Inflation targeting, credibility and confidence crises

We study the interplay between the central bank transparency, its credibility, and the ination target level. Based on a model developed in the spirit of the global games literature, we argue that whenever a weak central bank adopts a high degree of transparency and a low target level, a bad and self conrmed type of equilibrium may arise. In this case, an over-the-target ination becomes more likely. The central bank is considered weak when favorable state of nature is required for the target to be achieved. On the other hand, if a weak central bank opts for less ambitious goals, namely lower degree of transparency and higher target level, it may avoid condence crises and ensure a unique equilibrium for the expected ination. Moreover, even after ruling out the possibility of condence crises, less ambitious goals may be desirable in order to attain higher credibility and hence a better coordination of expectations. Conversely, a low target level and a high central bank transparency are desirable whenever the economy has strong fundamentals and the target can be fullled in many states of nature.

Inflation targeting in Brazil: a Keynesian approach

O Regime de Meta de Inflação se Tornou Dominante na Formulação de Políticas dos Bancos Centrais nos Últimos 15 Anos. a Teoria Subjacente, Particularmente a Regra de Taylor, Pode ser Vista como uma Competente Generalização Desse Comportamento. de um Ponto de Vista Keynesiano, Ele Será Aceitável se Encararmos a Taxa de Juros de Equilíbrio como Apenas uma Convenção Variável e se a Combinarmos ou com uma Taxa de Câmbio ou com uma Meta de Emprego. no Caso do Brasil, Porém, Além Dessa Ressalva Teórica e da Condição do Duplo Mandato, o Regime de Metas de Inflação Enfrenta um Problema de Incoerência. esta é uma Política que se Destinava a ser Utilizada na Administração da Política Monetária, não na Mudança do Regime de Política Monetária . a Política de Metas de Inflação foi Introduzida no Brasil em 1999 como um Substituto para a Âncora Cambial, que Havia Sido Usada Desastrosamente entre 1995 e 1998. Durante Muitos Anos, o País Havia Enfrentado uma Armadilha de Alta Taxa de Juros / Taxa de Câmbio Valorizada E, Portanto, Precisava Mudar seu Regime de Política Monetária Antes de Eventualmente Adotar o Regime de Meta de Inflação. Essa Mudança, que Começou com a Flutuação de Janeiro de 1999, Deveria ter Sido Completada com Reformas Específicas (Fim da Indexação dos Serviços Públicos e dos Próprios Juros Básicos). no Entanto, em Lugar de Desenvolver uma Estratégia para Reduzir a Taxa de Juros, o Governo Continuou a Definir a Inflação como o Principal Problema a ser Enfrentado e Adotou uma Política Formal de Metas de Inflação. a Conseqüência é que Desde 1999 Essa Política se Tornou o Obstáculo que a Economia Brasileira Enfrenta para Escapar da Armadilha da Taxa de Juros

Targeting the poor: a macroeconomic analysis of cash transfer programs

This paper introduces cash transfers targeting the poor in an incomplete markets model with heterogeneous agents facing idiosyncratic risk. These transfers change the degree of insurance in the economy and affect precautionary motives asymmetrically, leading the poorest households to decrease savings proportionally more than their richer counterparts. In a model economy calibrated to Brazil, once the cash transfer program is adopted, wealth inequality and social welfare increase, poverty decreases, while employment and income inequality remain about the same. Imperfect access to financial markets is important for these results, whereas whether the program is funded with lump sum or distortive taxes is not.

Mobility, targeting and private school vouchers

This paper uses general equilibrium simulations to explore the role ofresidential mobility in shaping the impact of different types of private school voucher policies. In particular, general vouchers available to all residents in the state are compared to vouchers specifically targeted to either underprivileged school districts or underprivileged households. The simulations are derived from a three-community mo deI of low, middle and high income school districts (calibrated to New York data), where each school district is composed of multiple types of neighborhoods that may vary in house quality as well as the leveI of neighborhood extemalities. Households that differ in both their income and in the ability leveI of their children choose between school districts, between neighborhoods within their school district, and between the local public school or a menu of private school altematives.Local public school quality within a district is endogenously determined bya combination of the average peer quality of public school attending children as well as local property and state income tax supported spending. Financial support (above a required state minimum) is set by local majority rule. Finally, there exists the potential for a private school market composed of competitive schools that face production technologies similar to those ofpublic schools but who set tuition and admissions policies to maximize profits. In tbis model, it is demonstrated that school district targeted vouchers are similar in their impact to non-targeted vouchers but vastIy different from vouchers targeted to low income households. Furthermore, strong migration effects are shown to significantly improve the likely equity consequences of voucher programs.

Inflation targeting, credibility and coordination aspects

There are plenty of economic studies pointing out some requirements, like the inexistence of fiscal dominance, for inflation targeting framework be implemented in successful (credible) way. Essays on how public targets could be used in the absence of such requirements are unusual. In this papel' we appraise how central banks could use inflation targeting before soundness economic fundamentaIs have been achieved. First, based on concise framework, where confidence crises and imperfect information are neglected, we conclude that less ambitious (greater) target for inflation increases the credibility in the precommitment. Optimal target is higher than the one obtained using the Cukierman-Liviatan [7] model, where increasing credibility effect is not considered. Second, extending the model to make confidence crises possible, multiple equilibria solutions becomes possible too. In this case, to set greater targets for inflation may stimulate confidence crises and reduce the policymaker credibility. On the other hand, multiple (bad) equilibria may be avoided. The optimal target depends on the likelihood of each equilibrium be selected. Finally, when perturbing common knowledge uniqueness is restored even considering confidence crises, as in Morris-Shin[ 14]. The first result, i.e. less ambitious target for inflation increases credibility in precommitment, is also recovered. Adding a precise public signal, cOOl'dinated self-fulfilling actions and equilibrium multiplicity may still exist for some lack of common knowledge (as in Angeleto and Weming[l]). In this case, to set greater targets for inflation may stimulate confidence crisis again, reducing the policymaker credibility. From another aspect, multiple (bad) equilibria may be avoided. Optimal policy prescriptions depend on the likelihood of each equilibrium be selected. Results also indicate that more precise public information may open the door for bad equilibrium, contrary to the conventional wisdom that more central oank transparency is always good when considering inflation targeting framework.

Apresentação 10: “Inflation Targeting”, “Currency Regimes with Defaultable Debts” e Sistema Tributário na Presença de Informalidade e Evasão Fiscal…A disseminação internacional das pesquisas aplicadas relacionadas a agenda brasileira

Coordenadora: Goret P. Paulo