The Olympic impact on hosting candidate countries

In this paper, we analyze the impact of hosting the Summer Olympics on macroeconomic aggregates such as GDP, consumption, government consumption and investments per capita. The data is in panel structure and includes the period of ten years before and ten years after the event containing the Olympic Summer Games between 1960 and 1996. The sample countries comprise only candidates to host the games. This sampling strategy allows us to estimate the average treatment effect consistently, because it is assumed that these countries are comparable to each other, including those that ultimately hosted the games. The impact of hosting the Olympic games is measured by Fixed Effect and First Difference regressions. Moreover, we do a structural break test developed by Andrews (1993) to identify if hosting the Olympic Games creates anticipation effects for demand changes that stimulate current GDP, consumption, government consumption and investments. The results indicate a positive effect of the Summer Olympics in all variables of interest. However, the distribution in time and anticipation of these effects is unclear in the tests, changing significantly depending on the model and the significance level used.

Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate performance

We argue in this paper that executives can only impact firm outcomes if they have influence over crucial decisions. Based on this idea we develop and test a hypothesis about how CEOs’ power to influence decisions will affect firm performance: since managers’ opinions may differ, firms whose CEOs have more decision-making power should experience more variability in firm performance. Thus performance depends on the interaction between executive characteristics and organizational variables. By focusing on this interaction we are able to use firm-level characteristics to test predictions that are related to unobservable managerial characteristics. Using such firmlevel characteristics of the Executive Office we develop a proxy for the CEO’s power to influence decisions and provide evidence consistent with our hypothesis. Firm performance (measured by Tobin’s Q, stock returns and ROA) is significantly more variable for firms with greater values of our proxy for CEO influence power. The results are robust across various tests designed to detect differences in variability.