Aggregate uncertainty, disappointment aversion and the business cycle

We investigate the eff ect of aggregate uncertainty shocks on real variables. More speci fically, we introduce a shock in the volatility of productivity in an RBC model with long-run volatility risk and preferences that exhibit generalised disappointment aversion. We find that, when combined with a negative productivity shock, a volatility shock leads to further decline in real variables, such as output, consumption, hours worked and investment. For instance, out of the 2% decrease in output as a result of both shocks, we attribute 0.25% to the e ffect of an increase in volatility. We also fi nd that this e ffect is the same as the one obtained in a model with Epstein-Zin- Weil preferences, but higher than that of a model with expected utility. Moreover, GDA preferences yield superior asset pricing results, when compared to both Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences and expected utility.

The effects of external and internal strikes on total factor productivity

This paper examines structural changes that occur in the total factor productivity (TFP) within countries. It is possible that some episodes of high economic growth or economic decline are associated with permanent productivity shocks, therefore, this research has two objectives. The Örst one is to estimate the structural changes present in TFP for a sample of 81 countries between 1950(60) and 2000. The second one is to identify, whenever possible, episodes in the political and economic history of these countries that may account for the structural breaks in question. The results suggest that about 85% of the TFP time-series present at least one structural break, moreover, at least half the structural changes can be attributed to internal factors, such as independence or a newly adopted constitution, and about 30% to external shocks, such as oil shock or shocks in international interest rates. The majority of the estimated breaks are downwards, indicating that after a break the TFP tends to decrease, implying that institutional rearrangements, external shocks, or internal shocks may be costly and from which it is very di¢ cult to recover.