How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

Latin America major player in the international financial markets, agony and ecstasy

This study deals with the complex relationship between the International Financial Markets (IFMs) and the countries of the Latin America Group, emphasizing the entrance and the exit conditions for these countries in the last two indebtedness cycles - 1967/1982 and 1990/1994. Finally, it makes some considerations about the consequences of these Latin America countries of being linking economic policies to the external financing abtained in the IFMs.

Past and future of the bankruptcy law in Brazil and Latin America

This paper studies the Bankruptcy Law in Latin America, focusing on the Brazilian reform. We start with a review of the international literature and its evolution on this subject. Next, we examine the economic incentives associated with several aspects of bankruptcy laws and insolvency procedures in general, as well as the trade-offs involved. After this theoretical discussion, we evaluate empirically the current stage of the quality of insolvency procedures in Latin America using data from Doing Business and World Development Indicators, both from World Bank and International Financial Statistics from IMF. We find that the region is governed by an inefficient law, even when compared with regions of lower per capita income. As theoretical and econometric models predict, this inefficiency has severe consequences for credit markets and the cost of capital. Next, we focus on the recent Brazilian bankruptcy reform, analyzing its main changes and possible effects over the economic environment. The appendix describes difficulties of this process of reform in Brazil, and what other Latin American countries can possibly learn from it.

International portfolio diversification: evidence from emerging markets

Taking into account previous research we could assume to be beneficial to diversify investments in emerging economies. We investigate in the paper International Portfolio Diversification: evidence from Emerging Markets if it still holds true, given the assumption of larger world markets integration. Our results suggest a wide spread positive time-varying correlations of emerging and developed markets. However, pair-wise cross-country correlations gave evidence that emerging markets have low integration with developed markets. Consequently, we evaluate out-of-sample performance of a portfolio with emerging equity countries, confirming the initial statement that it has a better a risk-adjusted performance over a purely developed markets portfolio.

Valuing emerging markets companies : new approaches to determine the effective exposure to country risk

The aim of this paper is to propose new methods to measure the effective exposure to country risk of emerging-market companies. Starting from Damodaran (2003), we propose seven new approaches and a revised CAPM for emerging markets companies. The “Prospective Lambda” represents the effective exposure according to analysts’ estimates of growth. The “Relative Lambda” relies on the firm value estimated through a relative valuation. The “Retrospective Lambda” represents the ex-post effective exposure to country risk. The “Company Effective Risk Premium” is a generalization of the Retrospective Lambda, and expresses the premium effectively requested by investors to invest in that specific company in the past year. “The Actual Lambda” and the “Company Actual Risk Premium” represent, respectively, the actual exposure to country risk of a company and the actual premium requested by investors to invest in that specific company. The “Industry Lambda” reflects the median exposure to country risk of the industry in which the company belongs. We tested our new measures of exposure to country risk on the Latin American emerging markets companies according to the classification of the MSCI Emerging Markets Latin America Index. The results confirm that the new approaches can be effectively applied by financial analysts to stable-growth companies that operate in emerging markets and to mature markets companies that operate in emerging markets, providing with a more reliable estimate of both the premium effectively requested by investors in the past and the actual premium. Applying the new approaches, the cost of equity reflects the effective exposure of a company to country risk without being over- or underestimated, as is the case with other existing approaches.

From the national-bourgeois to the associated dependency interpretation of latin America

Nos anos 1960 e 1970 a América Latina foi palco de golpes militares modernizadores e da transição de seus intelectuais do nacionalismo para a dependência associada. Nos anos 1950 dois grupos de intelectuais públicos, organizados entre a Cepal, em Santiago, Chile, e o ISEB, no Rio de Janeiro, Brasil, abriram caminho para o pensamento das sociedades e economias latino-americanas (inclusive do Brasil) a partir de uma visão nacionalista. A Cepal criticava principalmente a lei das vantagens comparativas e suas essenciais implicações imperialistas; o ISEB se focava na definição política de uma estratégia nacional-desenvolvimentista. A idéia de uma burguesia nacional era a resposta para esta interpretação da América Latina. A Revolução Cubana, a crise econômica dos anos 1960 e os golpes militares nos países do Cone Sul, entretanto, criaram espaço para a crítica a essas idéias com uma nova interpretação: a da dependência. Ao rejeitar totalmente a possibilidade de uma burguesia nacional, duas versões da interpretação da dependência (a interpretação “associada” e a “superexploração”) também rejeitaram a possibilidade de uma estratégia nacional-desenvolvimentista. Apenas uma terceira interpretação, a “nacional-dependente” continuava a afirmar a necessidade e a possibilidade de uma burguesia nacional e de uma estratégia nacional. Entretanto, foi a interpretação da dependência associada que foi dominante na América Latina nos anos 1970 e 1980.

Infrastructure and productivity in Latin America: is there a relationship in the long run?

This article analyses the relationship between infrastructure and total factor productivity (TFP) in the four major Latin American economies: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. We hypothesise that an increase in infrastructure has an indirect effect on long-term economic growth by raising productivity. To assess this theory, we use the traditional Johansen methodology for testing the cointegration between TFP and physical measures of infrastructure stock, such as energy, roads, and telephones. We then apply the Lütkepohl, Saikkonen and Trenkler Test, which considers a possible level shift in the series and has better small sample properties, to the same data set and compare the two tests. The results do not support a robust long-term relationship between the series; we do not find strong evidence that cuts in infrastructure investment in some Latin American countries were the main reason for the fall in TFP during the 1970s and 1980s.

