On the cost of sympathy : a alternative model of insurance markets

The paper provides an alternative model for insurance market with three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. The paper assumes that providers care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (sympathy assumption). This assumption is satisfied if, for example, they care about their reputation or if there are possible litigation costs in case they do not use the appropriate procedure. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows that the sympathy assumption 1eads to a 10ss of welfare for the households due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment.

Pricing the cost of an election: the impact of the 2014 elections on stock markets

Qual o efeito de eleições em ativos reais? É possível mensurar diretamente a diferença de preços mesmo que só possamos enxergar um dos resultados potenciais? Essa dissertação estima esses efeitos utilizando metodologia baseada em opções sobre ações. O modelo aqui desenvolvido adaptção tradicional Black-Scholes para incorporar dois novos parâmetros: um salto no preço do ativo perfeitamente antecipado e uma série de probabilidades diárias refletindo as crenças sobre quem venceria a corrida eleitoral. Aplicamos esse método para o caso brasileiro das Eleições Presidenciais de 2014 e a Petrobras - uma importante companhia do setor petrolífero do país -utilizando dados de bolsa do segundo turno das eleições. Os resultados encontrados mostram uma diferença de 65-77% para o valor da companhia, dependendo de quem vencesse nas urnas. Isso é equivalente a aproximadamente 2.5% do PIB de 2014 do país.

From public to private : the performance of former public workers in the Brazilian labor market

This paper analyzes the placement in the private sector of a subset of Brazilian public-sector employees. This group left public employment in the mid-1990’s through a voluntary severance program. This paper contrasts their earnings before and after quitting the public sector, and compares both sets of wages to public and private sector earnings for similar workers. We find that participants in this voluntary severance program suffered a significant reduction in average earnings wage and an increase in earnings dispersion. We test whether the reduction in average earnings and the increase in earnings dispersion is the expected outcome once one controls for observed characteristics, by means of counterfactual simulations. Several methods of controlling for observed characteristics (parametric and non-parametrically) are used for robustness. The results indicate that this group of workers was paid at levels below what would be expected given their embodied observable characteristics.

Bank relationships: effect on the availability and marginal cost of credit for firms in Argentina

The paper provides evidence on what affects at the margin the cost and availability of bank credit for firms in Argentina. We study in particular how banks use different pieces of private and public information to screen firms and overcome informational asymmetries in the credit market. Some private information is transferable, like balance sheet data. Private information generated in relationships is not. To capture the closeness of bank relationships, we resort to the concentration of bank credit and the number of credit lines in a bank. We also consider public information available in the Central de Deudores. The cost of credit is measured using overdrafts, the most expensive line of credit, at the bank that charges the highest rate for overdrafts. We find that the cost of credit is smaller for a firm with a close relationship to the marginal bank. Firms with large assets, a high sales/assets ratio, and a low debt/assets ratio pay a lower interest rate at the margin. A good credit history (no debt arrears and no bounced checks) and collateral also reduce the marginal interest rate. The availability of credit is measured by unused credit lines as a proportion of total liabilities with the main bank. The availability of credit depends positively on a close relationship with the main bank. Large assets, a high return over assets, a high sales/assets ratio, a low debt/assets ratio, a good credit history, and collateral lead to higher credit availability. Our measure of unused credit lines is less ambiguous than traditional measures like leverage, which may indicate financial distress rather than availability of credit.

How does corruption hurt growth? Evidences about the effects of corruption on factors productivity and per capita income

Corruption is a phenomenon that plagues many countries and, mostly, walks hand in hand with inefficient institutional structures, which reduce the effectiveness of public and private investment. In countries with widespread corruption, for each monetary unit invested, a sizable share is wasted, implying less investment. Corruption can also be a burden on a nation’s wealth and economic growth, by driving away new investment and creating uncertainties regarding private and social rights. Thus, corruption can affect not only factors productivity, but also their accumulation, with detrimental consequences on a society’s social development. This article aims to analyze and measure the influence of corruption on a country’s wealth. It is implicitly admitted that the degree of institutional development has an adverse effect on the productivity of production factors, which implies in reduced per capita income. It is assumed that the level of wealth and economic growth depends on domestic savings, foster technological progress and a proper educational system. Corruption, within this framework, is not unlike an additional cost, which stifles the “effectiveness” of the investment. This article first discusses the key theories evaluating corruption’s economic consequences. Later, it analyzes the relation between institutional development, factor productivity and per capita income, based on the neoclassical approach to economic growth. Finally, it brings some empirical evidence regarding the effects of corruption on factor productivity, in a sample of 81 countries studied in 1998. The chief conclusion is that corruption negatively affects the wealth of a nation by reducing capital productivity, or its effectiveness.

Public debt and the limits of fiscal policy to increase economic growth

Research that seeks to estimate the effects of fiscal policies on economic growth has ignored the role of public debt in this relationship. This study proposes a theoretical model of endogenous growth, which demonstrates that the level of the public debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio should negatively impact the effect of fiscal policy on growth. This occurs because government indebtedness extracts part of the savings of the young to pay interest on the debts of the older generation, who are no longer saving. Therefore, the payment of debt interest assumes an allocation exchange role between generations that is similar to a pay-as-you-go pension system, which results in changes in the savings rate of the economy. The major conclusions of the theoretical model were tested using an econometric model to provide evidence for the validity of this conclusion. Our empirical analysis controls for timeinvariant, country-specific heterogeneity in the growth rates. We also address endogeneity issues and allow for heterogeneity across countries in the model parameters and for cross-sectional dependence.

