Government policy and private investment in Brazil (1955/82)

The questlon of the crowding-out of private !nvestment by public expenditure, public investment in particular , ln the Brazilian economy has been discussed more in ideological terrns than on empirical grounds. The present paper tries to avoid the limitation of previous studies by estlmatlng an equation for private investment whlch makes it possible to evaluate the effect of economic policies on prlvate investment. The private lnvestment equation was deduced modifylng the optimal flexible accelerator medel (OFAM) incorporating some channels through which public expendlture influences privateinvestment. The OFAM consists in adding adjustment costs to the neoclassical theory of investrnent. The investment fuction deduced is quite general and has the following explanatory variables: relative prices (user cost of capitaljimput prices ratios), real interest rates, real product, public expenditures and lagged private stock of capital. The model was estimated for private manufacturing industry data. The procedure adopted in estimating the model was to begin with a model as general as possible and apply restrictions to the model ' s parameters and test their statistical significance. A complete diagnostic testing was also made in order to test the stability of estirnated equations. This procedure avoids ' the shortcomings of estimating a model with a apriori restrictions on its parameters , which may lead to model misspecification. The main findings of the present study were: the increase in public expenditure, at least in the long run, has in general a positive expectation effect on private investment greater than its crowding-out effect on priva te investment owing to the simultaneous rise in interst rates; a change in economlc policy, such as that one of Geisel administration, may have an important effect on private lnvestment; and reI ative prices are relevant in determining the leveI of desired stock of capital and private investrnent.

Decision making process: a comparison between the public and private sector

The problem of decision making, its mechanisms and consequences is the very core of management, it is virtually impossible to separate the act of manage from this knowledge area. As defined by Herbert Simon – "decision making" as though it were synonymous with "managing". A decision is a selection made by an individual regarding a choice of a conclusion about a situation. This represents a course of behavior pertaining to what must be done or what must not be done. A decision is the point at which plans, policies and objectives are translated into concrete actions. Our behavior during decisive moments is closely linked with our brain dominance profile. Over the years, our decision-making processes develop a consistent pattern, which can be described as a decision-making style. Our style is grounded in our preferences, which arise from our brain dominance characteristics […]. The importance of understanding the impact of our thinking preferences and how to improve the effectiveness as a leader of organizations are the main justifications for this thesis; the main problem addressed is the behavioral profile diversity in a selective Master’s cohort formed by students from several different countries. The research methodology approach has been quantitative, through questionnaire administration using the HBDI (Herrmann Brain Dominance Instrument), a validated framework developed by William "Ned" Herrmann when he was the leader of General Electric's Crotonville facility. This questionnaire has been administered in hundreds of thousands professional, enabling the possibility to establish correlations between a certain group and several historical databases. The selected group of analysis is the first cohort (23 students) from the CIM (Corporate International Master's), a joint program between Georgetown University (USA), ESADE (Spain) and FGV (Brazil). Besides decision preferences, the obtained profile enables the discussion on leadership style, heuristic's pitfalls and a base to compare with future cohorts. The fundamental research question is: how diverse is the dominant decision-making profile for the CIM students?

Mobility, targeting and private school vouchers

This paper uses general equilibrium simulations to explore the role ofresidential mobility in shaping the impact of different types of private school voucher policies. In particular, general vouchers available to all residents in the state are compared to vouchers specifically targeted to either underprivileged school districts or underprivileged households. The simulations are derived from a three-community mo deI of low, middle and high income school districts (calibrated to New York data), where each school district is composed of multiple types of neighborhoods that may vary in house quality as well as the leveI of neighborhood extemalities. Households that differ in both their income and in the ability leveI of their children choose between school districts, between neighborhoods within their school district, and between the local public school or a menu of private school altematives.Local public school quality within a district is endogenously determined bya combination of the average peer quality of public school attending children as well as local property and state income tax supported spending. Financial support (above a required state minimum) is set by local majority rule. Finally, there exists the potential for a private school market composed of competitive schools that face production technologies similar to those ofpublic schools but who set tuition and admissions policies to maximize profits. In tbis model, it is demonstrated that school district targeted vouchers are similar in their impact to non-targeted vouchers but vastIy different from vouchers targeted to low income households. Furthermore, strong migration effects are shown to significantly improve the likely equity consequences of voucher programs.

