A note on policy, the composition of public expenditures and economic growth

In this article we study the growth and welfare effects of fiscal and monetary policies in economies where public investment is part of the productive process we present four different models that share the same technology with public infrastructure as a separate argument of the production function. We show that growth is maximized at positive levels of income tax and inflation. However, unless there are no transfers or public goods in the economy, maximization of growth does not imply welfare maximization we show that the optimal tax rate is greater than the rate that maximizes growth and the optimal rate of money creation is below the growth maximizing rate. With public infrastructure in the production function we no longer obtain superneutrality in the Sidrausky model.

Public expenditures taxation and welfare measurement

this article addresses the welfare and macroeconomics effects of fiscal policy in a frarnework where govemment chooses tax rates and the distribution of revenues between consumption and investment. We construct and simulate a model where public consumption affects individuaIs' utility and public capital is an argument of the production function. The simulations suggest that by simply reallocating expenditures from consumption to investment, the govemment can increase the equilibrium leveIs of capital stock, hours worked, output and labor productivity. Funhennore, we 'show that the magnitude and direction of the long run impact of fiscal policy depends on the size of the elasticity of output to public capital. If this parameter is high enough, it may be the case that capital stock, within limits, increases with tax rates.

Inflation, welfare and public expenditures

This paper studies welfare effects of monetary policy in an overlapping generations model with capital and no form of taxation other than inflation. Public expenditures have a positive effect on labor productivity. The main result of the paper is that an expansive monetary policy can be welfare improving, at least for ìsmall enoughî inflation rates, and that there is an optimal inflation rate. Growth maximization, however, is never optimal. Steady-state capital and output increase with inflation, reproducing the so-called Tobin effect. For large inflation rates, however, the government authorities cannot affect real variables and there are only nominal effects.

Inflationary financing of public investment and economic growth

a theoretical model is constructed in order to explain particular historical experiences in which inflation acceleration apparently helped to spur a period of economic growth. Government financed expenditures affect positively the productivity growth in this model so that the distortionary effect of inflation tax is compensated by the productive effect of public expenditures. We show that for some interval of money creation rates there is an equilibrium where money is valued and where steady state physical capital grows with inflation. It is also shown that zero inflation and growth maximization are never the optimal policies.

Intergovernmental transfers and public spending in Brazilian municipalities

We estimate the effects of unconditional (full fiscal decentralization) versus conditional (partial fiscal decentralization) block grants on local public spending in Brazilian municipalities. Our results suggest that the effect of unconditional and conditional transfers do not differ statistically. Their combination promotes a full crowding-in effect on aggregate public spending — i.e., for $1 of unconditional and conditional grant receipts; we find $1 of additional local public expenditures, greater than the corresponding effect of local income, providing further evidence for the flypaper effect. Moreover, the effect of unconditional transfers on education (health) spending is smaller than the effect of conditional education (health) transfers but greater than the corresponding effect of local income. We consider four strategies to identify causal effects of federal grants and the local income on fiscal responses regarding Brazilian local governments: (i) a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, (ii) Redistributive rules of education funds, (iii) Oil and Gas production, and (iv) Rainfall deviations from the historical mean.

Sustained growth, government expenditure and inflation

We construct and simulate a theoretical model in order to explain particular historical experiences in which inflation acceleration apparently helped to spur a period of economic growth. Government financed expenditures affect positively the produtivity growth in this model so that the distortionary effect of inflation tax is compensated by the productive effect of public expenditures. We show that for some interval of money creation rates there is an equilibrium where money is valued and where steady state physica1 capital grows with inflation. It is a1so shown that zero inflation and growth maximization are never the optimal policies.

A note on growth and inflation

A simple exercise on growth and inflationary financing of public expenditures is presented in this note. In a parameterized overlapping generations mode1 where government expenses positivc1y affects the growth rate of human capital, steady state capital and output increase with inflation, reproducing the so called Tobin effect. For large inflation rates, however, government authorities cannot affect real variables and there are only nominal effects. It is also shown that the optimal policy implies some inflation but not growth maximization.

