A model to estimate the US term structure of interest rates

The US term structure of interest rates plays a central role in fixed-income analysis. For example, estimating accurately the US term structure is a crucial step for those interested in analyzing Brazilian Brady bonds such as IDUs, DCBs, FLIRBs, EIs, etc. In this work we present a statistical model to estimate the US term structure of interest rates. We address in this report all major issues which drove us in the process of implementing the model developed, concentrating on important practical issues such as computational efficiency, robustness of the final implementation, the statistical properties of the final model, etc. Numerical examples are provided in order to illustrate the use of the model on a daily basis.

Stochastic growth and monetary policy: the impacts on the term structure of interest rates

This paper builds a simple, empirically-verifiable rational expectations model for term structure of nominal interest rates analysis. It solves an stochastic growth model with investment costs and sticky inflation, susceptible to the intervention of the monetary authority following a policy rule. The model predicts several patterns of the term structure which are in accordance to observed empirical facts: (i) pro-cyclical pattern of the level of nominal interest rates; (ii) countercyclical pattern of the term spread; (iii) pro-cyclical pattern of the curvature of the yield curve; (iv) lower predictability of the slope of the middle of the term structure; and (v) negative correlation of changes in real rates and expected inflation at short horizons.

Evaluating the existence of structural change in the brazilian term structure of interest: evidence based on cointegration models with structural break

This paper investigates whether there is evidence of structural change in the Brazilian term structure of interest rates. Multivariate cointegration techniques are used to verify this evidence. Two econometrics models are estimated. The rst one is a Vector Autoregressive Model with Error Correction Mechanism (VECM) with smooth transition in the deterministic coe¢ cients (Ripatti and Saikkonen [25]). The second one is a VECM with abrupt structural change formulated by Hansen [13]. Two datasets were analysed. The rst one contains a nominal interest rate with maturity up to three years. The second data set focuses on maturity up to one year. The rst data set focuses on a sample period from 1995 to 2010 and the second from 1998 to 2010. The frequency is monthly. The estimated models suggest the existence of structural change in the Brazilian term structure. It was possible to document the existence of multiple regimes using both techniques for both databases. The risk premium for di¤erent spreads varied considerably during the earliest period of both samples and seemed to converge to stable and lower values at the end of the sample period. Long-term risk premiums seemed to converge to inter-national standards, although the Brazilian term structure is still subject to liquidity problems for longer maturities.

Business cycles in emerging economies : the role of interest rates

This paper documents the empirical relation between the interest rates that emerging economies face in international capital markets and their business cycles. It shows that the patterns observed in the data can be interpreted as the equilibrium of a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy, in which (i) firms have to pay for a fraction of the input bill before production takes place, and (ii) preferences generate a labor supply that is independent of the interest rate. In our sample, interest rates are strongly countercyclical, strongly positively correlated with net exports, and they lead the cycle. Output is very volatile and consumption is more volatile than output. The sample includes data for Argentina during 1983-2000 and for four other large emerging economies, Brazil, Mexico, Korea, and Philippines, during 1994-2000. The model is calibrated to Argentina’s economy for the period 1983-1999. When the model is fed with actual US interest rates and the actual default spreads of Argentine sovereign interest rates, interest rates alone can explain forty percent of output fluctuations. When simulated technology shocks are added to the model, it can account for the main empirical regularities of Argentina’s economy during the period. A 1% increase in country risk causes a contemporaneous fall in output of 0.5 ’subsequent recovery. An increase in US rates causes output to fall by the same on impact and by almost 2% two years after the shock. The asymetry in the effect of shocks to US rates and country risk is due to the fact that US interest rates are more persistent than country risk and that there is a significant spillover effect from US interest rates to country risk.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.