3 resultados para Political strategic
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
This paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs). The key element of the analysis is the “rent dissipation” that these arrangements induce: by eliminating intra-bloc trade barriers, an FTA reduces the incentives of the local firms to lobby for higher external tariffs, thereby causing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process. The prospect of rent dissipation moderates the governments’ willingness to participate in FTAs; they will support only arrangements that are “substantially” welfare improving, and no FTA that reduces welfare. Rent dissipation also implies that the prospects of political turnover may create strategic reasons for the formation of FTAs. Specifically, a government facing a high enough probability of losing power may want to form a trade bloc simply to “tie the hands” of its successor. An FTA can affect the likelihood of political turnover as well. If the incumbent party has a known bias toward special interests, it may want to commit to less distortionary policies in order to reduce its electoral disadvantage; the rent dissipation effect ensures that an FTA can serve as the vehicle for such a commitment. In nascent/unstable democracies, the incumbent government can use a free trade agreement also to reduce the likelihood of a dictatorial takeover and to “consolidate” democracy – a finding that is consistent with the timing of numerous accessions to and formations of preferential arrangements.
Resumo:
We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters a run-off election takes place among the top two candidates if neither achieves a majority of the votes. At a first stage, we show that the possibility of runoff increases political competition. At a second stage, we use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality from political competition to fiscal policy. Our second stage results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current spending, particularly personnel expenses. Furthermore, the impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.
Resumo:
Judging by their success in Europe, Asia and North America, passenger and cargo railways are appreciated as the key to infrastructural development in Brazil. The issues are complex and steeped in uncertainty, as well as political and economic agendas, and a wide array of intersecting issues such as business and unionized interests, agricultural and industrial geographical spreads, as well as the emergence of alternative power sources. Not only are the issues systemic, but railway development itself always comes as a physical network structure. The situation under consideration, in other words, is systemic from both the soft and hard systems point of view, thus promising a rich context for systems studies. As an initial attempt in understanding the situation at hand, the research reported here applied the problem structuring approach known as Strategic Options Development and Analysis (SODA) in order to map and analyze issues facing the Brazilian railways. Strategic options for the future development of the railways were identified and analyzed, and ways forward for future research are proposed. In addition, the report serves as an initial knowledge base that can guide future systemic planning studies in the industry.