Processo alternativo de catch-up em indústrias intensivas em recursos naturais: uma análise empírica da trajetória tecnológica da indústria de bioetanol de cana-de-açúcar no Brasil

Esta tese diz respeito ao desenvolvimento tecnológico e inovação em indústrias intensivas em recursos naturais no contexto de economias emergentes. A tese explora como a acumulação de capacidades tecnológicas e os mecanismos de aprendizagem influenciaram a trajetória tecnológica na indústria de bioetanol de cana-de-açúcar no Brasil, durante o período de meados da década de 1970 a 2014. Muito se avançou na compreensão do processo de catch-up tecnológico de empresas e indústrias de economias emergentes. Contudo, essas pesquisas geralmente exploram o processo de catch-up tecnológico relacionado às trajetórias tecnológicas já mapeadas pelos líderes mundiais em indústrias de manufatura e transformação. Parte desses estudos ignora que o desenvolvimento de atividades industriais poderia ocorrer em indústrias intensivas em recursos naturais. Além disso, indústrias intensivas em recursos naturais são geralmente encapsuladas como commodities e low-tech, caracterizadas por uma limitada oportunidade de aprendizagem tecnológica e acumulação de capacidades tecnológicas. Entretanto, o processo de industrialização em indústrias intensivas em recursos naturais em regiões como a América Latina ainda é pouco compreendido e são escassas as pesquisas que investigam o processo de catch-up tecnológico em nível de indústria, com raras exceções. Baseando-se em evidências da indústria de bioetanol do Brasil, esta pesquisa explora um processo de catch-up tecnológico que tem recebido pouca atenção na literatura. Esta pesquisa adotou um desenho qualitativo com base em uma estratégia de estudo de caso em nível de indústria, com extensivo trabalho de campo e coleta de evidências empíricas de primeira mão com cobertura de longo prazo em 20 organizações. Esta pesquisa encontrou que: (1) a evolução da trajetória tecnológica da indústria de bioetanol no Brasil caracterizou-se pela abertura de uma direção distinta daquela mapeada por líderes tecnológicos existentes. Esse processo de desvio qualitativo da trajetória tecnológica dominante iniciou durante os primeiros estágios de desenvolvimento tecnológico. Assim, a indústria percorreu uma trajetória de entrada precoce em path-creating; (2) a evolução dessa trajetória tecnológica não se deu de maneira homogenia. Foram encontrados três padrões relativamente distintos de acumulação de capacidades tecnológicas para funções (ou áreas) tecnológicas específicas: feedstock, processos agrícolas e processos industriais. Nas funções de feedstock e processos industriais, houve acumulação de capacidades tecnológicas de liderança mundial, enquanto na função processos agrícolas a acumulação de capacidades tecnológicas não evoluiu além do nível intermediário; (3) essas capacidades foram acumuladas de forma dispersa entre os atores da indústria (empresas produtoras, institutos de pesquisa, universidades, fornecedores, empresas de biotecnologia etc.) e possibilitaram a abertura de oportunidades de exploração de novos negócios, ainda que modestamente aproveitadas; e (4) a sutil heterogeneidade encontrada nos padrões de acumulação de capacidades tecnológicas foi influenciada pela combinação de mecanismos de aprendizagem tecnológica utilizados pela indústria ao longo do tempo. Por fim, constatou-se também que essa trajetória tecnológica contribuiu para gerar implicações significativas e foi também influenciada por fatores outros. Não obstante, esses resultados merecem esforço de investigação mais sistemático, uma vez que foram examinados aqui de forma superficial. Concluiu-se, portanto, que posições tecnológicas relevantes, especialmente por indústrias de economias emergentes, podem ser alcançadas por meio de trajetórias tecnológicas que não se baseiam, necessariamente, em tecnologias dominantes, já exploradas por líderes mundiais, de economias avançadas. Assim, os processos alternativos de catch-up podem ser altamente relevantes para a obtenção de progresso industrial. Ademais, a pesquisa concluiu que as indústrias intensivas em recursos naturais oferecem oportunidades para inovações significativas, e podem ser protagonistas nesse processo de catch-up alternativo, particularmente no contexto de países abundantes em recursos naturais. Assim sendo, esta pesquisa contribui para gerar novas evidências e explicações que nos ajudem a ampliar a noção de alternativas para o desenvolvimento industrial e econômico no contexto de economias emergentes. No debate sobre desenvolvimento industrial e econômico, as trajetórias tecnológicas alternativas, bem como as indústrias intensivas em recursos naturais, deveriam receber uma atenção especial por parte de decisores de políticas públicas e de ações empresariais.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

Opening ILT blackbox: Exploring recognition-based leadership perceptions with conjoint analysis

Although research on Implicit Leadership Theories (ILT) has put great effort on determining what attributes define a leader prototype, little attention has been given to understanding the relative importance of each of these attributes in the categorization process by followers. Knowing that recognition-based leadership perceptions are the result of the match between followers’ ILTs and the perceived attributes in their actual leaders, understanding how specific prototypical leader attributes impact this impression formation process is particularly relevant. In this study, we draw upon socio-cognitive theories to explore how followers cognitively process the information about a leader’s attributes. By using Conjoint Analysis (CA), a technique that allows us to measure an individual’s trade-offs when making choices about multi-attributed options, we conducted a series of 4 studies with a total of 879 participants. Our results demonstrate that attributes’ importance for individuals’ leadership perceptions formation is rather heterogeneous, and that some attributes can enhance or spoil the importance of other prototypical attributes. Finally, by manipulating the leadership domain, we show that the weighting pattern of attributes is context dependent, as suggested by the connectionist approach to leadership categorization. Our findings also demonstrate that Conjoint Analysis can be a valuable tool for ILT research.