23 resultados para The 2001 crisis
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
This paper studies the electricity load demand behavior during the 2001 rationing period, which was implemented because of the Brazilian energetic crisis. The hourly data refers to a utility situated in the southeast of the country. We use the model proposed by Soares and Souza (2003), making use of generalized long memory to model the seasonal behavior of the load. The rationing period is shown to have imposed a structural break in the series, decreasing the load at about 20%. Even so, the forecast accuracy is decreased only marginally, and the forecasts rapidly readapt to the new situation. The forecast errors from this model also permit verifying the public response to pieces of information released regarding the crisis.
Resumo:
Neste estudo, analiso o desempenho de empresas familiares e não-familiares na Europa, entre 2001 e 2013, com uma especial atenção ao período da crise financeira de 2008 e 2009. Doze anos de dados foram recolhidos e analisadosusando dois modelos: o modelo de ajustamento do mercado e uma técnica de estimativa de painéis. Ao contrário das expectativas, os resultados mostram que as empresas familiares não têm resultados significativamente superiores às empresas não familiares durante o período em análise, inclusive antes, durante, e depois da crise. No entanto, considerando o valor do beta, existem diferenças significativas. É possível concluir que as empresas familiares são, em geral, menos voláteis e que durante a crise apresentaram uma volatilidade extremamente baixa comparativamente com o mercado.JEL
Resumo:
This paper presents an interpretation of the European crisis based on the balance of payments imbalances within the Eurozone and highlighting the role of the “internal” real exchange rates as a primary cause of the crisis. It explores the structural contradictions that turn the Euro into a “foreign currency” for each individual Eurozone country. These contradictions imply the inability of national central banks to monetize the public and private debts, which makes the Euro crisis a sovereign crisis similar to those typical of emerging countries, but whose solution presents additional obstacles.
Resumo:
A presente dissertação investiga a relação empírica entre a crise financeira de 2007-2009, a crise da dívida soberana de 2010-2012 e a recente desaceleração dos mercados de capitais nos mercados emergentes. A exposição dos mercados emergentes à crise nos desenvolvidos é quantificada através de um modelo de interdependência de factores. Os resultados mostram que estes sofreram, de facto, um choque provocado por ambas as crises. No entanto, este foi um choque de curta duração enquanto os mercados desenvolvidos ainda lutavam com as consequências resultantes das sucessivas crises financeiras. A análise do modelo mostra ainda que após a crise da divida soberana, enquanto os mercados desenvolvidos iniciam a sua recuperação, os emergentes desaceleram o seu crescimento. De forma a completar a análise do modelo foi efectuado um estudo sobre a influência dos fluxos de capitais entre os mercados emergentes e desenvolvidos na direcção do seu crescimento, revelando que existe uma relação entre estes dois eventos.
Resumo:
This article investigates the existence of contagion between countries on the basis of an analysis of returns for stock indices over the period 1994-2003. The economic methodology used is that of multivariate GARCH family volatility models, particularly the DCC models in the form proposed by Engle and Sheppard (2001). The returns were duly corrected for a series of country-specific fundamentals. The relevance of this procedure is highlighted in the literature by the work of Pesaran and Pick (2003). The results obtained in this paper provide evidence favourable to the hypothesis of regional contagion in both Latin America and Asia. As a rule, contagion spread from the Asian crisis to Latin America but not in the opposite direction
Resumo:
This paper provides evidence on the relationship between rnonetary policy and the exchange rate in the aftermath of currency crises. It ana1yzes a large data set of currency crises in 80 countries in the period 1980 to 1998. The rnain question addressed is: can rnonetary policy significantly alter the probability of reversing the post-crisis undervaluation through nominal appreciation rather than higher int1ation? We find that tight rnonetary policy facilitates the reversal of currency undervaluation through nominal appreciation rather than inflation. When the econorny is also facing a banking crisis, depending on the specification, tight rnonetary policy rnay not have the same effect.
