Analysis of the restructuring of the Russian defence industry (by the example of aviation industry and knaapo) and the creation of United Aviation Construction Corporation

The present study is focused on the analysis of the three main governmental measures occurred in 2000-2006 in Russian defense industry: the creation of the holding structures, the establishing of the state monopoly in arms export, and creation of the United Aviation Construction Corporation (Ob¿edinennaya Aviastroitel¿naya Corporatziya), which was initiated by the President and Government of Russian Federation in 2006. The last project assumes the consolidation and joining of all producers of civil and military aviation into one united corporation in order to save the technological and productive potential of the sector after serious crisis in 1990-s. On the other hand, this project can be considered as one of the measures to establish state control and hierarchy in the defense industry. The current project tries to analyze the necessity and the possible impacts of restructuring processes. In order to perform such analysis, I need to observe the evolution of the sector, which involves the description of the restructuring and reforming of the industry since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The current situation in aviation sector was shaped by number of reforms performed by Government of Russian Federation, which I describe in phases: conversion, privatization, decentralization, followed by evident desire of the state to establish control over some companies. Later on, I am trying to understand the reasons lying behind all reforms of 2000-2006 and the integration of the industry. I also try to predict which impacts on the companies it will have. The last part presents the main conclusions of the paper.

Monopoly power, trade protection and growth: cross industry evidence

This paper investigates the impact of monopoly power on trade policy. Annual panel-databases of Brazilian industries for the years 1988 through 1994 were used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator, concentration index, control variables and sample size, and suggest that industries with higher monopoly power are more protected than competitive sectors. In the period of study the country experienced a major trade liberalization, but the results in the paper show that the reduction in protection was smaller in sectors with higher monopoly power. We thus have evidence favoring recent growth literature which stresses that interest groups with control over creasing productivity. The results here confirm the first part of this argument and show that organized groups in fact are able to obtain policy advantages that reduce competition.

Trade barriers and productivity growth: cross-industry evidence

This article investigates the impact of trade protection on the evolution of labor productivity and total factor productivity (TFP) of the Brazilian manufacturing sector. An annual panel-dataset of 16 industries for the years 1985 through 1997, a period that includes a major trade liberalization, was used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator (nominal tari®s and e®ective protection rate were used), control variables and time period and suggest that barriers to trade negatively a®ects productivity growth at industry level: those sectors with lower barriers experienced higher growth. We were also able to link the observed increase of industry productivity growth after 1991 to the widespread reduction on exective protection experienced in the country in the nineties.

Monopoly power and trade protection: cross- industry evidence

This paper investigates the impact of industry concentration on trade policy. Annual panel-databases of Brazilian industries for the years 1988 through 1994 were used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator. concentration index, control variables and sample size, and suggest that the higher the concentration of a given industry the higher its leveI of trade protection. In the period of study the country experienced a major trade liberalization, but the results in the paper show that the reduction in protection was smaller in more concentrated sectors. Assuming that concentration is ;1 gCl()d proX\' for mOllopoh' po\\'er as it reduces the free-rider problem in coordinating a lobby the results in this paper indicates that interest groups with control over specific markets in fact are able to obtain policy advantages that reduce (international) competition.

Tail risk in the hedge fund industry

The dissertation goal is to quantify the tail risk premium embedded into hedge funds' returns. Tail risk is the probability of extreme large losses. Although it is a rare event, asset pricing theory suggests that investors demand compensation for holding assets sensitive to extreme market downturns. By de nition, such events have a small likelihood to be represented in the sample, what poses a challenge to estimate the e ects of tail risk by means of traditional approaches such as VaR. The results show that it is not su cient to account for the tail risk stemming from equities markets. Active portfolio management employed by hedge funds demand a speci c measure to estimate and control tail risk. Our proposed factor lls that void inasmuch it presents explanatory power both over the time series as well as the cross-section of funds' returns.