Transparência, a resposta institucional à pressão social: o caso do Tribunal de Contas do Estado do Rio de Janeiro

The present work aims to identify emerging organizational changes in the Court of Accounts of the State of Rio de Janeiro - TCE/RJ that are happening in the contemporary scenery known as the Age of Information. The search for the comprehension of the institutional dynamics is oriented by concepts originated from the theory of complexity, which believe that the public services external control system can be understood in a political, technical and legal environment with growing levels of learning and innovation. While chasing the possible causes of these changes, we try to prove the hypothesis that the TCE/RJ is turning into a more transparent organization. For this purpose, we define the outlines and reaches of the principle of transparency, based in bibliographical and documental researches, and analyze the phenomenon perceived in a explanation research through semi-structured interviews performed with two groups: a sample representing the universe under jurisdiction entities top level directors and the other obtained in the universe of formal and informal leaderships existing in the educational body of the institution. The conclusion of the present work confirms the initial questions, indicating that the organization is really becoming more and more transparent. The social-technical changes that are happening today at the TCE/RJ are caused by the growing social pressure for more effective results in the control of public expenditures. Under the systemic point of view, we observe cracks in the protective bell-glass that evolves the institution - previously hermetic to the external contingencies and that works today as a SAC - Adaptive Complex System. Aspects such as organization structural changes, the introduction of strategic planning and the growing democratization of the decision process are producing a new organizational culture. The seniority of the Technical Headcount contributes to establish the pre-conditions for the development of a administration where the participation of the TCE/RJ technical employees adds importance to its development as an institution that generates republican effects in the society from its less hermetic decision process.

Government policy and private investment in Brazil (1955/82)

The questlon of the crowding-out of private !nvestment by public expenditure, public investment in particular , ln the Brazilian economy has been discussed more in ideological terrns than on empirical grounds. The present paper tries to avoid the limitation of previous studies by estlmatlng an equation for private investment whlch makes it possible to evaluate the effect of economic policies on prlvate investment. The private lnvestment equation was deduced modifylng the optimal flexible accelerator medel (OFAM) incorporating some channels through which public expendlture influences privateinvestment. The OFAM consists in adding adjustment costs to the neoclassical theory of investrnent. The investment fuction deduced is quite general and has the following explanatory variables: relative prices (user cost of capitaljimput prices ratios), real interest rates, real product, public expenditures and lagged private stock of capital. The model was estimated for private manufacturing industry data. The procedure adopted in estimating the model was to begin with a model as general as possible and apply restrictions to the model ' s parameters and test their statistical significance. A complete diagnostic testing was also made in order to test the stability of estirnated equations. This procedure avoids ' the shortcomings of estimating a model with a apriori restrictions on its parameters , which may lead to model misspecification. The main findings of the present study were: the increase in public expenditure, at least in the long run, has in general a positive expectation effect on private investment greater than its crowding-out effect on priva te investment owing to the simultaneous rise in interst rates; a change in economlc policy, such as that one of Geisel administration, may have an important effect on private lnvestment; and reI ative prices are relevant in determining the leveI of desired stock of capital and private investrnent.

Três ensaios sobre o gasto local no Brasil: descentralização, eficiência e voto

Partindo de uma avaliação sobre o contexto mundial de descentralização fiscal e de democratização em que o Brasil se encontrava no final do século XX, essa tese apresenta na primeira parte uma análise empírica para países em desenvolvimento evidenciando o condicionamento do tipo de regime de governo na relação entre descentralização fiscal e tamanho de governo. Estimações por system-GMM para países em desenvolvimento mostram que existe um nível de descentralização fiscal, entre 20% e 30%, que uma vez superado, resulta em democracias com tamanhos de governos menores do que as ditaduras. Esses resultado, que chama a atenção tanto para os governos locais, como para a influência da democracia no gasto público, estimulou a continuação da pesquisa na avaliação da eficiência dos gastos municipais no Brasil e sua relação com o voto. Assim, no segundo ensaio, são calculados indicadores de evolução da eficiência e da produtividade do gasto municipal (fatores de Malmquist) entre 2004 e 2008, para as áreas da saúde e educação. Os resultados da análise por fronteira estocástica mostram que tanto na educação, como na saúde, houve avanços na fronteira de produção (TFPC, em média, de 18.7%, na educação e de 14.2% na saúde) por avanços de mudança técnica (Technical Change - TC), ao invés de elevação da eficiência (Technical Efficiency Change – TEC). No último ensaio, os indicadores de eficiência e de produtividade são usados para testar a hipótese de que o eleitor municipal premia com o voto os prefeitos que melhoraram a eficiência do gasto da educação e/ou saúde em sua gestão. Os resultados não rejeitam a hipótese para a educação, mas rejeitam para a saúde. A fim de tratar prováveis erros de medida das variáveis de produtividade, as estimações são instrumentalizadas em regressões por dois estágios.

