Does absorptive capacity affect project performance? A study based on project management practices, organization learning, and knowledge

The literature has emphasized that absorptive capacity (AC) leads to performance, but in projects its influences still unclear. Additionally, the project success is not well understood by the literature, and AC can be an important mechanism to explain it. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of absorptive capacity on project performance in the construction industry of São Paulo State. We study this influence through potential and realized absorptive capacity proposed by Zahra and George (2002). For achieving this goal, we use a combination of qualitative and quantitative research. The qualitative research is based on 15 interviews with project managers in different sectors to understand the main constructs and support the next quantitative phase. The content analysis was the technique used to analyze those interviews. In quantitative phase through a survey questionnaire, we collected 157 responses in the construction sector with project managers. The confirmatory factor analysis and hierarchical linear regression were the techniques used to assess the data. Our findings suggest that the realized absorptive capacity has a positive influence on performance, but potential absorptive capacity and the interactions effect have no influence on performance. Moreover, the planning and monitoring have a positive impact on budget and schedule, and customer satisfaction while risk coping capacity has a positive impact on business success. In academics terms, this research enables a better understanding of the importance of absorptive capacity in the construction industry and it confirms that knowledge application in processes and routines enhances performance. For management, the absorptive capacity enables the improvements of internal capabilities reflected in the increased project management efficiency. Indeed, when a company manages project practices efficiently it enhances business and project performance; however, it needs initially to improve its internal abilities to enrich processes and routines through relevant knowledge.

Doces práticas para matar : o papel de recursos humanos em downsizing e demissão

As transformações ocorridas a partir da década de 80 na economia, na maneira de administrar as empresas e nas relações de trabalho levaram à perda de emprego de milhares de pessoas. Downsizing e demissão passaram a ser comum tanto no Brasil como em outros lugares do mundo. Chama a atenção, entretanto, que a literatura na área de recursos humanos não contemple as atividades de gerenciamento das demissões. Fala-se dos quatro pilares da área de recursos humanos: recrutamento, seleção, avaliação de desempenho, desenvolvimento e remuneração, mas o tema da demissão parece estar discretamente omitido. O objetivo deste trabalho foi: a) apresentar uma revisão da literatura nacional e internacional com artigos sobre o tema e b) buscar como profissionais de recursos humanos e demissores descrevem as práticas de demissão, de modo a evidenciar o papel da área de recursos humanos (e de gestores) nestes processos. A retórica em Recursos Humanos, já descrita por Legge (1995), de que precisamos ser cruéis para amar, apresenta-se como uma ação fundamental na construção das práticas organizativas em demissão e downsizing.

A avaliação de desempenho humano no exército brasileiro: uma análise do sistema 2003

This study aims to analyze the current systematics of Performance Appraisal used by the Brazilian Army, in a way that permits us to identify its characteristics that hinder it to fulfill the purposes and objectives to which it proposes. In order to do so, it is used the theoretical referential not only related to Performance Appraisal itself, but also that one that focus on the subjects related to it. In spite of the multiple forms Performance Appraisal can take, some internal characteristics and coherences must be observed so that the system can function correctly. Moreover, it can not be forgotten that, as a tool, the appraisal will be strongly influenced by the organizational culture where it is used. The organizational culture, in turn, does not find itself isolated from the society in which the organization operates. When all these characteristics are brought to the analyses of the system used by the Brazilian Army, several of problems emerges, including: the presence of objectives of antagonistic nature; the lack of linking with the organization strategy; the absence of mechanism to operate the objectives; appraisal used as a coercion tool, in the attempt to keep the domination system that begin to be contested; adoption of an appraisal method which strengthens the coercitive use of it and that does not propitiate a complete vision of the apprasee; the lack of steps on the appraisal process, including in the absence of parameters adoption for the appraisal, inserting great subjectivity into the system and supplying insufficient feedback to the appraisees; use of an instrument also of great subjectivity and reductionist; and a awarding system that, besides replying the distortions of the evaluation system, adds others.

Optimal performance fee and flow of funds in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of ow of funds as an implicit incentive in the asset management industry. We build a two-period bi- nomial moral hazard model to explain the trade-o¤s between ow, per- formance and fees where e¤ort depends on the combination of implicit ( ow of funds) and explicit (performance fee) incentives. Two cases are considered. With full commitment, the investor s relevant trade-o¤ is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce e¤ort in the rst period. The more concerned the investor is with today s pay- o¤, the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the second period by penalizing negative excess return in the rst period. Without full commitment, the investor learns some symmetric and imperfect infor- mation about the ability of the manager to obtain positive excess return. In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as e¤ort choices. We show that powerful implicit incentives may explain the ow-performance relationship with a numerical solution. Besides, risk aversion explains the complementarity between performance fee and ow of funds.