Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing

We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principIe which we call the implementation principIe. This principIe provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect contracting mechanisms in terms of contract catalogs (or menus), and allows us to conclude that in competi tive contracting situations, firms in choosing their contracting strategies can restrict attention, without loss of generality, to contract catalogs. Second, we establish a competi tive taxation principIe. This principIe, a refinement of the implementation principIe, provides a complete characterization of all implementable nonlinear pricing schedules in terms of product-price catalogs and allows us to reduce any game played over nonlinear pricing schedules to a strategically equivalent game played over product-price catalogs. Third, using the competitive taxation principIe and a recent result due to Reny (1999) on the existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous games, we demonstrate the existence of a N ash equilibrium for the mixed extension of the nonlinear pricing game.

Concorrência no Mercosul: para além do Protocolo de Fortaleza

We address specific problems to be considered once the Protocolo de Fortaleza becomes a fully recognised agreement. Elimination of anti-dumping measures a la WTO, services competition and the interrelationship between the regulatory agencies and the competition offices, issues regarding the concept of relevant market and, in a broader view, harmonisation of rules, criteria, institutions and regional competitive environments, are discussed. The European experience, if properly adapted, can be of value. In this context, two important principles are singled-out: acknowledgement of an acquis Mercosul – which allows a realistic and constructive perspective when facing the integration challenges, and the wise use of subsidiarity, for faster developments with lighter central institutions. Dispute settlement, in the competition framework, is not tackled, though – in this case – we are favourable to the creation of a supranational organism. All these points do not naturally encompass everything required for the full implementation of a competition policy in Mercosul.

Enforcing international financial standards in Brazil: limits and possibilities for adoption of IOSCO principles

Foreign capital and institutional investors play a key role in the Brazilian capital and financial markets. Internationally promoted regulatory patterns, especially IOSCO principles, have been increasingly influencing administrative rule making by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) as well as the adoption of transnational rules in Brazil by means of self-regulatory activity. Even though there is a certain level of convergence of market regulatory standards at the transnational level, implementation and enforcement of rules remains essentially domestic. We analyze two case studies regarding the transposition of international standards into the Brazilian legal system, which illustrate this tension between the transnational and domestic dimensions of financial markets regulation. The first case concerns a CVM rule on disclosure of executive compensation and the its interpretation by local courts. The second case refers to the adoption of suitability rules.