Resumo:
The private equity industry was experiencing a phenomenal boom at the turn of the century but collapsed abruptly in 2008 with the onset of the financial crisis. Considered one of the worst crises since the Great Depression of the 1930s, it had sent ripples around the world threatening the collapse of financial institutions and provoking a liquidity crunch followed by a huge downturn in economic activity and recession. Furthermore, the physiognomy of the financial landscape had considerably altered with banks retracting from the lending space, accompanied by a hardening of financial regulation that sought to better contain systemic risk. Given the new set of changes and challenges that had arisen from this period of financial turmoil, private equity found itself having to question current practices and methods of operation in order to adjust to the harsh realities of a new post-apocalyptic world. Consequently, this paper goes on to explore how the private equity business, management and operation model has evolved since the credit crunch with a specific focus on mature markets such as the United States and Europe. More specifically, this paper will aim to gather insights on the development of the industry since the crisis in Western Europe through a case study approach using as a base interviews with professionals working in the industry and those external to the sector but who have/have had considerable interaction with PE players from 2007 to the present.
Resumo:
The general idea of this research is to analyze overall firm performance before and after the global financial crisis of 2008. The main question is: What kind of strategies did companies adopt that led to positive business performance after the crisis? Are there any particular competitive advantages that bring better performance in the case of an economic downturn? This research focuses on competitive advantage gained by resource-based view attributes of a product (quality, durability and prestige) and dynamic capabilities (strategic flexibility in product development and technological innovation ability). The economic crisis setting provides a proper background to analyze the competitive advantage strategies in a dynamic, low-probability environment to determine which are most worth adopting in the business world. I employ an OLS regression analysis in order to measure the business performance of 136 Brazilian firms across four years – 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2012. The findings indicate that even though all of the strategic resources and capabilities positively influence firm performance in expansionary periods, only the superior product characteristics are pertinent in surviving an economic downturn.
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This dissertation aims at giving new insights for governments in understanding efficient water management models, especially in the case of the water crisis in Sao Paulo. Also, other actors dealing with water issues, such as multinational companies, could have new tools to improve efficiency in this field.
Resumo:
The Brazilian economy was severely hit by the 2008 crisis. In the beginning of the crisis, the vast majorities of the economic agents and authorities thought that Brazil could face some sort of decoupling since some macroeconomic fundamentals were very good. What we saw, however, was that the Brazilian economy was not decoupled, and expectations faced a huge deterioration soon after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 15th. Two aspects regarding the impact of crisis in Brazil, however, deserve a great deal of attention: (a) although deep, the impact did not last for a long time. Actually, the GDP growth experienced a good recovery in the second quarter of 2009, showing that the health of the Brazilian economy was good; (b) the Brazilian banking system performed very well during the crisis, although we cannot say the system was not in danger in the worst time of the crisis. In spite of the confidence crisis faced by the banking system 1, it showed a great deal of resilience. In this aspect, we argue that the restructure faced by the banking system in the aftermath of the Real Plan, as well as the development of a solid supervision regulation helped a lot the system to avoid the systemic crisis that was an open possibility to the Brazilian banking system in the end of 2008. These notes, thus, discusse why the Brazilian banking system performed pretty well in the 2008 financial crisis and how the Brazilian banking (and prudential) regulation can be taken as responsible for this good performance. More specifically, the paper back to the middle of the 1990s, when the Real Plan was implemented, in order to understand the role played by the restructuring of the Brazilian financial system in helping to pave the way to the great resilience experienced by the Brazilian banking system during the 2008 crisis. More specifically, the prudential regulation that was implemented in Brazil in the aftermath of the Real Plan seems to play a decisive role in the resilience of the system nowadays.
Resumo:
This paper attempts to understand the Brazilian financial crisis mainly from an ‘endogenous-failure’ perspective. It argues that the general mechanisms that led to this financial crisis were in essence endogenous to the workings of an economy facing a sudden liberalisation, a surge in capital inflows, ineffective regulation and weak governance. This paper will also argue that within this general framework, there is a very specific ‘Minskyian’ feature to the Brazilian crisis, which made it different from other financial crises both in Latin America and in East Asia: how a particularly radical monetary policy led to a major financial fragility in the financial sector and State finances, and to an unmanageable Ponzi finance in the accounts of the Federal Government.