Adaptation of the international investment contract: the hardship clause

Este trabalho acadêmico explora, em linhas gerais, a questão da adaptação do contrato de investimento internacional, e o tema ‘cláusula de hardship’ em específico. Objetiva-se efetuar uma análise detalhada da cláusula de hardship, como meio de adaptação e flexibilização de contratos internacionais de investimento sob a ótica da prática jurídica e mercantil contemporânea. A discussão se centra no contraste entre a possibilidade de adaptação do contrato por circunstâncias imprevisíveis e o imperativo de previsibilidade no investimento. Nesse sentido, o estudo busca oferecer soluções práticas para o dilema existente entre a necessidade de segurança na relação econômica (cumprimento do contato) e a prevenção da possibilidade de ruína financeira para quaisquer das partes no caso de uma mudança brusca no contexto dos negócios. O trabalho está centrado em uma investigação teórica acerca dos temas de readaptação contratual; diferenças entre sistemas jurídicos de estados-nações, e suas consequências no comércio internacional; e a cláusula de hardship em si. Como forma de contribuir para uma compreensão prática na questão da adaptação do contrato de investimento internacional devido a fatores imprevistos, este trabalho analisa casos reais e tendências atuais observadas na arbitragem internacional.

Testing the optimality of aggregate consumption decisions: is there rule-of-thumb behavior?

Consumption is an important macroeconomic aggregate, being about 70% of GNP. Finding sub-optimal behavior in consumption decisions casts a serious doubt on whether optimizing behavior is applicable on an economy-wide scale, which, in turn, challenge whether it is applicable at all. This paper has several contributions to the literature on consumption optimality. First, we provide a new result on the basic rule-of-thumb regression, showing that it is observational equivalent to the one obtained in a well known optimizing real-business-cycle model. Second, for rule-of-thumb tests based on the Asset-Pricing Equation, we show that the omission of the higher-order term in the log-linear approximation yields inconsistent estimates when lagged observables are used as instruments. However, these are exactly the instruments that have been traditionally used in this literature. Third, we show that nonlinear estimation of a system of N Asset-Pricing Equations can be done efficiently even if the number of asset returns (N) is high vis-a-vis the number of time-series observations (T). We argue that efficiency can be restored by aggregating returns into a single measure that fully captures intertemporal substitution. Indeed, we show that there is no reason why return aggregation cannot be performed in the nonlinear setting of the Pricing Equation, since the latter is a linear function of individual returns. This forms the basis of a new test of rule-of-thumb behavior, which can be viewed as testing for the importance of rule-of-thumb consumers when the optimizing agent holds an equally-weighted portfolio or a weighted portfolio of traded assets. Using our setup, we find no signs of either rule-of-thumb behavior for U.S. consumers or of habit-formation in consumption decisions in econometric tests. Indeed, we show that the simple representative agent model with a CRRA utility is able to explain the time series data on consumption and aggregate returns. There, the intertemporal discount factor is significant and ranges from 0.956 to 0.969 while the relative risk-aversion coefficient is precisely estimated ranging from 0.829 to 1.126. There is no evidence of rejection in over-identifying-restriction tests.

Estimating and forecasting the volatility of Brazilian finance series using arch models (Preliminary Version)

The goal of this paper is to present a comprehensive emprical analysis of the return and conditional variance of four Brazilian …nancial series using models of the ARCH class. Selected models are then compared regarding forecasting accuracy and goodness-of-…t statistics. To help understanding the empirical results, a self-contained theoretical discussion of ARCH models is also presented in such a way that it is useful for the applied researcher. Empirical results show that although all series share ARCH and are leptokurtic relative to the Normal, the return on the US$ has clearly regime switching and no asymmetry for the variance, the return on COCOA has no asymmetry, while the returns on the CBOND and TELEBRAS have clear signs of asymmetry favoring the leverage e¤ect. Regarding forecasting, the best model overall was the EGARCH(1; 1) in its Gaussian version. Regarding goodness-of-…t statistics, the SWARCH model did well, followed closely by the Student-t GARCH(1; 1)

Brazil and Turkey, a comparative analysis of both countries' economic development and institutional design from the Great Depression to the early 21st century

Apos uma década de rápido crescimento econômico na primeira década do século 21, Brasil e Turquia foram considerados duas das economias emergentes mais dinâmicas e promissoras. No entanto, vários sinais de dificuldades econômicas e tensões políticas reapareceram recentemente e simultaneamente nos dois países. Acreditamos que esses sinais e a sua simultaneidade podem ser entendidos melhor com um olhar retrospectivo sobre a história econômica dos dois países, que revela ser surpreendentemente paralela. Numa primeira parte, empreendemos uma comparação abrangente da história econômica brasileira e turca para mostrar as numerosas similaridades entre os desafios de política econômica que os dois países enfrentaram, assim como entre as respostas que eles lhes deram desde a virada da Grande Depressão até a primeira década do século 21. Essas escolhas de política econômica comuns dão forma a uma trajetória de desenvolvimento notavelmente análoga, caracterizada primeiro pela adoção do modelo de industrialização por substituição das importações (ISI) no contexto da recessão mundial dos anos 1930; depois pela intensificação e crise final desse modelo nos anos 1980; e finalmente por duas décadas de estabilização e transição para um modelo econômico mais liberal. Numa segunda parte, o desenvolvimento das instituições econômicas e políticas, assim como da economia política subjacente nos dois países, são analisados comparativamente a fim de prover alguns elementos de explicação do paralelo observado na primeira parte. Sustentamos que o marco institucional estabelecido nos dois países durante esse período também têm varias características fundamentais em comum e contribui a explicar as escolhas de política econômica e as performances econômicas comparáveis, detalhadas na primeira parte. Este estudo aborda elementos do contexto histórico úteis para compreender a situação econômica e política atual nos dois países. Potencialmente também constitui uma tentativa de considerar as economias emergentes numa perspectiva histórica e comparativa mais ampla para entender melhor as suas fraquezas institucionais e adotar um olhar mais equilibrado sobre seu potencial econômico.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.