What happens after the central bank of Brazil increases the target interbank rate by 1%?

I start presenting an explicit solution to Taylorís (2001) model, in order to illustrate the link between the target interest rate and the overnight interest rate prevailing in the economy. Next, I use Vector Auto Regressions to shed some light on the evolution of key macroeconomic variables after the Central Bank of Brazil increases the target interest rate by 1%. Point estimates show a four-year accumulated output loss ranging from 0:04% (whole sample, 1980 : 1-2004 : 2; quarterly data) to 0:25% (Post-Real data only) with a Örst-year peak output response between 0:04% and 1:0%; respectively. Prices decline between 2% and 4% in a 4-year horizon. The accumulated output response is found to be between 3:5 and 6 times higher after the Real Plan than when the whole sample is considered. The 95% confidence bands obtained using bias-corrected bootstrap always include the null output response when the whole sample is used, but not when the data is restricted to the Post-Real period. Innovations to interest rates explain between 4:9% (whole sample) and 9:2% (post-Real sample) of the forecast error of GDP.

What if firms adjust their debt-equity ratios toward a target range?

We estimate optimal target-ranges of capital structure controlling for a series of firmspecific characteristics and accounting for the serial correlation that arises from the dynamic component of the leverage choice. Then, we empirically examine if firms adjust their leverages toward the estimated optimal ranges. Our analysis suggests that the observed behavior of firms is consistent with the notion of range-adjustment.

What happens after the Central Bank of Brazil increases the target interbank rate by 1%?

In this paper I use Taylor's (2001) model and Vector Auto Regressions to shed some light on the evolution of some key macroeconomic variables after the Central Bank of Brazil, through the COPOM, increases the target interest rate by 1%. From a quantitative perspective, the best estimate from the empírical analysis, obtained with a 1994 : 2 - 2004 : 2 subsample of the data, is that GDP goes through an accumulated decline, over the next four years, around 0.08%. Innovations to interest rates explain around 9.2% of the forecast erro r of GDP.

Especulative (sic) attack on exchange rate target zone regime : the uncertainty case

We present a continuous time target zone model of speculative attacks. Contrary to most of the literature that considers the certainty case, i.e., agents know for sure the Central Bank behavior in the future, we build uncertainty into the madel in two different ways. First, we consider the case in whicb the leveI of reserves at which the central bank lets the regime collapse is uncertain. Alternatively, we ana1ize the case in which, with some probability, the government may cbange its policy reducing the initially positive trend in domestic credito In both cases, contrary to the case of a fixed exchange rate regime, speculators face a cost of launching a tentative attack that may not succeed. Such cost induces a delay and may even prevent its occurrence. At the time of the tentative attack, the exchange rate moves either discretely up, if the attack succeeds, or down, if it fails. The remlts are consistent with the fact that, typically, an attack involves substantial profits and losses for the speculators. In particular, if agents believed that the government will control fiscal imbalances in the future, or alternatively, if they believe the trend in domestic credit to be temporary, the attack is postponed even in the presence of a signal of an imminent collapse. Finally, we aIso show that the timing of a speculative attack increases with the width of the target zone.

International civil society actors in Genetically Modificied Organisms as a field of struggle: a neo-gramscian study in Brazil and the United Kingdom

Since the international financial and food crisis that started in 2008, strong emphasis has been made on the importance of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) (or “transgenics”) under the claim that they could contribute to increase food productivity at a global level, as the world population is predicted to reach 9.1 billion in the year 2050 and food demand is predicted to increase by as much as 50% by 2030. GMOs are now at the forefront of the debates and struggles of different actors. Within civil society actors, it is possible to observe multiple, and sometime, conflicting roles. The role of international social movements and international NGOs in the GMO field of struggle is increasingly relevant. However, while many of these international civil society actors oppose this type of technological developments (alleging, for instance, environmental, health and even social harms), others have been reportedly cooperating with multinational corporations, retailers, and the biotechnology industry to promote GMOs. In this thesis research, I focus on analysing the role of “international civil society” in the GMO field of struggle by asking: “what are the organizing strategies of international civil society actors, such as NGOs and social movements, in GMO governance as a field of struggle?” To do so, I adopt a neo-Gramscian discourse approach based on the studies of Laclau and Mouffe. This theoretical approach affirms that in a particular hegemonic regime there are contingent alliances and forces that overpass the spheres of the state and the economy, while civil society actors can be seen as a “glue” to the way hegemony functions. Civil society is then the site where hegemony is consented, reproduced, sustained, channelled, but also where counter-hegemonic and emancipatory forces can emerge. Considering the importance of civil society actors in the construction of hegemony, I also discuss some important theories around them. The research combines, on the one hand, 36 in-depth interviews with a range of key civil society actors and scientists representing the GMO field of struggle in Brazil (19) and the UK (17), and, on the other hand, direct observations of two events: Rio+20 in Rio de Janeiro in 2012, and the first March Against Monsanto in London in 2013. A brief overview of the GMO field of struggle, from its beginning and especially focusing in the 1990s when the process of hegemonic formation became clearer, serves as the basis to map who are the main actors in this field, how resource mobilization works, how political opportunities (“historical contingencies”) are discovered and exploited, which are the main discourses (“science” and “sustainability” - articulated by “biodiversity preservation”, “food security” and “ecological agriculture”) articulated among the actors to construct a collective identity in order to attract new potential allies around “GMOs” (“nodal point”), and which are the institutions and international regulations within these processes that enable hegemony to emerge in meaningful and durable hegemonic links. This mapping indicates that that the main strategies applied by the international civil society actors are influenced by two central historical contingencies in the GMO field of struggle: 1) First Multi-stakeholder Historical Contingency; and 2) “Supposed” Hegemony Stability. These two types of historical contingency in the GMO field of struggle encompass deeper hegemonic articulations and, because of that, they induce international civil society actors to rethink the way they articulate and position themselves within the field. Therefore, depending on one of those moments, they will apply one specific strategy of discourse articulation, such as: introducing a new discourse in hegemony articulation to capture the attention of the public and of institutions; endorsing new plural demands; increasing collective visibility; facilitating material articulations; sharing a common enemy identity; or spreading new ideological elements among the actors in the field of struggle.