Rent dissipation, political viability and the strategic adoption of free trade agreements

This paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs). The key element of the analysis is the “rent dissipation” that these arrangements induce: by eliminating intra-bloc trade barriers, an FTA reduces the incentives of the local firms to lobby for higher external tariffs, thereby causing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process. The prospect of rent dissipation moderates the governments’ willingness to participate in FTAs; they will support only arrangements that are “substantially” welfare improving, and no FTA that reduces welfare. Rent dissipation also implies that the prospects of political turnover may create strategic reasons for the formation of FTAs. Specifically, a government facing a high enough probability of losing power may want to form a trade bloc simply to “tie the hands” of its successor. An FTA can affect the likelihood of political turnover as well. If the incumbent party has a known bias toward special interests, it may want to commit to less distortionary policies in order to reduce its electoral disadvantage; the rent dissipation effect ensures that an FTA can serve as the vehicle for such a commitment. In nascent/unstable democracies, the incumbent government can use a free trade agreement also to reduce the likelihood of a dictatorial takeover and to “consolidate” democracy – a finding that is consistent with the timing of numerous accessions to and formations of preferential arrangements.

Fostering innovation and entrepreneurship in Brazil through private equity and venture capital public policies

It is well documented the positive impact of the Private Equity and Venture Capital (PE/VC) industry on the creation and development of highly successful innovative companies in a few countries, mainly in the United States. PE/VC firms provide not only capital to startups and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that usually have financing gap, especially in emerging markets, but also strategic resources that enable these enterprises to commercialize innovation. As consequence, government incentive and nurture of local PE/VC industries would be expected in emerging economies due to innovation‟s importance to economic growth. This paper aims to identify if the Brazilian government has supported local PE/VC industry throughout the years in order to foster favorable conditions to creating and developing successful innovative businesses. It also analyzes Brazil‟s main public policies towards PE/VC and if they encompass all the three stages of its cycle – fundraising, investing and exiting. I conducted an empirical research which collected primary data from a sample of 127 PE/VC firms (90% of the population) operating in Brazil as of June, 2008. All firms answered a webbased questionnaire that collected quantitative data regarding their investment vehicles, portfolio companies, investments and exits. I compared the data obtained from the survey with the main local governmental PE/VC support programs. First, I confirmed the hypothesis that the Brazilian government has been using the PE/VC industry as a public policy towards entrepreneurship and innovation. Second, I identified that although PE/VC public policies in Brazil are mostly concentrated in fundraising phase, they have been able to positively impact the whole cycle. Third, it became clear that the Brazilian government became more concerned about Seed and Venture Capital (VC) Early stages due to their importance to the entire PE/VC value chain. As consequence, I conclude that those public policies have been very important to build a dynamic and strong local PE/VC industry, whose committed capital grew 50% per year between 2005 and 2008 to achieve US$27 billion, which invested US$ 11 billion, which employs 1,400 professionals (75% with postgraduate degrees) and maintains 482 portfolio companies, mostly SMEs. In addition, PE/VCbacked companies represented one third of the Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) that occurred in Brazil between 2004 and 2008 (approximately US$15 billion).