14 resultados para Regulatory fragmentation
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
A regulação ambiental carece de maior transparência. Os órgãos de proteção do meio ambiente, em regra, apenas publicam as versões finais das medidas elaboradas, sem explicitar as justificativas técnicas que as embasaram, as alternativas consideradas e as possíveis contribuições decorrentes de participação social, entre outras questões. Em consequência, tem-se um cenário desfavorável à realização de controle pelos mais diversos atores. Para superá-lo, a análise de impacto regulatório é apresentada como instrumento apto a agregar clareza, objetividade e eficiência ao processo decisório ambiental. A incorporação da ferramenta, no entanto, deve ser realizada com cuidado especial, tendo em vista a existência de três principais peculiaridades do direito do meio ambiente. Primeiro, o setor lida não só com situações de risco, mas também com casos de incerteza, em que a ausência de informação impossibilita o cálculo de probabilidade de ocorrência de possíveis resultados. Em segundo lugar, a regulação ambiental recai sobre bens não transacionados em mercados, o que dificulta a obtenção de seu valor de troca, aspecto relevante para a análise de custo-benefício como tradicionalmente conhecida. Por fim, o meio ambiente apresenta desenho regulatório absolutamente fragmentado, composto por variados órgãos normatizadores, deliberativos e fiscalizadores em todos os níveis da federação, o que eleva o risco de deficiências na formação técnica das autoridades reguladoras.
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The idea that life undergoes a process of functional differentiation, and that, as a consequence, law becomes increasingly specialized – and maybe even transforms in its very nature – is now widespread. The specialized clusters of law or regulation are very often called regimes, in the international arena, international or transnational regimes. This paper deals, first, with three strong representations of international regimes and discusses some of their problems. It argues that, in order to make a good use of the category, it is necessary to keep in mind the differentiation between law and non-law in the wider context of governance. It then turns, firstly, to the notion of regimes as fragments of a unified and coherent public international law order and, secondly, as meeting points of regulations emerging from different legal orders as well as from other non-legal sources. Within public international law, regimes are seen as related to what is called the double fragmentation of that legal order. As clusters of regulation within a wider global regulatory order, regimes are put in relation to two types of legal or regulatory pluralism.
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Este Trabalho Discute as Perspectivas da Regulação Econômica no Brasil. para Tanto, Primeiramente Apresenta-Se a Evolução Histórica da Regulação no País, Discutindo as Principais Questões Relacionadas Às Agências Reguladoras Federais. em Segundo Lugar, os Marcos Regulatórios de Cinco Diferentes Setores (Telecomunicações, Eletricidade, Saneamento Básico, Petróleo e Gás Natural) são Analisados. em Terceiro Lugar, a Questão do Financiamento de Investimentos em Infra-Estrutura é Tratada, Enfatizando o Papel das Parcerias Público-Privadas (Ppps). uma Seção Final Cont~Em um Possível Agenda para a Regulação no Brasil
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Most studies around that try to verify the existence of regulatory risk look mainly at developed countries. Looking at regulatory risk in emerging market regulated sectors is no less important to improving and increasing investment in those markets. This thesis comprises three papers comprising regulatory risk issues. In the first Paper I check whether CAPM betas capture information on regulatory risk by using a two-step procedure. In the first step I run Kalman Filter estimates and then use these estimated betas as inputs in a Random-Effect panel data model. I find evidence of regulatory risk in electricity, telecommunications and all regulated sectors in Brazil. I find further evidence that regulatory changes in the country either do not reduce or even increase the betas of the regulated sectors, going in the opposite direction to the buffering hypothesis as proposed by Peltzman (1976). In the second Paper I check whether CAPM alphas say something about regulatory risk. I investigate a methodology similar to those used by some regulatory agencies around the world like the Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency (ANEEL) that incorporates a specific component of regulatory risk in setting tariffs for regulated sectors. I find using SUR estimates negative and significant alphas for all regulated sectors especially the electricity and telecommunications sectors. This runs in the face of theory that predicts alphas that are not statistically different from zero. I suspect that the significant alphas are related to misspecifications in the traditional CAPM that fail to capture true regulatory risk factors. On of the reasons is that CAPM does not consider factors that are proven to have significant effects on asset pricing, such as Fama and French size (ME) and price-to-book value (ME/BE). In the third Paper, I use two additional factors as controls in the estimation of alphas, and the results are similar. Nevertheless, I find evidence that the negative alphas may be the result of the regulated sectors premiums associated with the three Fama and French factors, particularly the market risk premium. When taken together, ME and ME/BE regulated sectors diminish the statistical significance of market factors premiums, especially for the electricity sector. This show how important is the inclusion of these factors, which unfortunately is scarce in emerging markets like Brazil.
