Um estudo sobre a relação varejo - fornecedor com metodologia de Soft systems

O objetivo neste estudo foi propor um programa de mudança na relação empresa-fornecedores num momento em que técnicas sobre o tema são discutidas na vivência de um relacionamento ainda nada colaborativo. Para tanto se utilizou a metodologia do tipo Soft Systems adequada à natureza social do objeto de estudo: as relações entre empresa varejista e seus fornecedores. Esta metodologia permite o levantamento de dados em campo, a caracterização do modelo de relacionamento vigente na empresa, a comparação deste modelo com o modelo idealizado e a elaboração de um programa de intervenção para readequação do modelo vigente.

The inequality curse: constraints and political discretion

We live in an unjust world characterized by economic inequality. No liberal theory of justice is able to justify it. Inequality is not “solved” with equality of opportunity or meritocracy. Nor by the socialist and republican critique. The poor will have to count with them and with democracy to make social progress reality. In their political struggle, they will face one economic constraint: the expected profit rate must remain attractive to business investors. Yet, giving that technological progress in increasingly capital-saving, this economic constraint does not obstruct that wages grow above the productivity rate and inequality is reduced. What really is an obstacle to social justice in the rich countries is, on one hand, the power that capitalist rentiers retain and financists acquired, and, on the other, the competition originated in low wage countries.

Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties

In infinite horizon financial markets economies, competitive equilibria fail to exist if one does not impose restrictions on agents' trades that rule out Ponzi schemes. When there is limited commitment and collateral repossession is the unique default punishment, Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) proved that Ponzi schemes are ruled out without imposing any exogenous/endogenous debt constraints on agents' trades. Recently Páscoa and Seghir (2009) have shown that this positive result is not robust to the presence of additional default punishments. They provide several examples showing that, in the absence of debt constraints, harsh default penalties may induce agents to run Ponzi schemes that jeopardize equilibrium existence. The objective of this paper is to close a theoretical gap in the literature by identifying endogenous borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure existence of equilibria in a model with limited commitment and (possible) default. We appropriately modify the definition of finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002)), to encompass models with limited commitment, default penalties and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. We show that, independently of the level of default penalties, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the existence of an equilibrium that is compatible with the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model. An interesting feature of our debt constraints is that they give rise to budget sets that coincide with the standard budget sets of economies having a collateral structure but no penalties (as defined in Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002)). This illustrates the hidden relation between finitely effective debt constraints and collateral requirements.

When a local competitor (slightly) shakes up the global giant: a case on the soft drink market

As marcas globais mantiveram muita atenção no campo do marketing (Kotler, 1997; Holt, Quelch, e Taylor, 2004; Özsomer e Altaras, 2008), enquanto as marcas locais foram subestimadas (Ger, 1999; Schuiling e Kapferer, 2004). No entanto, o debate adaptação contra padronização foi amplamente discutido. Centra-se na definição de como uma empresa internacional deve construir a sua estratégia: ao padronizar sua estratégia de marketing ou, adaptando para melhor atender a cultura e às necessidades locais (Levitt, 1983; Subhash, 1989; Herbig, 1998; Holt, 2004; Melewar e Vemmervik , 2004; Heerden e Barter, 2008). No entanto, este assunto não foi discutido no contexto específico do consumo alternativo oferecido por concorrentes locais específicos. Hoje em dia, um aumento na oferta de produtos alternativos é observado. O consumo socialmente responsável está crescendo (Sen e Bhattacharya, 2001; Holt, 2002; Loureiro, 2002; François-Lecompte e Valette-Florence, 2006). O mercado dos refrigerantes de cola é de interesse particular. Colas alternativas são refrigerantes de cola que surgiram durante a última década em algumas regiões ou zonas específicas do mundo. Estas colas claramente posicionam-se como uma alternativa ao refrigerante global Coca-Cola. A alternativa não é baseada no preço mas nas características especiais dos produtos que constituem uma proposição de valor específica, diferente da Coca-Cola. Na França, desde uma década, o número de colas regionais aumentou, sendo mais de quinze hoje. O refregirante Breizh Cola foi lançado em 2002 e atinge quase uma quota de mercado de 10% na região Bretanha hoje. Em 2009, a Coca-Cola Entreprise iniciou uma campanha de marketing específica, na Bretanha, baseada em recursos visuais e parcerias regionais. Este caso de adaptação em um contexto de concorrência local específico é explorado nesta dissertação que incide sobre as razões da preferência para Breizh Cola, de um lado, e sobre as acções empreendidas pela Coca-Cola na Bretanha, do outro lado. Este estudo mostra que a Coca-Cola anda nos passos de Breizh Cola, a fim de melhor atender às expectativas local.

