Debt composition and exchange rate balance sheet effects in Brazil: A firm level analysis

In this paper we study the interaction between macroeconomic environment and firms’ balance sheet effects in Brazil during the 1990’s. We start by assessing the influence of macroeconomic conditions on firms’ debt composition in Brazil. We found that larger firms tend to change debt currency composition more in response to a change in the exchange rate risk than small firms. We then proceed to investigate if and how exchange rate balance sheet effects affected the firms’ investment decisions. We test directly the exchange rate balance sheet effect on investment. Contrary to earlier findings (Bleakley and Cowan, 2002), we found that firms more indebted in foreign currency tend to invest less when there is an exchange rate devaluation. We tried different controls for the competitiveness effect. First, we control directly for the effect of the exchange rate on exports and imported inputs. We then pursue an alternative investigation strategy, inspired by the credit channel literature. According to this perspective, Tobin’s q can provide an adequate control for the competitiveness effect on investment. Our results provide supporting evidence for imperfect capital markets, and for a negative exchange rate balance sheet effect in Brazil. The results concerning the exchange rate balance sheet effect on investment are statistically significant and robust across the different specifications. We tested the results across different periods, classified according to the macroeconomic environment. Our findings suggest that the negative exchange rate balance sheet effect we found in the whole sample is due to the floating exchange rate period. We also found that exchange rate devaluations have important negative impact on both cash flows and sales of indebted firms. Furthermore, the impact of exchange rate variations is asymmetric, and the significant effect detected when no asymmetry is imposed is engendered by exchange rate devaluations.

The inequality curse: constraints and political discretion

We live in an unjust world characterized by economic inequality. No liberal theory of justice is able to justify it. Inequality is not “solved” with equality of opportunity or meritocracy. Nor by the socialist and republican critique. The poor will have to count with them and with democracy to make social progress reality. In their political struggle, they will face one economic constraint: the expected profit rate must remain attractive to business investors. Yet, giving that technological progress in increasingly capital-saving, this economic constraint does not obstruct that wages grow above the productivity rate and inequality is reduced. What really is an obstacle to social justice in the rich countries is, on one hand, the power that capitalist rentiers retain and financists acquired, and, on the other, the competition originated in low wage countries.

Endogenous borrowing constraints and default when markets are incomplete

Incomplete markets and non-default borrowing constraints increase the volatility of pricing kernels and are helpful when addressing assetpricing puzzles. However, ruling out default when markets are in complete is suboptimal. This paper endogenizes borrowing constraints as an intertemporal incentive structure to default. It modeIs an infinitehorizon economy, where agents are allowed not to pay their liabilities and face borrowing constraints that depend on the individual history of default. Those constraints trade off the economy's risk-sharing possibilities and incentives to prevent default. The equilibrium presents stationary properties, such as an invariant distribution for the assets' solvency rate.

Macroeconomic constraints to growth of Brazilian economy diagnosis and some policy proposals

The recent process of accelerated expansion of the Brazilian economy was driven by exports and fixed capital formation. Although the pace of growth was more robust than in the 1990´s, we can still witness the existence of certain macroeconomic constraints to its continuation in the long run such as, for instance, the exchange rate overvaluation in particular since 2005, and in general the modus operandi of monetary policy. Such constraints may jeopardize the sustainability of the current pace of growth. Therefore, we argue that Brazil still lies in a trap made up of high interest and low exchange rates. The elimination of the exchange rate misalignment would bring about a great increase in the rate of interest, which on its turn would impact negatively upon investment and hence upon the sustainability of long run economic growth. We outline a set of policy measures to eliminate such a trap, in particular, the adoption of an implicit target for the exchange rate, capital controls and the abandonment of the present regime of inflation targeting. Recent events seem to go in this direction.