Three essays on local demand for public services

Local provision of public services has the positive effect of increasing the efficiency because each locality has its idiosyncrasies that determine a particular demand for public services. This dissertation addresses different aspects of the local demand for public goods and services and their relationship with political incentives. The text is divided in three essays. The first essay aims to test the existence of yardstick competition in education spending using panel data from Brazilian municipalities. The essay estimates two-regime spatial Durbin models with time and spatial fixed effects using maximum likelihood, where the regimes represent different electoral and educational accountability institutional settings. First, it is investigated whether the lame duck incumbents tend to engage in less strategic interaction as a result of the impossibility of reelection, which lowers the incentives for them to signal their type (good or bad) to the voters by mimicking their neighbors’ expenditures. Additionally, it is evaluated whether the lack of electorate support faced by the minority governments causes the incumbents to mimic the neighbors’ spending to a greater extent to increase their odds of reelection. Next, the essay estimates the effects of the institutional change introduced by the disclosure on April 2007 of the Basic Education Development Index (known as IDEB) and its goals on the strategic interaction at the municipality level. This institutional change potentially increased the incentives for incumbents to follow the national best practices in an attempt to signal their type to voters, thus reducing the importance of local information spillover. The same model is also tested using school inputs that are believed to improve students’ performance in place of education spending. The results show evidence for yardstick competition in education spending. Spatial auto-correlation is lower among the lame ducks and higher among the incumbents with minority support (a smaller vote margin). In addition, the institutional change introduced by the IDEB reduced the spatial interaction in education spending and input-setting, thus diminishing the importance of local information spillover. The second essay investigates the role played by the geographic distance between the poor and non-poor in the local demand for income redistribution. In particular, the study provides an empirical test of the geographically limited altruism model proposed in Pauly (1973), incorporating the possibility of participation costs associated with the provision of transfers (Van de Wale, 1998). First, the discussion is motivated by allowing for an “iceberg cost” of participation in the programs for the poor individuals in Pauly’s original model. Next, using data from the 2000 Brazilian Census and a panel of municipalities based on the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) from 2001 to 2007, all the distance-related explanatory variables indicate that an increased proximity between poor and non-poor is associated with better targeting of the programs (demand for redistribution). For instance, a 1-hour increase in the time spent commuting by the poor reduces the targeting by 3.158 percentage points. This result is similar to that of Ashworth, Heyndels and Smolders (2002) but is definitely not due to the program leakages. To empirically disentangle participation costs and spatially restricted altruism effects, an additional test is conducted using unique panel data based on the 2004 and 2006 PNAD, which assess the number of benefits and the average benefit value received by beneficiaries. The estimates suggest that both cost and altruism play important roles in targeting determination in Brazil, and thus, in the determination of the demand for redistribution. Lastly, the results indicate that ‘size matters’; i.e., the budget for redistribution has a positive impact on targeting. The third essay aims to empirically test the validity of the median voter model for the Brazilian case. Information on municipalities are obtained from the Population Census and the Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court for the year 2000. First, the median voter demand for local public services is estimated. The bundles of services offered by reelection candidates are identified as the expenditures realized during incumbents’ first term in office. The assumption of perfect information of candidates concerning the median demand is relaxed and a weaker hypothesis, of rational expectation, is imposed. Thus, incumbents make mistakes about the median demand that are referred to as misperception errors. Thus, at a given point in time, incumbents can provide a bundle (given by the amount of expenditures per capita) that differs from median voter’s demand for public services by a multiplicative error term, which is included in the residuals of the demand equation. Next, it is estimated the impact of the module of this misperception error on the electoral performance of incumbents using a selection models. The result suggests that the median voter model is valid for the case of Brazilian municipalities.

