O novo sistema de análise prévia dos atos de concentração e a questão do Gun-Jumping: traçando parâmetros para as empresas

Em 29 de maio de 2012 entrou em vigor a Lei nº 12.529/2011, que introduziu no Brasil o sistema de análise prévia dos atos de concentração. Nesse novo regime, as empresas deverão preservar as condições de concorrência entre si e não mais poderão consumar a operação antes de sua aprovação pelo Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE), sob pena de violarem as regras do sistema de análise prévia das operações, i.e., praticarem gun-jumping ilegal. Contudo, nem a Nova Lei, nem o Novo Regimento Interno do CADE especificaram quais práticas implicariam a consumação da operação. Dessa forma, o presente trabalho buscou identificar parâmetros, através da experiência americana e europeia e da análise de acordos de preservação da reversibilidade da operação, que pudessem auxiliar as empresas a conduzirem suas atividades no momento que antecede a aprovação da operação.

Reversibilidade de bens em concessões de telecomunicações

A aproximação do término dos contratos de concessão do STFC demanda maior detalhamento das discussões acerca do modo de aplicação do instituto da reversibilidade de bens. Este artigo trata dos contornos da regra de reversão aplicável ao setor de telecomunicações, indicando os limites para e as ferramentas jurídicas para sua aplicação. Especificamente, postula-se que a Lei Geral de Telecomunicações e a Constituição Federal impossibilitam a adoção de uma leitura patrimonialista, sendo necessária a adoção de soluções contratuais com o propósito de viabilizar a reversão da posse dos bens reversíveis, em parcelas restritas àquelas estritamente indispensáveis à continuidade do STFC. The approaching term of the switched fixed telephony (STFC) concessions requires the discussions on asset reversibility to be held at a greater level of detail as to the characteristics of this legal concept. This paper outlines the asset reversibility rule applicable to the telecommunications sector and indicates the limits and legal tools for its implementation. Specifically, we argue that the Federal Constitution and the General Telecommunications Act do not allow for an interpretation centered on the estate in reversion (an interpretation we refer to as patrimonialista). Consequently, the implementation of this reversion rule should rely on contractual arrangements dealing with possessory rights over the assets which are essential for the continuous provision of STFC, or capacities thereof.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.