Rumo a um desenho técnico de um sistema de apoio à decisão para uma reconfiguração do soft systems methodology: o caso do planejamento sistêmico

A multidisciplinaridade da tomada de decisão sofre com as peculiaridades de qualquer campo multidisciplinar. A falta de comunicação, muitas vezes, gera problemas e as respostas que podem ser encontradas dentro de outras áreas. Os Métodos de Estruturação de Problemas são respostas para os questionamentos atuais nas escolas de administração e negócios, principalmente o uso multimetodológico destes com outros métodos. Tendo o Soft Systems Metholodogy – SSM – como base, e a incorporação do Strategic Options Development and Analysis – SODA – ao processo do SSM, Georgiou (2012) apresenta o Planejamento Sistêmico em sua configuração mais recente. Visando buscar uma ferramenta computacional que atenda os pressupostos do SSM, e que incorpore as especificações da configuração do Planejamento Sistêmico, definem-se uma notação para o método e uma formalização das para as comunicações existentes entre os elementos, subsistemas, sistema e ambiente e, com isso, torna-se possível controlar o uso do método de forma iterativa. Para demonstrar tal uso, apresenta-se uma análise de um caso real e demonstra as dificuldades encontradas na utilização da Notação e Comunicação definida. Posteriormente, apresenta-se um desenho técnico de uma ferramenta computacional modular e que pode ser usada de forma integrada com outras ferramentas de outros métodos. Como resultado, têm-se o avanço na definição de padrões no uso das ferramentas do SSM, na apresentação dos aspectos sistêmicos do Planejamento Sistêmico, na apresentação de um uso iterativo do método e na apresentação de um desenho técnico para uma ferramenta computacional.

Credit borrowing constraints in a DSGE framework: income vs. housing

Credit market in Brazil distinguishes from advanced economies in many aspects. One of them is related to collaterals for households borrowing. This work proposes a DSGE framework, based on Gerali et al.(2010), to analyse one pecularity of Brazillian credit market: payroll-deducted personal loans. To original model, we added the possibility to households contract long term debt and compare to differents types of credit constrains: one based on housing and other based on future income. We callibrate and estimate the model to Brazil, using Bayesian technique. Results show that, in a economy where credit constraints are based on income, responses to shocks appear to be stronger, at first, but dissipate faster. This occurs because income responds quickly to shock than housing prices, so does amount available to loans. In order to smooth consumption, agents compensate lower income and borrowing by increasing working hours, restoring loans and debt in a shorter time.

Financial constraints and house prices: an international perspective

In this paper, we show substantial empirical evidence that house prices are more sensitive to shocks to percapita income, in countries where housing finance is more developed. This result is consistent with the theoretical framework developed in the paper, where we study the impact ofprogressive relaxation of financiai constraints on housing demand and equilibrium house prices. Our results are consistent with recent literature on financiai constraints and business investment, which argues that the investment of less constrained firms can be more sensitive to changes in cash flow. More broadly, our results challenge the traditional view that financiai development leads to smaller fluctuations in key economic variables. The policy implications are c1ear and important. Even iffinancial development is desirable for other reasons, the potential associated increase in volatility should be an explicit policy concern.

Construction of facilities under asymmetric information: do constitutional constraints matter?

