Should we be afraid of managed care?: a theoretical assessment

Managed caIe capitation contracts provide monetary incentives for doctoIs to save medical costs while standard health insurance contracts do noto The papeI proposes an alternative model for insurance markets which is used to analyze managed caIe contracts. In our model, households would like to buy insurance for the possible need of a service. The distinctive aspect of our model is that providers of service have privileged information on the most appropriate procedure to be followed. In the managed care application of the model, doctors are the providers of the service and through a diagnosis have better information of the patient's health condition. Equilibrium in our model is always constrained eflicient. A partial capitation contract arises when both the cost and net benefits of treatment are high enough. We show that a capitation contract provides incentives for doctors: i) to care about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (altruistic behamor); and ii) to save medical costs (managed care behamor). Doctors, in this case, choose less medically eflicient treatments as they would choose under a standard health insurance contract. Besides this, household' welfare is increased in comparison to the standard contract. This increased welfare translates into a revealed preference for the capitation contract.

Uma análise empírica sobre as preferências do consumidor brasileiro de cervejas artesanais

Um dos produtos mais consumidos do mundo vem passando por grandes transformações, e a cerveja que conhecemos como tipo Pilsen (Light Lager) deixou de ser opção única nas prateleiras. Dado o potencial de crescimento do setor no Brasil, o objetivo deste trabalho é mapear as preferências do consumidor de cerveja artesanal, usando técnicas de preferência declarada, a partir da aplicação de questionários que convidam o entrevistado a elencar suas preferências diante das combinações dos atributos Cor, Paladar, Aroma e Álcool. A partir da estratificação da amostra em Idade e Experiência, os resultados indicam que Paladar, seguido da Cor e, por último, o Aroma são os atributos mais relevantes para o entrevistado Experiente, enquanto o Não Experiente atribui maior peso à Cor, seguida do Paladar, sendo o Aroma um atributo irrelevante em suas escolhas. O atributo Álcool revelou-se insignificante em todas as estratificações realizadas.

On the impossibility of prisoner's dilemmas in adversarial preference games

Why don't agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisonerís dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PDís are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or jealousy may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results ñ including the possibility of conflict inducing growth.