Managerial turnover and leverage under a takeover threat

How do shareholders perceive managers who lever up under a takeover threat? Increasing leverage conveys good news if it reflects management's ability to enhance value. It conveys bad news, though, if inefficient managers are more pressured to lever up. This paper demonstrates that negative (positive) updating prevails when takeover costs are small (large). Managers who leve r up to end a takeover threat thus may commit to an increase in the firm's value and yet increase their chances of being replaced by their shareholders. The model predicts that intraindustry leverage is less dispersed when takeover costs are low.

The sources of spinoff equity gains: takeover premiums or operating gains

Although the existence of spinoff equity gains is well documented, their source remains controversial. Arnong many potential causes, the literature suggests that spinoff equity gains could arise from expected tax benefits, expected takeover premia, operating performance improvement or from refocusing benefits. This paper investigates the link between spinoff announcement and post completion equity gains and post spinoff operating performance changes, takeover activity and refocusing benefits. The results indicate that spinoff announcement retums reflect anticipated takeover premiums as well as expected operating performance gains and refocusing benefits unrelated to operating performance. However, only the parent's operating performance gains are anticipated at the spinoff announcement. We find that post spinoff equity gains are driven mostly by operating performance changes for both parents and spun off subsidiaries. Takeover activity and unrelatedness of business lines between parent and subsidiary expIain littIe of post spinoff equity gains. OveralI, the data suggests that spinoffs equity gains mostly reflect anticipated real economic gains in terms of improved operating performance, and to a lesser extent takeover premium and refocusing benefit.

Cross-border reverse takeover: o caso das multinacionais brasileiras

O Cross-border reverse takeover, conduzido pelas multinacionais brasileiras, gerou desempenho superior? Cross-border reverse takeover tem sido a expressão usada para designar a aquisição de empresas em países desenvolvidos por empresas de países em desenvolvimento. Essas aquisições, reversas porque invertem o fluxo tradicional dos investimentos internacionais, respondem atualmente por parcela significativa desses investimentos e colocam em cheque a forma tradicional de pensar os negócios internacionais. Meu argumento é que as empresas que fizeram aquisições em países desenvolvidos passam a ter acesso aos recursos não disponíveis no país de origem, tais como novas tecnologias, técnicas de gestão mais avançadas, mercado de capitais mais desenvolvidos, recursos financeiros de baixo custo, entre outros. Por outro lado, elas já desenvolveram competências para gerir esses recursos e passam a ter vantagem competitiva sobre os competidores locais, levando ao desempenho superior. No entanto, partindo dos dados da base de dados Thomson ONE, que registra todas as fusões e aquisições anunciadas, oncluídas ou não, e empregando as metodologias de estudos de evento e de regressões multivariadas, com base em dados contábeis sobre uma amostra de empresas brasileiras listadas em bolsa de valores, esta tese demonstra que estatisticamente não é possível afirmar que essas empresas obtiveram desempenho superior.