Resumo:
Economists have argued that regulation is the appropriate approach to maintain output in its economically efficient level in a natural monopoly, and that can be achieved by submitting these companies to regulatory agencies’ decisions. The autonomous agencies are, however, not free in an absolute sense, and it is important to ask what the priorities of the new administration are. One answer is that it is designed to give leeway and powers of discretion to unbiased professionals with expertise in their field. In practice, however, professional experts might often be politically motivated. The objective of this study is to investigate whether political nominations to the presidency of regulatory agencies, rather than technical appointments, affect the level of regulatory risk. In order to achieve this purpose, an event study was performed, where the regulatory risk in a political nomination will be compared to a technical nomination, in terms of abnormal return.
Resumo:
O governo brasileiro recentemente aprovou uma legislação instituindo um novo marco regulatório para as reservas petrolíferas do pré-sal. Segundo as novas regras, estas áreas deverão ser licitadas mediante um leilão de partilha de lucro. Motivado por esta mudança, apresentamos um modelo de leilão de partilha sob afiliação, demonstrando a existência de um equilíbrio monótono em estratégias puras e caracterizando a solução. Alem disso, provamos que este mecanismo gera receita esperada maior ou igual a um leilão de primeiro preço usual. Em seguida, introduzimos no modelo uma função representando taxas de royalties que dependem do valor do objeto. Este instrumento permite uma elevação na receita esperada de ambos os modelos, fazendo com que a diferença entre eles encolha. Finalmente, analisando o novo marco regulatório sob o ponto de vista dos resultados obtidos, concluímos que o antigo modelo de concessão utilizado pelo governo brasileiro é mais adequado e lucrativo.
Regulatory reform in the brazilian railway sector and concession valuation: a preliminary assessment
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Trabalho apresentado na 4th Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures
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Trabalho apresentado no Law and Society Annual Conference, 2015
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Escola de Direito do Rio de Janeiro da Fundação Getulio Vargas
Resumo:
A new paradigm is modeling the World: evolutionary innovations in all fronts, new information technologies, huge mobility of capital, use of risky financial tools, globalization of production, new emerging powers and the impact of consumer concerns on governmental policies. These phenomena are shaping the World and forcing the advent of a new World Order in the Multilateral Monetary, Financial, and Trading System. The effects of this new paradigm are also transforming global governance. The political and economic orders established after the World War and centered on the multilateral model of UN, IMF, World Bank, and the GATT, leaded by the developed countries, are facing significant challenges. The rise of China and emerging countries shifted the old model to a polycentric World, where the governance of these organizations are threatened by emerging countries demanding a bigger participation in the role and decision boards of these international bodies. As a consequence, multilateralism is being confronted by polycentrism. Negotiations for a more representative voting process and the pressure for new rules to cope with the new demands are paralyzing important decisions. This scenario is affecting seriously not only the Monetary and Financial Systems but also the Multilateral Trading System. International trade is facing some significant challenges: a serious deadlock to conclude the last round of the multilateral negotiation at the WTO, the fragmentation of trade rules by the multiplication of preferential and mega agreements, the arrival of a new model of global production and trade leaded by global value chains that is threatening the old trade order, and the imposition of new sets of regulations by private bodies commanded by transnationals to support global value chains and non-governmental organizations to reflect the concerns of consumers in the North based on their precautionary attitude about sustainability of products made in the World. The lack of any multilateral order in this new regulation is creating a big cacophony of rules and developing a new regulatory war of the Global North against the Global South. The objective of this paper is to explore how these challenges are affecting the Tradinge System and how it can evolve to manage these new trends.
Resumo:
International trade is facing some significant challenges: a serious deadlock to conclude the last round of the multilateral negotiation at the WTO, the fragmentation of trade rules by the multiplication of preferential and mega agreements, the arrival of a new model of global production and trade leaded by global value chains that is threatening the old trade order, and the imposition of new sets of regulations by private bodies commanded by transnationals to support global value chains and non-governmental organizations to reflect the concerns of consumers in the North. The lack of any multilateral order in this new regulation is creating a big cacophony of rules and developing a new regulatory war
Resumo:
Over the last decades, there is an increasing concern around what should be the role played by the World Trade Organization before the proliferation of preferential and plurilateral trade agreements (PTAs). Moreover, the expansion of the trade agenda through issues not encompassed by the WTO agreements, such as sustainability and global value chains led to a process of fragmentation of international trade law, strengthening the false idea that there would be a complete antagonism between preferentialism and multilateralism. As tariff preferences have diminished in importance, non-tariff measures as domestic regulation have become relatively more significant as determinants of market access and the conditions of competition. Given this equation, and regarding the importance to safeguard the progress achieved by the multilateral trade system, the present article seeks to elucidate some points considered relevant to the regulatory barriers subject and, therefore, address the role that can be attributed to the WTO as a key to effective governance of trade regulatory cooperation