Chasing patents

We examine the problem faced by a company that wishes to purchase patents in the hands of two di¤erent patent owners. Complementarity of these patents in the production process of the company is a prime e¢ciency reason for them being owned (or licenced) by the company. We show that this very same complementarity can lead to patent owners behaving strategically in bargaining, and delaying their sale to the company. When the company is highly leveraged, such ine¢cient delay is limited. Comparative statics results are also obtained. Relevant applications include assembly of patents for drug treatments from the human genome, and land assembly.

Unitização de jazidas de petróleo: uma aplicação do modelo de Green e Porter

Neste trabalho abordamos a unitização como uma reinterpretação de cartel, partindo do modelo clássico de Green e Porter. A incerteza geológica é representada por um componente estocástico no custo marginal. Caracterizamos o contrato ótimo e, a partir da estática comparativa, avaliamos a eficiência e a viabilidade da cooperação. O preço e o grau da externalidade afetam positivamente o nível de eficiência do contrato ótimo. Mas enquanto preços elevados viabilizam os acordos, o grau de externalidade elevado pode conduzir a equilíbrios ineficientes ou mesmo inviabilizar a produção. O mesmo resultado ocorre com os custos fixos. Adicionalmente, quanto maior for o número de firmas envolvidas no acordo, menor será a chance de existir um contrato mais eficiente que a regra da captura.

Inferring conduct under the threat of entry : the case of Brazilian cement industry

This paper demonstrates that when an industry faces potential entry and this threat of entry constrains pre-entry prices, cost and conduct are not identified from the comparative statics of equilibrium. In such a setting, the identifying assumption behind the well-established technique of relying on exogenous demand perturbations to empirically distinguish between alternative hypotheses of conduct is shown to fail. The Brazilian cement industry, where the threat of imports restrains market outcomes, provides an empirical illustration. In particular, pricecost margins estimated using this established technique are considerably biased downward, underestimating the degree of market power. A test of conduct is proposed, adapted to this constrained setting, which suggests that outcomes in the industry are collusive and characterised by market division.

Workplace diversity and incentive contracts : theory and evidence

This paper presents a simple theory of the provision of incentives in firms in which the principal optimally chooses both compensation contracts and the composition of the work force. Assuming that individuals display group loyalty, a less diverse (more homogeneous) work force will be more cooperative. Simple comparative statics provide some testable implications relating risk, diversity and incentive pay. I also analyze the case in which workers’ characteristics cannot be readily observed ex ante. The theory then predicts that firms are more likely to prevent workers from interacting with each other when workers are expected to have similar characteristics. This shows a surprising effect of diversity in the workplace: more diverse firms will promote more interactions between workers of different types, i.e. they will be less segregated. I test the main predictions of the model using a cross-sectional sample of corporate boards. I use the proportion of women on boards as a measure of diversity. There are three main empirical findings: (1) a significant negative correlation between firm risk and diversity, (2) a significant positive relationship between performance-based compensation and diversity and (3) a significant positive correlation between the number of board meetings (a measure of interactions among directors) and diversity. The evidence is broadly consistent with the implications of the theory.

Do insurance defrauders want to be punished?

We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can costly audit the truthfulness of this announcement. If the audit confirms a false declaration, the insurer is legally allowed to punish the defrauder. We characterize the efRcient contracts when this punishment is bounded from above by a legal restriction. Then, we do some comparative statics on the efRcient contracts and on the agent's utility. The most important result of this paper concerns the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment. We prove that there exists a uni que value of this legal limit that maximizes the expected utility of a high risk type. Facing this particular value of the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment, the insurer will effectively audit a low risk reporto We also show that this particular value increases with the probability of facing a high risk policyholder. Therefore, when this probability is sufRciently high, the nullity of the contract is not enough. From the point of view of a potential defrauder, the law should allow harder sanctions. This is an striking result because the nullity of the contract is a common sanction for this kind of fraud in the USA and in some European countries.

Bias from ignoring price dispersion in demand estimation

Consumers often pay different prices for the same product bought in the same store at the same time. However, the demand estimation literature has ignored that fact using, instead, aggregate measures such as the “list” or average price. In this paper we show that this will lead to biased price coefficients. Furthermore, we perform simple comparative statics simulation exercises for the logit and random coefficient models. In the “list” price case we find that the bias is larger when discounts are higher, proportion of consumers facing discount prices is higher and when consumers are more unwilling to buy the product so that they almost only do it when facing discount. In the average price case we find that the bias is larger when discounts are higher, proportion of consumers that have access to discount are similar to the ones that do not have access and when consumers willingness to buy is very dependent on idiosyncratic shocks. Also bias is less problematic in the average price case in markets with a lot of bargain deals, so that prices are as good as individual. We conclude by proposing ways that the econometrician can reduce this bias using different information that he may have available.