Regional trade agreements and the world trade organization

A Década de 1990 foi Marcada por uma Considerável Proliferação de Acordos Regionais de Comercio (Arcs). Esses Acordos, que em Princípio Teriam Caráter Excepcional no Sistema Multilateral de Comércio, Espalharam-Se por Várias Partes do Mundo E, Atualmente, são Raros os Casos de Países que não Participam de Pelo Menos um Acordo Preferencial. este Artigo tem como Objetivo Analisar os Acordos Preferenciais e suas Implicações no Sistema Multilateral de Comércio E, para Tanto, são Considerados os Aspectos Normativos e Econômicos Relacionados ao Tema. Além Disso, Apresenta-Se a Sistematização das Principais Questões Alusivas À Interpretação das Regras da Omc Relativas Aos Acordos Regionais de Comércio. Finalmente, com o Intuito de Fornecer Elementos Adicionais para a Avaliação do dos Acordos Preferenciais Serão Analisados os Impactos Econômicos de Alguns dos Principais Acordos para o Mercosul.

Rent dissipation, political viability and the strategic adoption of free trade agreements

This paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs). The key element of the analysis is the “rent dissipation” that these arrangements induce: by eliminating intra-bloc trade barriers, an FTA reduces the incentives of the local firms to lobby for higher external tariffs, thereby causing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process. The prospect of rent dissipation moderates the governments’ willingness to participate in FTAs; they will support only arrangements that are “substantially” welfare improving, and no FTA that reduces welfare. Rent dissipation also implies that the prospects of political turnover may create strategic reasons for the formation of FTAs. Specifically, a government facing a high enough probability of losing power may want to form a trade bloc simply to “tie the hands” of its successor. An FTA can affect the likelihood of political turnover as well. If the incumbent party has a known bias toward special interests, it may want to commit to less distortionary policies in order to reduce its electoral disadvantage; the rent dissipation effect ensures that an FTA can serve as the vehicle for such a commitment. In nascent/unstable democracies, the incumbent government can use a free trade agreement also to reduce the likelihood of a dictatorial takeover and to “consolidate” democracy – a finding that is consistent with the timing of numerous accessions to and formations of preferential arrangements.

Agreements and disputes over non-tariff measures

In trade agreements, governments can design remedies to ensure compliance (property rule) or to compensate victims (liability rule). This paper describes an economic framework to explain the pattern of remedies over non-tariff restrictions—particularly domestic subsidies and nonviolation complaints subject to liability rules. The key determinants of the contract form for any individual measure are the expected joint surplus from an agreement and the expected loss to the constrained government. The loss is higher for domestic subsidies and nonviolations because these are the policies most likely to correct domestic distortions. Governments choose property rules when expected gains from compliance are sufficiently high and expected losses to the constrained country are sufficiently low. Liability rules are preferable when dispute costs are relatively high, because inefficiencies in the compensation process reduce the number of socially inefficient disputes filed.

Citizens and the future of multilateralism in a polycentric world at 2030: the perspectives of emerging countries for the trading system: the impasse of WTO, the trends of mega agreements, the logic of value chains and the advent of consumers concerns on international trade

