The impact of daycare attendance on math test scores for a cohort of 4th graders in Brazil

We estimate the impact of having attended center-based daycare institutions during early childhood on Math test scores at the 4th grade of elementary school. Because enrollment in daycare centers may depend on unobservable character-istics of the family and the child, we build and estimate a structural model of endogeneous choice of school to deal with the selectivity problem. We nd that attendance to daycare institutions is associated with a gain of approximately 0,04 standard deviation in Math test scores. This result is important to the extent our OLS results as well as most of the studies for Brazil nd no e¤ect associated to daycare attendance, suggesting selectivity may play a role on this finding.

Incomplete contracts and the problem of social harm

We construct a model in which a first mover decides on its location before it knows the identity of the second mover; joint location results in a negative extemality. Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover's initial decision cannot be specified. We analyze several kinds of rights, including damages, injunctions, and rights to exclude (arising from covenants or land ownership). There are cases in which allocating any of these basic rights to the first mover-i.e., first-party rights-is dominated by second-party rights, and cases in which the reverse is true. A Coasian result (efficiency regardless of the rights allocation) only holds under a limited set of conditions. As corollaries of a theorem ranking the basic rights regimes, a number of results emerge contradicting conventional wisdom, including the relative inefficiency of concentrated land ownership and the relevance of the generator's identity. We conclude with a mechanism and a new rights regime that each yield the first best in all cases.