As políticas públicas de urbanização e regularização fundiária no processo de inclusão social: o PROAP Rio de Janeiro

This work objectives to investigate how the public policies of urbanization and land regularization of the Program of Urbanization of Informal Settlements - PROAP, in Rio de Janeiro allow the social inclusion and the rescue of the citizenship of the poor populations. To reach this objective the two programs of PROAP were analyzed into two communities both beneficed by each one of these programs. First, the social exclusion and how it reflects itself in the form of appropriation of the territory and in the type of housing was deeply analyzed. It leads the analysis of the public policies. As a next step, a brief historical analysis was made to include the PROAP in the historical context, and this was analyzed in each one of its stages. Finally, through a qualitative approaching, the slum of Vigário Geral and the irregular settlement of Ana Gonzaga have been researched, both were chose by their singular characteristics and, according to speech of the inhabitants, it was evaluated how the Program contributes in the social inclusion in these communities.

Cartel deterrence and settlements: the Brazilian experience

Settlements are an important part of a program of cartel deterrence, particularly when the likelihood of conviction and the litigation costs are higher. This type of negotiated procedure to reach finality is in essence complementary to the fully adversarial procedures associated to the trial by the administrative or judicial courts, and to other investigative instruments, such as the leniency agreement. The Brazilian experience provides some insights about the different models of direct settlement in cartel cases and the complex interaction among settlements, leniency agreements, and trial outcome. First, there is leeway for the complementary models of settlements, the first oriented mainly to increasing the likelihood of detection, and the second oriented to saving social costs of litigation. Second, the concern with the preservation of the demand for leniency agreements led the competition authority to restrict the use of settlements, which are effectively designed for the defendants that are likely guilty and give higher value to finality. The recent experience illustrates that the current settlement policy has not caused any adverse effect on leniency agreements, while reducing litigation costs and granting finality in some cases.