Do firms always want to learn from corporate venture capital investments?

In this paper, the learning intentions and outcomes for corporate venture capital are questioned. Through qualitative research in the oil and gas sector, we identified a desire to control the direction and pace of innovation as the main driver for this type of investments. A new model and framework for CVC are presented. Contrary to the traditional model of CVC, which features a dyadic relation between corporate investor and venture entrepreneur, our model shows that CVC investments create a more complex conjoint of relations between multiple stakeholders. These relations challenge the neo-Schumpeterian model of competition. Using the grounded theory approach, we created a theoretical framework explaining and predicting outcomes of corporate venture capital other than learning. At firm level, our framework conceptualizes CVC programs as dynamic capabilities, and suggests a competitive advantage for the corporate investor through its ability to faster and better integrate the new technology. At market level, we proposed that CVC investments positively affect the pace of innovation in the market through an increased speed of acceptance of technologies supported by corporate investors.

The human side of project management - an investigation of critical chain concepts in the Argentinean Project Environment

The global marketplace is rapidly intensifying. Longer product sales lives, greater profit margins or simply survival, is dependent on management¿s ability to create and lead change. Project Management has become an important competency, combined with other business practices to adapt to the trend of changing conditions. Critical Chain is a relatively new project methodology, elaborated by Eliyahu Goldratt in order to complete projects faster, make more efficient use of resources and securing the project deliverables. The methodology is based on the assumption that traditional project techniques such as CPM and PERT, do not recognize critical human behavior. The methodology claims that many project failures are a direct result of how safety is built into the task delivery times, and then wasted by human behavior such as Student Syndrome, Parkinson Law and Multitasking. However, there has been little or no previous research regarding this topic in the Argentine marketplace. This study intended to investigate to what extent the human behavior concepts of critical chain project management are present, by performing in-depth interviews with Argentine project stakeholders. It appears that the four human behavior concepts are present in Argentina and that the majority of Argentine companies are yet to apply project management techniques.

Re-framing risk transfer to assess integrative partnership opportunities: the S.A.R. approach and the AIG/BID/CNO regional surety bond facility of 2007

Identificar, compartilhar e gerenciar os riscos de contratar são preocupações que impedem o estabelicmento e a administração das Parcerias Públicos Particulares (PPP). Porem, gerentes das entidades públicas, bancos de formento, construtoras e seguradoras pesquisam e utilizam muitas técnicas para enfrentar a avaliação e gerenciamento dos riscos. A transferência de risco é uma indicação dos chamados benefícios que são inspirados pelos PPP, contudo devido às realidades contratuais e conceptuais, a entidade de cede o risco (o partido público) permanece quase sempre como o portador final do risco. Conseqüentemente, o partido público retem um interesse de resistência na gerência total destes riscos cedidos. Esta dissertação explora alguns defeitos das aproximações comuns a conceituar a gestão de risco no contexto de um PPP. Focalizando os conceitos da interdependência e da reciprocidade e usando na decisão para transferir o risco do projeto, esta dissertação molda a decisão para transferir o risco nos termos das realidades interdependentes de relacionamentos sistemáticos, alargam os conceitos técnicos do risco e da avaliação de risco, considerando o uso reflexivo das diferenças na analise de um estudo de caso. O autor explora estes conceitos em uma análise da decisão de um gerente de risco da empresa de construção civil brasileira Construtora Norberto Odebrecht (ODB) para projetar uma facilidade inovadora da ligação de garantia com Inter-American Development Bank (BID) e uma seguradora, American International Group (AIG), um negócio que ganhe o reconhecimento Trade Finance Magazine’s 2007 deal of the year. O autor mostra que por compreender a transferência de risco nos termos abordados nesta dissertação, um atore que transfere o risco pode identificar e criar mais oportunidades de estabelecer relacionamentos em longo prazo, através dos processos que a literatura atual do PPP ainda não considere. Os resultados devem fornecer contribuições para a pesquisas sobre a transferência do risco do projeto, na cooperação entre organizações e na seleção do sócio do projeto do potencial.

The Panama canal expansion mega project : a case study and stakeholder´s analysis

As globalization increases integration, a new playing field is emerging which is driving the need for operational efficiencies and alignment of complementary capabilities among countries to build sustainable models and integrated offerings. As demands increase, companies are turning to effective project management as means to control operations and countries are increasing the amount of mega projects to boost their competitiveness and global footprint. Given the scale, complexity, political nature, multicultural makeup, and high level of visibility; mega projects rely on successful stakeholder management to effectively manage its operational, tactical, and strategic levels to execute their mission. This paper examines the success drivers of mega projects and presents an in depth stakeholder assessment of the Panama Canal Expansion mega project to identify the perceived value to its stakeholder community. The stakeholder categories include: the Panama Canal Authority, subcontractors executing the expansion project, customers of the canal in Panama and U.S., as well as the communities surrounding the Panama Canal and ports in the U.S. East Coast. The conclusion of this paper captures the relationship between the effective stakeholder engagement from the Panama Canal Authority, the perceived value of the Panamanian stakeholders, and compares it to U.S. based mega projects being executed simultaneously to allow the U.S. East Coast ports to accommodate increased cargo volumes.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.