Beyond indifferent players: on the existence of prisoners dilemmas in games with amicable and adversarial preferences

Why don’t agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PD’s are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or enmity may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results.

On the impossibility of prisoner's dilemmas in adversarial preference games

Why don't agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisonerís dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PDís are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or jealousy may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results ñ including the possibility of conflict inducing growth.

The BoP approach and its links to main related research fields: sense-making of the current discussion

A Base-da-Pirâmide (Base ofthePyramid- BoP) é referida na literatura como sendo o segmento sócio-econômico mais baixo em termos de paridade do poder de compra. Esse segmento encontrase geralmente excluído do sistema capitalista global. Esta tese analisa o tema BoP e discute dentro de um contexto sócio-econômico, como essa abordagem se relaciona com outras áreas de pesquisa, assim como a teoria do desenvolvimento internacional e a teoria de negócios internacionais. Estas duas teorias são identificadas como tendo uma relação mais forte com BoP. No que se segue, a abordagem BoP é incorporada nessas duas teorias com o objetivo de tornar este conceito mais claro e abrangente. Seguindo este raciocínio a abordagem BoP vem identificar contribuições no tocante a cada uma dessas abordagens teóricas. O argumento principal da tese é que a abordagem BoP é capaz de ligar essas duas teorias (teoria do desenvolvimento internacional e a teoria de negócios internacionais) em um só modelo teórico, mostrando assim que essas duas abordagens teóricas distintas podem na realidade serem complementares.