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors (HAC-IV) and the nearly integrated regressor model. In both models, we nd WAP similar and (locally) unbiased tests which dominate other available tests.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.

Purchasing power parity: the choice of price index

Looking closely at the PPP argument, it states that the currencies purchasing power should not change when comparing the same basket goods across countries, and these goods should all be tradable. Hence, if PPP is valid at all, it should be captured by the relative price indices that best Öts these two features. We ran a horse race among six di§erent price indices available from the IMF database to see which one would yield higher PPP evidence, and, therefore, better Öt the two features. We used RER proxies measured as the ratio of export unit values, wholesale prices, value added deáators, unit labor costs, normalized unit labor costs and consumer prices, for a sample of 16 industrial countries, with quarterly data from 1975 to 2002. PPP was tested using both the ADF and the DFGLS unit root test of the RER series. The RER measured as WPI ratios was the one for which PPP evidence was found for the larger number of countries: six out of sixteen when we use DF-GLS test with demeaned series. The worst measure of all was the RER based on the ratio of foreign CPIs and domestic WPI. No evidence of PPP at all was found for this measure.

The promised LAN: the transformative power of information and communications technology in developing countries

Este tese analise as implicações dos investimentos em tecnologia de informação e comunicação (ICT) em países ainda em desenvolvimento, especialmente em termos de educação, para estimular a implementação de uma infra-estrutura mais moderna em vez da continuação do uso de métodos tradicionais. Hoje, como o interesse e os investimentos em ICT estão crescendo rapidamente, os módulos e as idéias que existem para medir o estado de ICT são velhos e inexatos, e não podem ser aplicados às culturas de países em desenvolvimento. Políticos e investidores têm que considerar estes problemas quando estão pensando em investimentos ou socorros para programas em ICT no futuro, e investigadores e professores precisam entender os fatores importantes no desenvolvimento para os ICTs e a educação antes de começar estudos nestes países. Este tese conclue que investimentos em tecnologias móbeis e sem fios ajudarem organizações e governos ultrapassar a infra-estrutura tradicional, estreitando a divisão digital e dando o resulto de educação melhor, alfabetização maior, e soluções sustentáveis pelo desenvolvimento nas comunidades pobres no mundo de países em desenvolvimento.

Important, unimportant a critical anticipation of the assumptions of legal positivism in Alice in Wonderland

Almost a full century separates Lewis’ Alice in Wonderland (1865) and the second, lengthier and more elaborate edition of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law (1960; first edition published in 1934). And yet, it is possible to argue that the former anticipates and critically addresses many of the philosophical assumptions that underlie and are elemental to the argument of the latter. Both texts, with the illuminating differences that arise from their disparate genre, have as one of their key themes norms and their functioning. Wonderland, as Alice soon finds out, is a world beset by rules of all kinds: from the etiquette rituals of the mad tea-party to the changing setting for the cricket game to the procedural insanity of the trial with which the novel ends. Pure Theory of Law, as Kelsen emphatically stresses, has the grundnorm as the cornerstone upon which the whole theoretical edifice rests2. This paper discusses some of the assumptions underlying Kelsen’s argument as an instance of the modern worldview which Lewis satirically scrutinizes. The first section (Sleepy and stupid) discusses Lewis critique of the idea that, to correctly apprehend an object (in the case of Kelsen’s study, law), one has to free it from its alien elements. The second section (Do bats eat cats?) discusses the notion of systemic coherence and its impact on modern ways of thinking about truth, law and society. The third section (Off with their heads!) explores the connections between readings of systems as neutral entities and the perpetuation of political power. The fourth and final section (Important, Unimportant) explains the sense in which a “critical anticipation” is both possible and useful to discuss the philosophical assumptions structuring some positivist arguments. It also discusses the reasons for choosing to focus on Kelsen’s work, rather than on that of Lewis’ contemporary, John Austin, whose The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (published in 1832) remains influential in legal debates today.

The consequences of the culture aspect and the power distance in the execution of global strategies in multinational companies in Brazil

One of the challenges presented by the current conjecture in Global Companies is to recognize and understand that the culture and levels in structure of the Power Distance in Organizations in different countries contribute, significantly, toward the failure or success of their strategies. The alignment between the implementation and execution of new strategies for projects intended for the success of the Organization as a whole, rather than as an individual part thereof, is an important step towards reducing the impacts of Power Distance (PDI) on the success of business strategies. A position at odds with this understanding by Companies creates boundaries that increase organizational chasms, also taking into consideration relevant aspects such as, FSAs (Firm-Specific Advantages) and CSAs (Country-Specific Advantages). It is also important that the Organizations based in countries or regions of low Power Distance (PDI) between its individuals be more flexible and prepared to ask and to hear the suggestions from Regional and Local Offices. Thus, the purpose of this study is to highlight the elements of effective strategy implementation considering the relevant aspects at all levels of global corporate culture that justify the influences of power distance when implementing new strategies and also to minimize the impacts of this internal business relationship. This study also recognizes that other corporate and cultural aspects are relevant for the success of business strategies so consider, for instance, the lack of alignment between global and regional/local organizations, the need for competent leadership resources, as well as the challenges that indicate the distance between the hierarchical levels ─ Headquarters and Regional Office ─ as some of the various causes that prevent the successful execution of global strategies. Finally, we show that the execution of the strategy cannot be treated as a construction solely created by the Headquarters or by only one Board and that it needs to be understood as a system aimed at interacting with the surroundings.