Contingent Edis: a new contractual framework for minimizing the risk of incentive failures

Granting economic development incentives (or “EDIs”) has become commonplace throughout the United States, but the efficiency of these mechanisms is generally unwarranted. Both the politicians granting, and the companies seeking, EDIs have incentives to overestimate the EDIs benefits. For politicians, ribbon–cutting ceremonies can be the highly desirable opportunity to please political allies and financiers, and the same time that they demonstrate to the population that they are successful in promoting economic growth – even when the population would be better off otherwise. In turn, businesses are naturally prone to seek governmental aid. This explains in part why EDIs often “fail” (i.e. don’t pay–off). To increase transparency and mitigate the risk of EDI failure, local and state governments across the country have created a number of accountability mechanisms. The general trait of these accountability mechanisms is that they apply controls to some of the sub–risks that underlie the risk of EDI failure. These sub–risks include the companies receiving EDIs not generating the expected number of jobs, not investing enough in their local facilities, not attracting the expected additional businesses investments to the jurisdiction, etc. The problem with such schemes is that they tackle the problem of EDI failure very loosely. They are too narrow and leave multiplier effects uncontrolled. I propose novel contractual framework for implementing accountability mechanisms. My suggestion is to establish controls on the risk of EDI failure itself, leaving its underlying sub–risks uncontrolled. I call this mechanism “Contingent EDIs”, because the EDIs are made contingent on the government achieving a preset target that benchmarks the risk of EDI failure. If the target is met, the EDIs will ex post kick in; if not, then the EDIs never kick in.

Contractual solutions to the holdup problem: a survey

In this survey, we presented the general idea and main results from what we understand that are the most important contributions to contractual solutions to the holdup problem literature. The aim of this paper is to push the previous analysis, uniform the notation and provide a snapshot on the most recent literature, as well as bring topics for future inquires on this issue.

Performance-based compensation vs. guaranteed compensation: contractual incentives and performance

Top management from retail banks must delegate authority to lower-level managers to operate branches and service centers. Doing so, they must navigate through conflicts of interest, asymmetric information and limited monitoring in designing compensation plans for such agents. Pursuant to this delegation, the banks adopt a system of performance targets and incentives to align the interests of senior management and unit managers. This paper evaluates the causal relationship between performance-based salaries and managers’ effective performance. We use a fixed effects estimator to analyze an unbalanced panel of data from one of the largest Brazilian retail banks during the period from January 2007 to June 2009. The results indicate that agents with guaranteed variable salary contracts demonstrate inferior performance compared with agents who have performance-based compensation packages. We conclude that there is a moral hazard that can be observed in the behavior of agents who are subject to guaranteed variable salary contracts.