Growth, structural change and technological capabilities Latin America in a comparative perspective

Countries differ in terms of technological capabilities and complexity of production structures. According to that, countries may follow different development strategies: one based on extracting rents from abundant endowments, such as labor or natural resources, and the other focused on creating rents through intangibles, basically innovation and knowledge accumulation. The present article studies international convergence and divergence, linking structural change with trade and growth through a North South Ricardian model. The analysis focuses on the asymmetries between Latin America and mature and catching up economies. Empirical evidence supports that a shift in the composition of the production structure in favor of R&D intensive sectors allows achieving higher rates of growth in the long term and increases the capacity to respond to demand changes. A virtuous export-led growth requires laggard countries to reduce the technological gap with respect to more advanced ones. Hence, abundance of factor endowments requires to be matched with technological capabilities development for countries to converge in the long term.

On the evolution of TFP in Latin America

Due to several policy distortions, including import-substitution industrialization, widespread government intervention and both domestic and international competitive barriers, there has been a general presumption that Latin America has been much less productive than the leading economies in the last decades. In this paper we show, however, that until the late seventies Latin American countries had high productivity levels relative to the United States. It is only after the late seventies that we observe a fast decrease of relative TFP in Latin America. We also show that the inclusion of human capital in the production function makes a crucial diference in the TFP calculations for Latin America.

Structural Transformation and Productivity in Latin America

We investigate the role of sectorial differences in labor productivity and the process of structural transformation (reallocation of labor across sectors) in accounting for the time path of aggregate productivity across six Latin American countries (Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela) from 1950 to 2003. We used a general equilibrium model with three sectors (agriculture, industry and services) calibrated to those six economies. The model is used to compare the trajectory of productivity in each sector of activity with that of the United States and it impact on aggregate productivity.While in Brazil and Argentina, the Service Sector was responsible for reversing the process of catch up in productivity that occurred until the 1980s, in others, like Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, low productivity growth of the three sectors explain their poor performance.

Theorizing Latin America : transactions, resources and institutions

Nos anos 80, a América Latina, uma das regiões menos desenvolvidas do mundo, enfrentou um período de mudanças econômicas e políticas significativas que levaram essa região a um lugar de destaque no mercado mundial. Por conseguinte, a América Latina foi objeto de diversos estudos, que, por sua vez, foram compilados nesta revisão de literatura, a fim de que se possam identificar quais os avanços foram feitos no âmbito da Gestão e Negócios Internacionais. Como base, tomou-se a metodologia aplicada por Meyer e Peng (2005), fazendo um paralelo entre três importantes teorias da área (Teoria de Baseada em Recursos, Teoria Baseada no Custo das Transações e Teoria Institucional) e alguns assuntos-chave de extrema relevância ao entendimento do tema (Construindo Vantagens Competitivas, Liberalização Econômica versus Regulação Governamental e Internacionalização) Ao final, delimitamos as contribuições da América Latina ao estudo da Gestão e Negócios Internacionais, fazendo algumas sugestões para futuros pesquisas nesse âmbito.

The experience of semi-formal infrastructure finance in developing countries: proposals for Brazil and Latin America

This paper has the purpose of analyzing the role of civil society in funding and providing nfrastructure projects in developing countries. Considering that local associations around the world have been directly engaged on some infrastructure projects – some scholars define it as “semi-formal finance” –, the intention is to demonstrate that the experiences on such arrangements in developing countries have been responsible for fostering infrastructure investments in the poorer regions where the government is more absent. Based upon legal, economic and social aspects, this paper aims to contribute to a broader debate for the development of infrastructure in emerging countries. The conclusion is that, under a more social approach, the legal and economic mechanisms in developing countries are able to consider such arrangements in the benefit of their development.

On the evolution of TFP in Latin America

Due to several policy distortions, including import-substitution industrialization, widespread government intervention and both domestic and international competitive barriers, there has been a general presumption that Latin America has been much less productive than the leading economies in the last decades. In this paper we show, however, that until the late seventies Latin American countries had high productivity levels relative to the United States. It is only after the late seventies that we observe a fast decrease of relative TFP in Latin America. We also show that the inclusion of human capital in the production function makes a crucial difference in the TFP calculations for Latin America.

Partial economic reforrns and financial crises: an emerging markets perspective

The recent emerging market experiences have posed a challenge to the conventional wisdom that unsustainable fiscal deficits are the key to understanding financial crises in these countries. The health of the domestic banking system has emerged as the main driving force behind the perverse dynamics of partial reforms. The current paper shares this view and uses a model of contractual inefliciencies in the banking sector to understand the dynamics of these reforms. We find that the threat of a large exchange rate devaluation depends on the stock of international reserves relative to the stock of domestic credit that must be extended by the Central Bank in response to a large capital outflow. Moreover, if a country has a weak banking sector but high net reserve ratios, the capital flow reversal might only increase the vulnerability to a currency crisis without necessarily causing it. The results are in accordance with much of the empiricalliterature on the determinants of financiaI crises in emerging markets. Some aspectsof the recent policy debate on the introduction of capital controls are also analysed.