Fiscal adjustment, conditionality and politics in IMF programs

A common feature in programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the use of conditionalities, macroeconomic and structural measures that a requesting country should adopt to obtain an assistance package. The objective of this work is to conduct an empirical analysis of the economic and political determinants of such conditionalities. In particular, our main contribution consists in the development of a new measure of conditionality, fiscal adjustment, and its comparison with the most used in the literature, the number of conditions. We choose fiscal adjustment because it is an adequate proxy for program austerity, since its implementation carries economic and political costs. In the empirical exercise, we use data from 184 programs in the period of 1999 and 2012, and estimate how our two measures of conditionalities respond to the economic and political factors. Our results suggest that they are quite different. The main determinant of the number of conditions is the political proximity of the borrowing country to the Fund’s major shareholders, the members of G5. On the other hand, the main determinant of fiscal adjustment is the size of the government fiscal deficit. Finally, we did not find correlation between the size of fiscal adjustment and the number of conditions. These results suggest that the analysis of the content of IMF programs should take into account the different measures of agreed conditionality.

Corporate governance and its influence on the investment decision process of equity market's professionals: An inside view of how corporate governance issues influence the decision-making process of sell-side and buy-side professionals when analyzing Brazilian listed companies

Corporate governance has been in the spotlight for the past two decades, being subject of numerous researches all over the world. Governance is pictured as a broad and diverse theme, evolving through different routes to form distinct systems. This scenario together with 2 types of agency problems (investor vs. management and minorities vs. controlling shareholders) produce different definitions for governance. Usually, studies investigate whether corporate governance structures influence firm performance, and company valuation. This approach implies investors can identify those impacts and later take them into consideration when making investment decisions. However, behavioral finance theory shows that not always investors take rational decisions, and therefore the modus operandi of those professionals needs to be understood. So, this research aimed to investigate to what extent Brazilian corporate governance standards and practices influence the investment decision-making process of equity markets' professionals from the sell-side and buy-side. This exploratory study was carried out through qualitative and quantitative approaches. In the qualitative phase, 8 practitioners were interviewed and 3 dimensions emerged: understanding, pertinence and practice. Based on the interviews’ findings, a questionnaire was formulated and distributed to buy-siders and sell-siders that cover Brazilian stocks. 117 respondents from all over the world contributed to the study. The data obtained were analyzed through structural equation modeling and descriptive statistics. The 3 dimensions became 5 constructs: definition (institutionalized governance, informal governance), pertinence (relevance), practice (valuation process, structured governance assessment) The results of this thesis suggest there is no definitive answer, as the extent to which governance will influence an investment decision process will depend on a number of circumstances which compose the context. The only certainty is the need to present a “corporate governance behavior”, rather than simply establishing rules and regulations at firm and country level.