On endogenous cost of altruism

The paper extends the cost of altruism model, analyzed in Lisboa (1999). There are three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, have to choose a non-observable leveI of effort, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides suflicient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows the optimal contract induces providers to care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature, which in Lisboa (1999) was stated as altruism assumption. Equilibrium is inefficient in comparison with the standard moral hazard outcome whenever high leveIs of effort is chosen precisely due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment for some signals. We show, however that an equilibrium is always constrained optimal.

The costs of education, longevity and the poverty of nations

This paper explores the distortions on the cost of education, associated with government policies and institutional factors, as an additional determinant of cross-country income differences. Agents are finitely lived and the model takes into account life-cycle features of human capital accumulation. There are two sectors, one producing goods and the other providing educational services. The model is calibrated and simulated for 89 economies. We find that human capital taxation has a relevant impact on incomes, which is amplified by its indirect effect on returns to physical capital. Life expectancy plays an important role in determining long-run output: the expansion of the population working life increases the present value of the flow of wages, which induces further human capital investment and raises incomes. Although in our simulations the largest gains are observed when productivity is equated across countries, changes in longevity and in the incentives to educational investment are too relevant to ignore.

The role of consumer's risk aversion on price rigidity

This paper aims at contributing to the research agenda on the sources of price stickiness, showing that the adoption of nominal price rigidity may be an optimal firms' reaction to the consumers' behavior, even if firms have no adjustment costs. With regular broadly accepted assumptions on economic agents behavior, we show that firms' competition can lead to the adoption of sticky prices as an (sub-game perfect) equilibrium strategy. We introduce the concept of a consumption centers model economy in which there are several complete markets. Moreover, we weaken some traditional assumptions used in standard monetary policy models, by assuming that households have imperfect information about the ineflicient time-varying cost shocks faced by the firms, e.g. the ones regarding to inefficient equilibrium output leveIs under fiexible prices. Moreover, the timing of events are assumed in such a way that, at every period, consumers have access to the actual prices prevailing in the market only after choosing a particular consumption center. Since such choices under uncertainty may decrease the expected utilities of risk averse consumers, competitive firms adopt some degree of price stickiness in order to minimize the price uncertainty and fi attract more customers fi.'

The determinantss of foreign direct investment distribution among the Brazilian states

O Investimento Estrangeiro Direto (IED) tem desempenhado um papel importante no esforço do Brasil para tornar-se uma economia orientada para o mercado. De 1995 a 2012 o Brasil recebeu $ 511.5 bilhões de dólares em IED. Em 2012, o Brasil foi o segundo país em desenvolvimento que mais recebeu IED e o quarto no mundo (UNCTAD).Devido à concentração geográfica, os estados brasileiros que são consideravelmente menos desenvolvidos e mais pobres, são aqueles que mais precisam de investimentos e que no entanto, não têm sido receptores relevantes de IED. Em 2010, os estados com os maiores estoques de IED foram São Paulo, com 42,3 por cento do total ($ 99,9 bilhões de dólares), Rio de Janeiro com 13,3 por cento ($ 31,4 bilhões de dólares) e Minas Gerais com 10,6 por cento do total ($ 25,1 bilhões de dólares). Como pode ser observado, apenas três dos vinte e sete estados brasileiros receberam cerca de 66 por cento do total de IED destinado ao Brasil.Dada tal diferenciação na distribuição de IED entre os estados brasileiros, o presente estudo busca explicar se o benefício tributário também é determinante para o fluxo de IED, além das demais variáveis já consideradas como determinantes em outros estudos. Dada a limitação de dados, realizamos duas análises econométricas com dados em painel: 1. Usando seis variáveis chaves: tamanho do mercado consumidor, a qualidade da mão de obra, infraestrutura, custo da mão de obra, carga tributária e benefício tributário (por macro regiões), nos anos de 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010; 2. Usando cinco variáveis: as mesmas do primeiro modelo, excluindo o custo da mão de obra (por falta de dados) e utilizando os dados de benefício tributário por estado, nos anos de 2010, 2011 e 2012.

After the demise of neoliberalism but not of conservatism, a third developmentalism?

Neoliberalism and developmentalism are the two alternative forms of economic and political organization of capitalism. Since the 2008 global financial crisis we see the demise of neoliberalism in rich countries, as state intervention and regulation increased, opening room for a third historical developmentalism (the first was mercantilism, the second, Fordism). Not only because of major market failures, not only because the market is definitely unable to assure financial stability and full employment, an active macroeconomic policy is being required. Modern economies are divided into a competitive and a non-competitive sector; for the coordination of the competitive sector the market is irreplaceable and regulation as well as strategic industrial policy will be pragmatically adopted following the subsidiarity principle, whereas for the non-competitive sector, state coordination and some state ownership are usually more efficient. Besides, the fact that capitalist economies are increasingly diversified and complex is an argument against the two extremes – against statism as well as neoliberalism – in so far that they require market coordination combined with increased regulation. But the third developmentalism probably will not be progressive as was the second, because the social-democratic political parties are disoriented. They won the battle for the welfare state, which neoliberalism was unable to dismantle, but the competition of low wage developing countries and immigration continue to offer arguments to conservative political parties that defend the reduction of the cost of labor contracts or the or precarization of labor.