A new paradigm is modeling the World: evolutionary innovations in all fronts, new information technologies, huge mobility of capital, use of risky financial tools, globalization of production, new emerging powers and the impact of consumer concerns on governmental policies. These phenomena are shaping the World and forcing the advent of a new World Order in the Multilateral Monetary, Financial, and Trading System. The effects of this new paradigm are also transforming global governance. The political and economic orders established after the World War and centered on the multilateral model of UN, IMF, World Bank, and the GATT, leaded by the developed countries, are facing significant challenges. The rise of China and emerging countries shifted the old model to a polycentric World, where the governance of these organizations are threatened by emerging countries demanding a bigger participation in the role and decision boards of these international bodies. As a consequence, multilateralism is being confronted by polycentrism. Negotiations for a more representative voting process and the pressure for new rules to cope with the new demands are paralyzing important decisions. This scenario is affecting seriously not only the Monetary and Financial Systems but also the Multilateral Trading System. International trade is facing some significant challenges: a serious deadlock to conclude the last round of the multilateral negotiation at the WTO, the fragmentation of trade rules by the multiplication of preferential and mega agreements, the arrival of a new model of global production and trade leaded by global value chains that is threatening the old trade order, and the imposition of new sets of regulations by private bodies commanded by transnationals to support global value chains and non-governmental organizations to reflect the concerns of consumers in the North based on their precautionary attitude about sustainability of products made in the World. The lack of any multilateral order in this new regulation is creating a big cacophony of rules and developing a new regulatory war of the Global North against the Global South. The objective of this paper is to explore how these challenges are affecting the Tradinge System and how it can evolve to manage these new trends.

Justiça penal negociada: o processo penal pelas partes

O presente trabalho busca analisar a aplicabilidade da Justiça Penal Negociada no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro a partir do papel desempenhado pelas partes no processo penal. Nesse sentido, quanto ao Ministério Público, serão estudadas as funções exercidas pelos seus membros, bem como as principais características institucionais, a fim de se interpretar a natureza da sua atividade na promoção da ação penal pública, especialmente o dilema entre a possibilidade de atuação discricionária ou a sua vinculação à obrigatoriedade. Em relação ao imputado, serão examinadas a possibilidade jurídica de limitação infraconstitucional aos seus direitos fundamentais e de renúncia ao exercício das suas garantias processuais individuais. Por fim, a partir do atual panorama evolutivo dos acordos criminais existentes na nossa legislação, espera-se verificar se de fato há uma tendência de fortalecimento do papel das partes e de desfocalização da figura do juiz, passando para o Ministério Público a tarefa de regulador do processo penal, ao negociar com o imputado as repercussões penais de suas condutas.

5th BRICS Trade and Economic Research Network (TERN) meeting: the impact of mega agreements on BRICS

The BRICS TERN – BRICS Trade and Economics Research Network is a group of independent research institutes established four years ago by five think tanks from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The main objective of the network is to study different aspects of trade and economic relations amongst these five countries. The purpose of the V BRICS TERN Meeting was to analyze and debate the effects of the negotiations of the Mega Agreements, mainly those initiated by the US and the EU, already in negotiation, to each of the BRICS Trade Policies. Both Mega Agreements were examined – the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The studies included the main impacts on trade flows and on the international trade rules system, respecting the perspective of each of the countries concerned. This workshop was an initiative of the Center for Global Trade and Investments (CGTI), a think-tank on International Trade held by FGV Sao Paulo School of Economics. Its main objective is the research on trade regulation, preferential trade agreements, trade and currency, trade and global value chains, through legal analysis and economic modelling. One of its main researches, now, is on the potential economic and legal impacts of the Mega Agreements on Brazil and WTO rules. This meeting was organized in March14, 2014, in Rio de Janeiro, in a perfect timing for introducing such issues in the international agenda, in advance of the 6th BRICS Summit scheduled to be held in Brazil in July 2014.

The not so generalized effects of nonreciprocal trade agreements

This dissertation uses an empirical gravity equation approach to study the relationship between nonreciprocal trade agreements (NRTAs) and members’ trade flows. Estimations relate bilateral imports to trade policy variables using a very comprehensive dataset with over fifty years of data. Results show that meager average trade effects exist only if members are excluded from the world trading system or if they are very poor. As trade flows between NRTA members are already rising before their creation, results also suggest a strong endogeneity concerning their formation. Moreover, estimations show that uncertainty and discretion tend to critically hinder NRTA’s performance. On the other hand, reciprocal trade agreements show the opposite pattern regardless of members’ income status.Encouraging developing countries’ openness to trade through reciprocal liberalization emerges consequently as a possible policy implication.