Applying negotiation skills in the design of public policies: analysis of the city of São Paulo’s invoice program

The author argues that by applying problem-solving negotiation skills in the design of public policies, public administrators benefit from more effective and wide-ranging outcomes in the realization of their goals. In order to demonstrate this idea, the author analyzes how negotiation skills – such as identifying key actors and their interests, recognizing hardbargaining tactics and changing the players, knowing your best alternative, creating value and building trust – permeated and contributed to the success of the City of São Paulo’s Invoice Program (“Programa Nota Fiscal Paulistana”), a public policy aimed at combating tax evasion of service tax in the City of São Paulo.

The influence of materialism on consumption indebtedness in the context of low income consumers from the city of São Paulo

This research is in the domains of materialism, consumer vulnerability and consumption indebtedness, concepts frequently approached in the literature on consumer behavior, macro-marketing and economic psychology. The influence of materialism on consumer indebtedness is investigated within a context that is characterized by poverty and by factors that cause vulnerability, such as high interest rates, limited access to credit and to quality affordable goods. The objectives of this research are: to produce a materialism scale that is well adapted to its environment, characterizing materialism adequately for the population studied; to compare results obtained with results of other studies; and to measure the relationship between materialism, socio-demographic variables, attitude to debt and consumption indebtedness. The primary data used in the analyses were collected from field research carried out in August, 2005 that relied on a probabilistic household sample of 450 low income individuals who live in poor regions of the city of Sao Paulo. The materialism scale, adapted and translated into Portuguese from Richins (2004), proved to be very successful and encourages new work in the area. It was noted that younger adults tend to be more materialistic than older ones; that illiterate adults tend to be less materialistic than those who did literacy courses when they were already adults; and that gender, income and race are not associated with the materialism construct. Among the other results, a logistic regression model was developed in order to distinguish those individuals who have an installment plan payment booklet from those who do not, based on materialism, socio-demographic variables and purchasing and consumer habits. The proposed model confirms materialism as a behavioral variable useful for forecasting the probability of an individual getting into debt in order to consume, in some cases almost doubling the chance of occurrence of this event. Findings confirm the thesis that it is not only adverse economic factors that lead people to get into debt; and that the study of demand for credit for consumption purposes must, of necessity, include variables of a psychological nature. It is suggested that the low income materialistic consumer experiences feelings of powerlessness and exclusion because of the gap that exists between their possessions and their desires. Lines of conduct to combat this marginalization from the consumer society are drawn targeting marketing professionals, public policy makers and vulnerability researchers. Finally, the possibility of new studies involving the materialism construct, which is central to literature on consumer behavior, albeit little used in empirical studies in Brazil, are discussed.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.