Inglorious revolution : sovereign debt, tropical credibility, and financial underdevelopment in imperial Brazil

In 1824 the creation of institutions that constrained the monarch’s ability to unilaterally tax, spend, and debase the currency put Brazil on a path toward a revolution in public finance, roughly analogous to the financial consequences of England’s Glorious Revolution. This credible commitment to honor sovereign debt resulted in successful long-term funded borrowing at home and abroad from the 1820s through the 1880s that was unrivalled in Latin America. Some domestic bonds, denominated in the home currency and bearing exchange clauses, eventually circulated in European financial markets. The share of total debt accounted for by long-term funded issues grew, and domestic debt came to dominate foreign debt. Sovereign debt yields fell over time in London and Rio de Janeiro, and the cost of new borrowing declined on average. The market’s assessment of the probability of default tended to decrease. Imperial Brazil enjoyed favorable conditions for borrowing, and escaped the strong form of “original sin” stressed by recent work on sovereign debt. The development of vibrant private financial markets did not, however, follow from the enhanced credibility of government debt. Private finance in Imperial Brazil suffered from politicized market interventions that undermined the development of domestic capital markets. Private interest rates remained high, entry into commercial banking was heavily restricted, and limited-liability joint-stock companies were tightly controlled. The Brazilian case provides a powerful counterexample to the general proposition of North and Weingast that institutional changes that credibly commit the government to honor its obligations necessarily promote the development of private finance. The very institutions that enhanced the credibility of sovereign debt permitted the systematic repression of private financial development. In terms of its consequences for domestic capital markets, the liberal Constitution of 1824 represented an “inglorious” revolution.

Direito de recesso e respectivo valor de reembolso em companhias

Direito de recesso e valor de reembolso em companhias devem ser interpretados conjuntamente. São duas faces da mesma moeda. A aferição do valor de reembolso, conforme previsto no artigo 45 e respectivos parágrafos da Lei 6.404/1976, não é necessariamente feita pelo valor de patrimônio líquido da companhia. Ali se estabelece apenas um piso, no caso de previsão estatutária sobre o tema. No caso de silencia estatutário, há uma lacuna quanto ao critério de aferição do valor de reembolso. A melhor interpretação é uma interpretação sistemática e finalística da norma, no sentido de que o valor das ações a serem reembolsadas deve ser o valor mais próximo do real. Atualmente, na maioria dos casos, o valor econômico é o que melhor representa o real valor de uma companhia e, portanto, em caso de silencia estatutário, deveria prevalecer como critério de aferição do valor de reembolso. Como fundamentos deste raciocínio, utiliza-se do conceito e função do direito de recesso em companhias, suas características, principalmente a taxatividade de suas hipóteses e possibilidade de reversão da decisão motivadora do recesso, seu histórico legislativo, mormente as influências políticas e econômicas na definição de suas hipóteses. O trabalho analisa, também, como seu elemento de sustentação, a jurisprudência e aborda o entendimento da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários. Ainda como forma de justificar e fundamentar o raciocínio desenvolvido no presente trabalho, os conceitos de eficiência e valor justo e sua possível e pacífica convivência são abordados no item que trata de uma visão de Direito e Economia sobre o tema. Por fim, faz-se uma análise de como, na prática, as companhias de capital aberto tem se comportado com relação a esta questão, por meio da análise de todos os estatutos das companhias listadas na "BMF/BOVESPA" na primeira quinzena de janeiro de 2015.

The influence of the tag-along rights in the value of companies: an event study of the effects on the market and service companies

The aim of this work is to check the effect of granting tag-along rights to stockholders by analyzing the behavior of the return of the stock. To do so we carried out event studies for a group of 21 company stocks, divided into service provider companies and others, who granted this right to their stockholders after Law 10,303 was passed in October, 2001. In the test we used two models for estimating abnormal returns: adjusted to the market and adjusted to the risk and market. The results of the tests we carried out based on these models did not capture abnormal returns (surpluses), telling us that the tag-along rights did not affect the pattern of daily returns of the stocks of companies traded on BOVESPA (The Sao Paulo Stock Exchange). We did not expect this result because of the new corporate governance practices adopted by companies in Brazil.

Do insiders get abnormal returns? : event studies on the trades of insiders of the firms with differentiated corporate governance of the São Paulo stock exchange

The subject insider trading is controversial. This paper presents series of event studies carried through on the trades with stocks of the firm carried by insiders with the objective to detect abnormal returns, based on the access to privileged information. The sample is composed by trades performed by insiders of the companies with stocks negotiated in the São Paulo Stock Exchange, that are classified as firms with differentiated corporate governance. Indication that trades performed by insiders resulted in abnormal returns compared to the statistically significant expected ones, as in the purchases of common shares; or for selling of preferred stocks.