A note on convergence of Peck-Shell and Green-Lin mechanisms in the Diamond-Dybvig model

We study the effects of population size in the Peck-Shell analysis of bank runs. We find that a contract featuring equal-treatment for almost all depositors of the same type approximates the optimum. Because the approximation also satisfies Green-Lin incentive constraints, when the planner discloses positions in the queue, welfare in these alternative specifications are sandwiched. Disclosure, however, it is not needed since our approximating contract is not subject to runs.

Demand- side resistance to creative destruction in schumpeterian growth theory

The Schumpelerian model of endogeno~s growlh is generalized with lhe introduction of stochastic resislance. by agenls other Ihan producers. to lhe innovations which drive growth. This causes a queue to be formcd of innovations, alrcady discovered, bUI waiting to be adopled~ A slationary stochastic equilibrium (SSE) is obtained when the queue is stable~ It is shown that in the SSE, such resistance will always reduce lhe average growth iate hut it may increa~e wclfare in certain silualions. In an example, Ihis is when innovatiuns are small anti monopoly power great. The cont1icl hetween this welfare motive for resistance and those of rent-seeking innovalors.may well explain why growth rates differ.