Autonomia e futuro da perícia oficial na percepção dos peritos criminais

Este estudo teve como objetivo levantar a visão de futuro da Criminalistiea brasileira conforme as pereepçõcs autonómieas de peritos oficiais empregando como parad igma os efeitos da Lei 12.03012009, que atribuiu a autonomia técnica, científica ti funcional " estes profissionais. Para isso, rea lizou-se uma pesquisa bibliográfica c de campo. O univcrso da pesquisa foi os Peritos Oficiai , . /\ amo,tra foi fommda por 39 peritos Criminais, um grupo principal COl1lpo~to por 31 peritos de carreira incluindo gestores locais de Instituições Federais (Polícia FctJeral, Polícia do Distrito Federal) e c.s tadoaiS (Polícia Civil e Secretaria de Scgurança Pública) c um grupo complcnlenlar composto por Gestores (04) c Lideranças (04) Nacionai~ destes órgãos. Ao grupo principal foi aplicado um testc de evocação com as palavras "Autonomia" e "Pcricia". como fase preparatória às entrevistas semi cSlrutura

Demand aggregation and credit risk effects in pooled procurement: evidence from the Brazilian public purchases of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies

Pooled procurement has an important role in reducing acquisition prices of goods. A pool of buyers, which aggregates demand for its members, increases bargaining power and allows suppliers to achieve economies of scale and scope in the production. Such aggregation demand e ect lowers prices paid for buyers. However, when a buyer with a good reputation for paying suppliers in a timely manner is joined in the pool by a buyer with bad reputation may have its price paid increased due to the credit risk e ect on prices. This will happen because prices paid in a pooled procurement should refect the (higher) average buyers' credit risk. Using a data set on Brazilian public purchases of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, we nd evidence supporting both e ects. We show that the prices paid by public bodies in Brazil are lower when they buy through pooled procurement than individually. On the other hand, federal agencies (i.e. good buyers) pay higher prices for products when they are joined by state agencies (i.e. bad buyers) in a pool. Such evidence suggests that pooled procurement should be carefully designed to avoid that prices paid increase for its members.