Public policies impacts on Latin American labor structures, preparing for integration

One of the Main Subjects to Be Discussed, in Order to Adjust Latin American Economies to a Regional Integration Network, as Imposed By Mercosul or Other Economic Common Markets, is Related to the Employment and Other Labor Markets Public Policies. the Question to Be Posed Is: Having in Mind the Characteristics of Different Labor Markets and Labor Forces, What are the Impacts of Governmental Measures Presented in the Diverse Economic Conditions of Those Countries. Having in Mind These Impacts, This Paper Aims to Examine the Requisites to Adjust the Labor Structure Standards of Latin American Countries and What Would Be the Reforms to Be Performed By These Countries in Order to Prepare These Markets and Labor Forces to Adapt to Regional Integration Networks Represented By Mercosul, Alca or Other Common Markets. There are Evaluated the Impacts of the Globalization Process, Economic Stabilization and Reform Policies Undertaken By Some Selected Latin American Countries Since the Eighties on the Labor Structure Standards, Considering the Specific Adjustment Measures to Cope With the Negative Effects of These Policies. Next, Some Cases of Europe Union (Eu) Countries Measures to Prepare to Integration is Examined, in Order to Provide Some Elements to Better Understand the Possibilities to Handle With the Extensive Changes in External Conditions. in Sequence Some Statistical Indicatives of the Impacts of These Measures on the Occupational Structuring are Analyzed For a Group of Selected Latin American and Eu Countries.

The influence of urban structures on entrepreneurial decision-making: a comparative analysis of Mexico City and São Paulo

Promover a atividade empreendedora é hoje mais do que nunca uma prioridade para as economias em desenvolvimento. Em diferentes partes do mundo, empreendedores têm sido reconhecidos como verdadeiros agentes de transformação, e as novas empresas que eles criam tornam-se condutoras de inovação, que ao final pode ser difundida ao resto da economia. Teorias de economia urbana, que analisam a dinâmica da relação entre aglomeração urbana e atividade econômica, enfatizam a importância da concentração espacial das indústrias num mesmo setor industrial. Entender os incentivos que dão início à atividade empreendedora é algo novo e o foco desses estudos tem sido principalmente em alguns poucos casos de economias industrializadas. Não obstante, o sucesso de um punhado de clusters de alta tecnologia, como o Vale do Silício, por exemplo, na Califórnia, Estados Unidos, não pode ser replicado, e as condições locais devem ser consideradas a fim de entender a surgimento desses ecossistemas. Este estudo pretende investigar os critérios em que os empreendedores fundamentam suas decisões quando selecionam as localizações do seu negócio. Especificamente, a pesquisa explora o recente movimento dos ecossistemas de empreendedores na Cidade do México e em São Paulo, as duas maiores áreas metropolitanas da América Latina, à luz das teorias de economia urbana. A fim de chegar aos resultados, a pesquisa segue o método baseado sobre uma análise comparativa de estudo de casos em dois bairros: Vila Leopoldina em São Paulo e a Colônia Roma Norte na Cidade do México. Os resultados consolidados baseados em entrevistas qualitativas realizadas nos dois bairros revelam que o lugar/sitio urbano, definido em termos de laços locais assim como da atmosfera geral do ambiente, continua sendo importante para os atores apesar das comunicações de alta velocidade que produzem mais interações entre as regiões do mundo. Além disso, a relação entre o empreendedor e o seu entorno é altamente dependente do estágio de desenvolvimento e da natureza da atividade da empresa; redes informais revelam-se essenciais para identificar as oportunidades de negócio antes de serem progressivamente substituídas por relações instituídas com fundos de capital de risco ou incubadoras. Estes dois ecossistemas nascentes geram suas próprias características, o que já pode sugerir suas futuras evoluções.

Electoral institutions,cleavage structures,and the number of parties

Theory: A classic question in political science concems ",hat deteImines the number of parties that compete in a given polity. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to answering this question, one that emphasizes the role of electorallaws in structuring coalitional incentives, another that emphasizes the importance of pre-existing social cleavages. In tbis paper, we view the number of parties as a product of the interaction between these two forces, following Powell (1982) and Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994). Hypotheses: The effective number of parties in a polity should be a multiplicative rather than an additive function ofthe peImissiveness ofthe electoral system and the heterogeneity ofthe society. Methods: Multiple regression on cross-sectional aggregate electoral statistics. Unlike previous studies, we (1) do not confine attention to developed democracies; (2) explicitly control for the influence of presidential elections, taking account of whether they are concurrent or nonconcurrent, and ofthe effective number ofpresidential candidates; and (3) also control for the presence and operation of upper tiers in legislative elections. Results: The hypothesis is confiImed, both as regards the number of legislative and the number of presidential parties .

Affine processes, arbitrage-Free Term structures of legendre polynomials,and option pricing

Multivariate Affine term structure models have been increasingly used for pricing derivatives in fixed income markets. In these models, uncertainty of the term structure is driven by a state vector, while the short rate is an affine function of this vector. The model is characterized by a specific form for the stochastic differential equation (SDE) for the evolution of the state vector. This SDE presents restrictions on its drift term which rule out arbitrages in the market. In this paper we solve the following inverse problem: Suppose the term structure of interest rates is modeled by a linear combination of Legendre polynomials with random coefficients. Is there any SDE for these coefficients which rules out arbitrages? This problem is of particular empirical interest because the Legendre model is an example of factor model with clear interpretation for each factor, in which regards movements of the term structure. Moreover, the Affine structure of the Legendre model implies knowledge of its conditional characteristic function. From the econometric perspective, we propose arbitrage-free Legendre models to describe the evolution of the term structure. From the pricing perspective, we follow Duffie et al. (2000) in exploring Legendre conditional characteristic functions to obtain a computational tractable method to price fixed income derivatives. Closing the article, the empirical section presents precise evidence on the reward of implementing arbitrage-free parametric term structure models: The ability of obtaining a good approximation for the state vector by simply using cross sectional data.

Valuation and performance of firms in complex ownership structures : an application to Korean chaebols

We propose several new metrics to describe the complex ownership structure of business groups, and provide simple formulas and algorithms to compute these metrics. We use these measures to describe in detail the ownership structure of Korean chaebols in the period of 2003 to 2004. In addition, we validate the usefulness of our new metrics by showing empirically that they are important for understanding the valuation and performance of group firms. In particular, we show evidence that firms that are central to the control structure of the chaebol (central firms), firms in cross-shareholdings, and firms that are placed at the bottom of the group (i.e., with lower ultimate ownership) have lower profitability than other group firms. The valuation results suggest that central firms and firms in cross-shareholding loops have lower valuations than other public Chaebol firms. The lower valuation of these firms is not explained by variation in measures of ownership concentration and separation between ownership and control.