The interdisciplinary perspective on International Law and International Relations by Anne-Marie Slaughter

Este artigo consiste em uma resenha crítica sobre a reflexão de Anne-Marie Slaughter para uma aproximação interdisciplinar entre Direito Internacional e Relações Internacionais. Slaughter tem sido apontada, internacionalmente, como uma das protagonistas neste debate acadêmico, e sua obra é indicada como uma das mais influentes na academia dos Estados Unidos da América, no século XX. Em tempos de aproximação entre juristas e internacionalistas no Brasil, o artigo procura contribuir com a contextualização da produção da autora, bem como elucidar os momentos de influência das suas atividades em outros centros de discussão e produção. A proposta principal deste artigo é, assim, favorecer um mapeamento histórico e contextualizado da chamada para o debate interdisciplinar entre Direito Internacional e Relações Internacionais, a partir dos trabalhos de um de seus pivôs na academia nos Estados Unidos.

Brazil & Lusphone Africa: a study of history, international relations, & international trade

This report was inspired by a personal motivation to acquire more in depth knowledge about Brazil and Lusophone (Portuguese speaking) African nations and how they interact with each other in relation to their common colonial histories, cultures, and on matters of international relations, international development, and international trade. The countries selected for purpose and focus of this report are Brazil, Angola, and Mozambique; reference will also be made with respect to other Lusophone African countries such as Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and São Tomé e Príncipe. Some of the research methodologies used to gather information about Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, and other Lusophone African nations in relation to their respective histories, international relations, international trade relations, and roles in the global economy as emerging market nations.

Foreign support, internal political disputes and mass killings

This paper studies the incentives underlying the relations between foreign countries and rival domestic groups. It models the interaction in a infinitely-repeated game between these three players. The domestic groups bargain for a split of the domestic surplus and may engage in violent dispute for power and in unilateral mass killing processes. The foreign country may choose to support one of these groups in exchange for monetary transfers. The paper characterizes the parametric set in which strategies leading to no violent disputes nor mass killings are Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibra in the presence of foreign support, but not in its absence.