The insurance function of contracts

One of the central problems in contract law is to define the frontier between legal and illegal breaches of promises. The distinction between good and bad faith is perhaps the conceptual tool most commonly used to tell one from the other. Lawyers spend a lot of energy trying to frame better definitions of the concepts of good and bad faith based on principles of ethics or justice, but often pay much less attention to theories dealing with the incentives that can engender good faith behavior in contractual relationships. By describing the economics of what Stiglitz defined as “explicit” and “implicit” insurance, I highlight the “insurance function” hidden in any promise with basically no mathematical notation. My aim is to render the subject intelligible and useful to lawyers with little familiarity with economics.

A pontencialidade educativa da pena de prestação de serviços à comunidade

Este trabalho objetiva constatar se a pena de prestação de serviços à comunidade, quando aplicada, tem um papel educativo junto ao infrator beneficiário da medida, seja como substituta da pena privativa de liberdade, após a condenação, seja como medida alternativa, após transação penal em sede do Juizado Especial Criminal. Com base no conceito de educação apresentado pelo professor Paulo Freire, busca identificar, através de entrevistas com beneficiários, se existe um trabalho conscientizador ( mediante troca de experiências e atividades educativas) desenvolvido pelas instituições receptoras dos beneficiários da medida e, se a reinserção imediata do infrator na sociedade viabiliza essa conscientização sobre a sua conduta criminosa. Assim, pretende constatar se a referida medida tem apenas um caráter punitivo ou vem desenvolvendo uma função educativa durante a sua execução.

Aggregate vs disaggregate data analysis: a paradox in the estimation of money demand function of Japan under the low interest rate policy

We investigate the issue of whether there was a stable money demand function for Japan in 1990's using both aggregate and disaggregate time series data. The aggregate data appears to support the contention that there was no stable money demand function. The disaggregate data shows that there was a stable money demand function. Neither was there any indication of the presence of liquidity trapo Possible sources of discrepancy are explored and the diametrically opposite results between the aggregate and disaggregate analysis are attributed to the neglected heterogeneity among micro units. We also conduct simulation analysis to show that when heterogeneity among micro units is present. The prediction of aggregate outcomes, using aggregate data is less accurate than the prediction based on micro equations. Moreover. policy evaluation based on aggregate data can be grossly misleading.