Water for life : the impact of the privatization of water services on child mortality

While most countries are committed to increasing access to safe water and thereby reducing child mortality, there is little consensus on how to actually improve water services. One important proposal under discussion is whether to privatize water provision. In the 1990s Argentina embarked on one of the largest privatization campaigns in the world including the privatization of local water companies covering approximately 30 percent of the country’s municipalities. Using the varia tion in ownership of water provision across time and space generated by the privatization process, we find that child mortality fell 8 percent in the areas that privatized their water services; and that the effect was largest (26 percent) in the poorest areas. We check the robustness of these estimates using cause specific mortality. While privatization is associated with significant reductions in deaths from infectious and parasitic diseases, it is uncorrelated with deaths from causes unrelated to water conditions.

Accountability and yardstick competition in the public provision of education

This paper explores the institutional change introduced by the public disclosure of an education development index (IDEB, Basic Education Development Index) in 2007 to identify the e ect of education accountability on yardstick competition in education spending for Brazilian municipalities. Our results are threefold. First, political incentives are pervasive in setting the education expenditures. The spatial strategic behavior on education spending is estimated lower for lame-ducks and for those incumbents with majority support at the city council. This suggests a strong relation between commitment and accountability which reinforces yardstick competition theory. Second, we nd a minor reduction (20%) in spatial interaction for public education spending after IDEB's disclosure | compared to the spatial correlation before the disclosure of the index. This suggests that public release of information may decrease the importance of the neighbors` counterpart information on voter`s decision. Third, exploring the discontinuity of IDEB`s disclosure rule around the cut-o of 30 students enrolled in the grade under assessment, our estimates suggest that the spatial autocorrelation | and hence yardstick competition | is reduced in 54%. Finally, an unforeseen result suggests that the disclosure of IDEB increases expenditures, more than 100% according to our estimates.

Public versus private provision of infrastructure in a neoclassical growth model

This article studies the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public (“infrastructure”). A positive externality due to infrastructure capital is assumed, so that the government could improve upon decentralized allocations internalizing the externality, but public investmentis …nanced through distortionary taxation. It is shown that privatization is welfare-improving for a large set of economies and that after privatization under-investment is optimal. When operation inefficiency in the public sectoror subsidy to infrastructure accumulation are introduced, gains from privatization are higherand positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters.

A pontencialidade educativa da pena de prestação de serviços à comunidade

Este trabalho objetiva constatar se a pena de prestação de serviços à comunidade, quando aplicada, tem um papel educativo junto ao infrator beneficiário da medida, seja como substituta da pena privativa de liberdade, após a condenação, seja como medida alternativa, após transação penal em sede do Juizado Especial Criminal. Com base no conceito de educação apresentado pelo professor Paulo Freire, busca identificar, através de entrevistas com beneficiários, se existe um trabalho conscientizador ( mediante troca de experiências e atividades educativas) desenvolvido pelas instituições receptoras dos beneficiários da medida e, se a reinserção imediata do infrator na sociedade viabiliza essa conscientização sobre a sua conduta criminosa. Assim, pretende constatar se a referida medida tem apenas um caráter punitivo ou vem desenvolvendo uma função educativa durante a sua execução.

Liderança e gênero na administração pública: a percepção dos gerentes das agências da previdência social em Recife

