Monopolies life cycle, bureaucratization, and Schumpeterian growth

This paper analyzes the links between the internaI organization of firms and macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which firms face dynamic agency costs. These agency costs are due to the formation of vertical collusions within the organization. To respond to the opportunity of internaI collusion, firms go through a whole life cycle, getting more bureaucratized and Iess efficient over time. vVeak creative destruction in the economy facilitates informal collusion inside firms and exacerbates bureaucratization. As bureaucratization affects the firms' profitability and the return to innovation, stationary equilibrium growth depends in turn on the efficiency of collusive side-contracts within firms.

Development, technological change and innovation, Schumpeter and neo-Schumpeterians

This review essay is devoted to a discussion of some central aspects of the Schumpeterian and neo-Schumpeterian approaches to the dynamic processes of development, technological change and innovation. This essay is organised in two parts. In the first, Schumpeter's insightful distinction between circular flow and development is discussed. In the second, some central elements of the neo-Schumpeterian interpretation and extension of Schumpeter's views are critically outlined, special emphasis being placed on some recent attempts to formalize several of his insights on the cyclical dynamics of the processes of technological change and innovation. I should stress that due to space constraints I will focus primarily upon macrotheoretic issues, thus paying only secondary attention to the neo-Schumpeterian literature on the microeconomics of technological change and to the burgeoning empirical developments along those lines.