Yet another reason to tax goods

The optimal taxation of goods, labor and capital income is considered in a two period model where: i) private information changes through time; ii) savings are not observed, and; iii) savings a§ect preferences conditional on the realization of types. The simultaneous appearance of these three elements cause optimal commodity taxes to depend on o§-equilibrium savings. As a consequence, separability no longer su¢ ces for the uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz (AS) to obtain. If preferences are homothetic AS is partially restored: taxes are uniform within periods, however, future consumption is taxed at a higher rate than current consumption.

A note on an application of Arrow's theorem: sufficient conditions for Lucas' inflation and welfare

Bellman's methods for dynamic optimization constitute the present mainstream in economics. However, some results associated with optimal controI can be particularly usefuI in certain problems. The purpose of this note is presenting such an example. The value function derived in Lucas' (2000) shopping-time economy in Infiation and Welfare need not be concave, leading this author to develop numerical analyses to determine if consumer utility is in fact maximized along the balanced path constructed from the first order conditions. We use Arrow's generalization of Mangasarian's results in optimal control theory and develop sufficient conditions for the problem. The analytical conclusions and the previous numerical results are compatible .

How to indirectly assess transaction costs to evaluate market integration: evidence from the international ethanol market

Mercados são instituições criadas para facilitar uma atividade de comercialização. Isto é possível porque um mercado é constituído por instituições que foram desenhadas para reduzir os custos de transação associados a este processo de troca. A partir dessas duas ideias, esta tese possui três objetivos principais. (i) Analisar por que a literatura de análise de cointegração tem mensurado estes custos de forma imprecisa. A principal razão é certa confusão entre os conceitos de custos de transação, de transporte e de comercialização. (ii) Propor um procedimento para mensurar indiretamente os custos de transação de mercado variáveis combinando os modelos de cointegração com mudança de regime e a estrutura teórica oferecidas pela Nova Economia Institucional. Este procedimento é aplicado para quantificar quanto custa comercializar etanol no mercado internacional usando suas atuais instituições. (iii) Por fim, usando os mesmos modelos e a mesma estrutura teórica, esta dissertação contesta a hipótese de que já existe um mercado internacional de etanol bem desenvolvido, tal qual a literatura tem assumido. De forma semelhante, também é avaliada a hipótese de que a remoção das barreiras comerciais norte-americanas para o etanol brasileiro seria uma condição suficiente para o desenvolvimento deste mercado internacional. Os testes aplicados rejeitam ambas as hipóteses.

Yet another reason to tax goods

When, in a dynamic model, choices by an agent : i) are not observed, and; ii) affect preferences conditional on the realization of types, new and unexpected features come up in Mirrlees’ (1971) optimal taxation frame- work. In the simplest possible model where a non-trivial filtration may be incorporated, we show how these two characteristics make it neces- sary for IC constraints to be defined in terms of strategies rather than pure announcements. Tax prescriptions are derived, and we are able to show that uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz fails to hold, in general. Clean results regarding capital income taxation are not easy to come about because usual assumption on preferences do not allow for determining which constraints bind at the optimum. However, in the most ’natural’ cases, we show that return on capital ought to be taxed.