Public debt indexation and denomination, the case of Brazil: a comment

In this work I analyze the model proposed by Goldfajn (2000) to study the choice of the denomination of the public debt. The main purpose of the analysis is pointing out possible reasons why new empirical evidence provided by Bevilaqua, Garcia and Nechio (2004), regarding a more recent time period, Önds a lower empirical support to the model. I also provide a measure of the overestimation of the welfare gains of hedging the debt led by the simpliÖed time frame of the model. Assuming a time-preference parameter of 0.9, for instance, welfare gains associated with a hedge to the debt that reduces to a half a once-for-all 20%-of-GDP shock to government spending run around 1.43% of GDP under the no-tax-smoothing structure of the model. Under a Ramsey allocation, though, welfare gains amount to just around 0.05% of GDP.

Public debt sustainability and endogenous seignorage in Brazil: time-series evidence from 1947-92

Using national accounts data for the revenue-GDP and expenditure GDP ratios from 1947 to 1992, we examine two central issues in public finance. First, was the path of public debt sustainable during this period? Second, if debt is sustainable, how has the government historically balanced the budget after hocks to either revenues or expenditures? The results show that (i) public deficit is stationary (bounded asymptotic variance), with the budget in Brazil being balanced almost entirely through changes in taxes, regardless of the cause of the initial imbalance. Expenditures are weakly exogenous, but tax revenues are not;(ii) a rational Brazilian consumer can have a behavior consistent with Ricardian Equivalence (iii) seignorage revenues are critical to restore intertemporal budget equilibrium, since, when we exclude them from total revenues, debt is not sustainable in econometric tests.

The public choice perspective and Knight's institutionalist bent

A close scrutiny of a sample of the works of the chief protagonists of the Public Choice "Revolution" is a revelation. Endless cases of contradiction, basic assumptions and motivations which have much in common with Marxism are detected. Knight's legitimizing role is an illusion (not to say a fraud). Knight's affinities with the institutionalists are established. Distinction is made between the contradictions assignable to the Ricardian Vice and unavoidable contradictions arising from complexities in the phenomena and partiality in the theories. The languages of abstract, applied an professional economics are identified and critically examined.

Public expenditures taxation and welfare measurement

this article addresses the welfare and macroeconomics effects of fiscal policy in a frarnework where govemment chooses tax rates and the distribution of revenues between consumption and investment. We construct and simulate a model where public consumption affects individuaIs' utility and public capital is an argument of the production function. The simulations suggest that by simply reallocating expenditures from consumption to investment, the govemment can increase the equilibrium leveIs of capital stock, hours worked, output and labor productivity. Funhennore, we 'show that the magnitude and direction of the long run impact of fiscal policy depends on the size of the elasticity of output to public capital. If this parameter is high enough, it may be the case that capital stock, within limits, increases with tax rates.

Public debt sustainability and endogenous seigniorage in Brazil: time-series evidence from 1947-92: revised version

Using national accounts data for the revenue-GDP and expenditureGDP ratios from 1947 to 1992, we examine three central issues in public finance. First, was the path of public debt sustainable during this period? Second, if debt is sustainable, how has the government historically balanced the budget after shocks to either revenues or expenditures? Third, are expenditures exogenous? The results show that (i) public deficit is stationary (bounded asymptotic variance), with the budget in Brazil being balanced almost entirely through changes in taxes, regardless of the cause of the initial imbalance. Expenditures are weakly exogenous, but tax revenues are not; (ii) the behavior of a rational Brazilian consumer may be consistent with Ricardian Equivalence; (iii) seigniorage revenues are critical to restore intertemporal budget equilibrium, since, when we exclude them from total revenues, debt is not sustainable in econometric tests.

Comments on public debt indexation and denomination, the case of Brazil

In this work I analyze the model proposed by Goldfajn (2000) to study the choice of the denomination of the public debt. Some potential shortcmomings of the mo dei in explaining the data are discussed. Measures of the overestimation of the welfare gains of reducing distortions from taxation, under the model's simplified time frame, are also provided. Assuming a time-preference parameter of 0.9, for instance, welfare gains associated with a hedge to the debt that reduces to half a once-for-all 20o/o-of-GDP shock to governemnt spending run around 1.43% of GDP under the no-tax-smoothing structure of the model. Under a Ramsey allocation, though, welfare gains amount to just around 0.05% of GDP.

Contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations

A repeated moral hazard setting in which the Principal privately observes the Agent’s output is studied. It is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the Agent is supposed to exert effort every period, receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback until he is fired. The optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized, and shown to require burning of resources. These are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor (δ). For the infinite horizon case a family of fixed interval review contracts is characterized and shown to achieve first best as δ → 1. The optimal contract when δ << 1 is partially characterized. Incentives are optimally provided with a combination of efficiency wages and the threat of termination, which will exhibit memory over the whole history of realizations. Finally, Tournaments are shown to provide an alternative solution to the problem.