This paper studies construction of facilities in a federal state under asymmetric information. A country consists of two regions, each ruled by a local authority. The federal government plans to construct a facility in one of the regions. The facility generates a local value in the host region and has spillover effects in the other region. The federal government does not observe the local value because it is the local authority's private information. 80 the federal governrnent designs an incentive-compatible mechanism, specifying if the facility should be constructed and a balanced scheme of interregional transfers to finance its cost. The federal governrnent is constitutionally constrained to respect a given leveI of each region's welfare. We show that depending upon the facility's local value and the spillover effect, the governrnent faces different incentive problems. Moreover, their existence depends crucially on how stringent constitutional constraints are. Therefore, the optimal mechanism will also depend upon these three features of the model.

Does liquidity constraints matter for Ricardian equivalence?

The paper analysis a general equilibrium model with two periods, several households and a government that has to finance some expenditures in the first period. Households may have some private information either about their type (adverse selection) or about some action levei chosen in the first period that affects the probability of certain states of nature in the second period (moral hazard). Trade of financiai assets are intermediated by a finite collection of banks. Banks objective functions are determined in equilibrium by shareholders. Due to private information it may be optimal for the banks to introduce constraints in the set of available portfolios for each household as wellas household specific asset prices. In particular, households may face distinct interest rates for holding the risk-free asset. The government finances its expenditures either by taxing households in the first period or by issuing bonds in the first period and taxing households in the second period. Taxes may be state-dependent. Suppose government policies are neutml: i) government policies do not affect the distribution of wealth across households; and ii) if the government decides to tax a household in the second period there is a portfolio available for the banks that generates the Mme payoff in each state of nature as the household taxes. Tben, Ricardian equivalence holds if and only if an appropriate boundary condition is satisfied. Moreover, at every free-entry equilibrium the boundary condition is satisfied and thus Ricardian equivalence holds. These results do not require any particular assumption on the banks' objective function. In particular, we do not assume banks to be risk neutral.

Do borrowing constraints decrease intergenerational mobility? evidence from Brazil

In this paper, we find evidence that suggests that borrowing constraints may be an important determinant of intergenerational mobility in Brazil. This result contrasts sharply with studies for developed countries, such as Canada and the US, where credit constraints do not seem to play an important role in generating persistence of inequality. Moreover, we find that the social mobility is lower in Brazil in comparison with developed countries. We follow the methodology proposed by Grawe (2001), which uses quantile regression, and obtain two results. First, the degree of intergenerational persistence is greater for the upper quantiles. Second, the degree of intergenerational persistence declines with income at least for the upper quantiles. Both findings are compatible with the presence of borrowing constraints affecting the degree of intergenerational persistence, as predicted by the theory.

Equilibria in exchange economies with financial constraints : beyond the Cass trick

We consider an exchange economy under incomplete financiaI markets with purely financiaI securities and finitely many agents. When portfolios are not constrained, Cass [4], Duffie [7] and Florenzano-Gourdel [12] proved that arbitrage-free security prices fully characterize equilibrium security prices. This result is based on a trick initiated by Cass [4] in which one unconstrained agent behaves as if he were in complete markets. This approach is unsatisfactory since it is asymmetric and no more valid when every agent is subject to frictions. We propose a new and symmetric approach to prove that arbitrage-free security prices still fully characterize equilibrium security prices in the more realistic situation where the financiaI market is constrained by convex restrictions, provided that financiaI markets are collectively frictionless.

Endogenous borrowing constraints and default when markets are incomplete

Incomplete markets and non-default borrowing constraints increase the volatility of pricing kernels and are helpful when addressing assetpricing puzzles. However, ruling out default when markets are in complete is suboptimal. This paper endogenizes borrowing constraints as an intertemporal incentive structure to default. It modeIs an infinitehorizon economy, where agents are allowed not to pay their liabilities and face borrowing constraints that depend on the individual history of default. Those constraints trade off the economy's risk-sharing possibilities and incentives to prevent default. The equilibrium presents stationary properties, such as an invariant distribution for the assets' solvency rate.