Hybrid political institutions and governability: the budgetary process in Brazil

In this paper we take a close look at some of the particular pathways by which majoritarian and consensual institutions affect governability. We demonstrate that the mix of majoritarian and consensual institutions found within a country can influence these pathways quite dramatically, such that they produce rather different consequences for governability, even when these pathways are relatively similar in nature. Particularly, we focus on the rules governing the relationship between the President and the Legislature, especially the appropriation of amendments proposed by legislators. In some presidential countries, the president possesses a partial veto (or a line-item veto) which allows him/her to approve or strike appropriations, which legislators introduce in amendments. Concentrating on the case of Brazil, we argue and demonstrate that whether or not the president can use this tool to sustain governing majorities (i.e., to increase governability) depends on the kind of amendment introduced by legislators. One kind, individual amendment, is linked to the majoritarian institution of a powerful presidency and therefore helps to increase governability. A second kind, collective amendment, is linked to consensual institutions and actually does not enhance legislative support for the Executive.

Bancos públicos e desenvolvimento : análise de decisões judiciais e intervenção do Estado na economia

Esta dissertação tem o objetivo de estudar, entre diferentes modelos de organização econômica, aspectos da feição do arranjo financeiro brasileiro, com ênfase sobre os bancos públicos agentes de mercado no Brasil. A pesquisa está divida em uma etapa eminentemente jurídica, de sistematização e análise de normas e decisões judiciais; e uma leitura de economia política do contexto em que essas variáveis jurídicas estão inseridas. As normas pesquisadas analisam a constituição e o funcionamento do arranjo financeiro brasileiro, identificando elementos que constituem um maior protagonismo dos bancos oficiais no Sistema Financeiro Nacional, como, por exemplo, as funções de política econômica e mecanismos de poupança e depósito compulsórios. Entre outras normas, merecem destaque a Lei 4.595/64 e a Constituição Federal de 1988. A pesquisa de decisões judiciais, por sua vez, estuda o contexto e os principais argumentos de ações que envolveram um aspecto sensível na coexistência de bancos públicos e privados: a possibilidade de bancos oficiais depositarem e gerirem recursos em caráter de exclusividade. A leitura de economia política feita no segundo capítulo consiste em ampliar a lente de análise sobre o arranjo financeiro baseado em bancos públicos. Para tanto, serão analisados alguns modelos de organização econômica, divididos pela literatura de variedades de capitalismo em economias de mercado liberais e coordenadas. Ao interpretar esses modelos para o contexto econômico brasileiro, nota-se que o Brasil se valeu de mecanismos de coordenação distintos dos demais apresentados na literatura: uma coordenação pública da economia de mercado, enquanto alternativa para superar gargalos específicos do desenvolvimento econômico nacional. O Brasil, portanto, valendo-se de mecanismos de coordenação próprios, desenha o seu arranjo financeiro a partir de uma singularidade institucional: a possibilidade dos bancos oficiais poderem operar, exclusivamente, determinados recursos mesmo em uma economia de mercado; conta com mecanismos de coordenação eminentemente públicos, mas, ao mesmo tempo, deixando claro que existem mecanismos de mercado e concorrenciais estabelecidos e que devem ser observados. Essa dicotomia, entre bancos oficiais e privados, com um maior protagonismo dos bancos públicos em uma economia de mercado é que constitui, principalmente, essa singularidade institucional.

An empirical approach toward understanding the linkage between legal and financial institutions

Researchers have made different attempts to investigate the interaction between the quality and efficiency of a country’s institutions and a country’s economic performance. Within this framework, emphasis has been put on the relationship between the legal institutions and the financial system as essential factors in creating and enhancing overall economic growth. The link between legal institutions and the financial systems, however, is still somewhat controversial. This paper reports on a survey administered to 1,362 participants regarding preferences for investment under different legal and financial institutions. Results suggest that the performance of a country‘s legal institutions affects the willingness to invest money in that country and that people of different gender, age, political traditions, and professional experience react differently to these institutions.

The implementation of corporate governance in Germany and Brazi l: a comparative case study

The recent promotion of best corporate governance standards by several different government institutions and non-for profit organizations resulted in the implementation of more sophisticated governance mechanisms. As consequence to the separation of ownership and control the concept of agency theory arose. Agency theory argues that without out proper control mechanism managers would behave exploit owners due to information asymmetry. Regulators have promoted corporate governance mechanisms in order to address this issue. This paper aims to contrast the implementation of best corporate governance practices in Germany and Brazil on the example of two practical examples. With this purpose in mind, this paper analyzed two companies listed in the main stock exchange in Germany and Brazil throughout a period of 5 years. In order to measure the degree of corporate governance practices implemented 3 different parameters have been chosen. In line with great part of the literature the parameters considered to be relevant are; composition, procedures and deviation from the local corporate governance code. The comparison of the data revealed that board composition in the two analyzed companies is similar regarding the proportion of independent representatives but does distinguish in size. While committees are related to the same topics it can be implied that Natura’s board is more involved in the actual management of the company. Lastly, Beiersdorf has been able to comply to a larger extend with the recommendations of the local German code than Natura to the recommendations published by Brazilian code of the IBGC.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.