Electoral control in the presence of gridlocks

This article presents a game-theoretic partisan model of voting and political bargaining. In a two-period setup, voters ¯rst elect an executive incumbent and the legislators from a pool of candidates belonging to di®erent parties. Once elected, the executive and the legislature bargain over a budget. Party origin and a relevant parameter of the economy, the state of the world, in°uence the bargaining cost, such that political gridlocks may occur. At the end of the ¯rst period voters observe the outcome of bargaining but do not observe the true estate of the world, and decide whether or not to reelect the same parties for the Executive and the Legislature. The model con¯rms the very recent literature by showing that voters tend to have more °exible reelection criteria when they believe the true state of the world is likely to be unfavorable. On the other hand, when voters believe the true state of the world is likely to be favorable, they become more demanding in order to reelect the incumbents. In particular, there will be government shutdown with positive probability in equilibrium. Gridlocks occur due to the imperfect information of voters and they constitute indeed an information revelation mechanism that improves electoral control in the second period.

Testing for super-exogeneity in the presence of common deterministic shifts

This paper introduces the concept of common deterministic shifts (CDS). This concept is simple, intuitive and relates to the common structure of shifts or policy interventions. We propose a Reduced Rank technique to investigate the presence of CDS. The proposed testing procedure has standard asymptotics and good small-sample properties. We further link the concept of CDS to that of superexogeneity. It is shown that CDS tests can be constructed which allow to test for super-exogeneity. The Monte Carlo evidence indicates that the CDS test for super-exogeneity dominates testing procedures proposed in the literature.