Os desafios advindos da redefinição do papel do Estado e da busca pela eficiência na prestação dos serviços públicos fundamentam a realização do presente estudo. Diante disso, abordou-se a realidade dos Gerentes das Agencias da Previdência Social do Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social, pessoas-chave na implantação de um modelo de Administração Pública que atenda às demandas sociais. Buscou-se identificar as percepções sobre o desenvolvimento da liderança, explicitando as relações de gênero vivenciadas no exercício desses cargos. A abordagem de gênero baseou-se no expressivo contingente de mulheres existente no serviço público. Assim, entende-se que as questões de liderança nesse setor são permeadas pelas relações de gênero. Nesse aspecto, foi realizada a contextualização da trajetória e lutas das mulheres por emancipação e da situação delas nos cargos de destaque na Administração Pública. Contextualizando o presente estudo, realizou-se a construção histórica e a apresentação dos conceitos relacionados à modernização do Estado, à Gestão Pública e à prestação dos serviços públicos no Brasil, isso conduziu à discussão de temas relacionados à cidadania e direitos sociais. Quanto aos aspectos metodológicos, trata-se de um estudo de caso, com abordagem qualitativa, de caráter descritivo. A pesquisa de campo viabilizou os meios para a coleta dos dados, com a aplicação de questionário e entrevista semiestrurada associada à construção de desenhos. Adotou-se a análise de conteúdo para o tratamento dos dados. Foi realizada a caracterização do perfil sócio-profissional dos servidores que ocupam cargos de gerente no nível operacional do INSS e abordados os dilemas decorrentes do exercício de cargos de chefia e da busca pela liderança no desenvolvimento das competências necessárias à gestão das Agências. No âmbito das relações de gênero, foram correlacionados os significados, a partir da elaboração das vivências, enquanto homens e mulheres, no desempenho do papel de gerente nesses locais de trabalho. Importantes resultados foram observados na análise das entrevistas com a aplicação da técnica de construção de desenhos. Em geral, os gerentes demonstraram gostar e ter orgulho do que fazem, contudo, há desgastes e tensionamentos decorrentes das deficiências de infraestrutura, entre outras. Apesar disso, os gerentes demonstram capacidade de aprendizagem com essas situações e sobressaem muitos sentimentos positivos, entre eles, envolvimento, compromisso e colaboração. Os resultados da pesquisa levantam questões e recomendações que serão colocadas à disposição da organização, com elementos e reflexões no intuito de contribuir com os processos educacionais na gestão de pessoas.

Optimal provision of implicit and explicit incentives in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by investors to portfolio managers in a two-period relationship. We show that the fiow of funds is a powerful incentive in an asset management contract. We build a binomial moral hazard model to explain the main trade-ofIs in the relationship between fiow, fees and performance. The main assumption is that efIort depend" on the combination of implicit and explicit incentives while the probability distrioutioll function of returns depends on efIort. In the case of full commitment, the investor's relevant trade-ofI is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce efIort in the first período The more concerned the investor is with today's payoff. the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the following periods. That is. in the second period, the investor penalizes observed low returns by withdrawing resources from non-performing portfolio managers. Besides, he pays performance fee when the observed excess return is positive. When commitment is not a plausible hypothesis, we consider that the investor also learns some symmetríc and imperfect information about the ability of the manager to generate positive excess returno In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as efIort choices exerted by the portfolio manager. We show that implicit incentives can explain the fiow-performance relationship and, conversely, endogenous expected return determines incentives provision and define their optimal leveIs. We provide a numerical solution in Matlab that characterize these results.

Cyclicality of SME Lending and Government Involvement in Banks

Recent regulatory efforts aim at lowering the cyclicality of bank lending because of its potential detrimental effects on financial stability and the real economy. We investigate the cyclicality of SME lending by local banks with vs. without a public mandate, controlling for location, size, loan maturity, funding structure, liquidity, profitability, and credit demand-side factors. The public mandate is set by local governments and stipulates a deviation from strict profit maximization and a sustainable provision of financial services to local customers. We find that banks with a public mandate are 25 percent less cyclical than other local banks. The result is credit supply-side driven and especially strong for savings banks with high liquidity and stable deposit funding. Our findings have implications for the banking structure, financial stability and the finance-growth nexus in a local context.

Cyclicality of SME lending and government involvement in banks

Recent regulatory efforts aim at lowering the cyclicality of bank lending because of its potential detrimental effects on financial stability and the real economy. We investigate the cyclicality of SME lending by local banks with vs. without a public mandate, controlling for location, size, loan maturity, funding structure, liquidity, profitability, and credit demand-side factors. The public mandate is set by local governments and stipulates a deviation from strict profit maximization and a sustainable provision of financial services to local customers. We find that banks with a public mandate are 25 percent less cyclical than other local banks. The result is credit supply-side driven and especially strong for savings banks with high liquidity and stable deposit funding. Our findings have implications for the banking structure, financial stability and the finance-growth nexus in a local context.