A participação do poder legislativo na definição das metas e prioridades do orçamento publico federal no periodo 1990/95

A elaboração do orçamento público é uma das mais importantes atribuições do Poder Legislativo nos países de regime democrático, não obstante a iniciativa das leis orçamentárias tenha se transferido para o Executivo. Atualmente, os papéis desempenhados pelos Poderes Executivo e Legislativo na elaboração do orçamento estão definidos nas constituições, onde se observa uma tendência ao equilíbrio entre os dois Poderes. A história do orçamento está intimamente associada ao poderio crescente dos parlamentos que passaram a reivindicar o direito de autorizar as receitas e dispor sobre as despesas públicas. O orçamento, introduzido primeiramente na Inglaterra, como um instrumento de controle político do Parlamento sobre a Coroa, e adotado pelos franceses e norte-americanos em suas lutas por liberdade, aos poucos, foi sendo utilizado pela maioria das nações. No Brasil, tomando-se por referência as constituições ao longo de sua história, a participação do Poder Legislativo na elaboração do orçamento caracterizou-se pela oscilação em termos do maior ou menor controle sobre as decisões orçamentárias. A Constituição Federal de 1 988 recuperou as prerrogativas do Congresso Nacional para dispor sobre matéria orçamentária que haviam sido retiradas na Constituição de 1 967. A Constituição trouxe importantes mudanças nesta área, entre elas a conclusão do processo de unificação orçamentária, a aprovação pelo Legislativo não só da lei orçamentária como dos novos instrumentos de planejamento (lei do plano plurianual e lei de diretrizes orçamentárias), a instituição de uma comissão mista permanente de Senadores e Deputados e a possibilidade de emendar os projetos de lei do Executivo. A lei de diretrizes orçamentárias, considerada uma das mais relevantes inovações introduzidas ao capítulo da Constituição que trata do orçamento público, foi concebida com o objetivo maior de permitir uma intervenção prévia do Poder Legislativo na elaboração do projeto de lei do orçamento, antecipando as decisões sobre as metas e prioridades a serem contempladas na elaboração orçamentária. Apesar dos novos instrumentos e do amplo poder de intervenção, no período de 1990 à 1995 a atuação do Legislativo no que diz respeito à definição de metas e prioridades ficou comprometida principalmente pela falta de vontade política para aprovar a Lei Complementar de Finanças Públicas e para implantar na comissão mista de orçamento uma estrutura e processos de funcionamento correspondentes ao novo papel que a Constituição reservou a esta comissão. A análise dos documentos e os depoimentos levantados mostraram que a atuação do Legislativo foi prejudicada também pela inexistência do planejamento governamental e pela deficiência dos projetos de lei do Executivo, que pouca atenção deram às metas e prioridades.

The Limits of political compromise: debt ceilings and political competition

We study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political competition in an economy where political parties alternate in office. Due to rent-seeking motives, incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level. Parties cannot commit to future policies, but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if it expects future governments to do the same. In contrast to the received literature, we find that strict limits on government borrowing can exacerbate political-economy distortions by rendering a political compromise unsustainable. This tends to happen when political competition is limited. Conversely, a tight limit on the public debt fosters a compromise that yields the efficient outcome when political competition is vigorous, saving the economy from immiseration. Our analysis thus suggests a legislative tradeoff between restricting political competition and constraining the ability of governments to issue debt.

Public debt sustainability and endogenous seignorage in Brazil: time-series evidence from 1947-92

Using national accounts data for the revenue-GDP and expenditure GDP ratios from 1947 to 1992, we examine two central issues in public finance. First, was the path of public debt sustainable during this period? Second, if debt is sustainable, how has the government historically balanced the budget after hocks to either revenues or expenditures? The results show that (i) public deficit is stationary (bounded asymptotic variance), with the budget in Brazil being balanced almost entirely through changes in taxes, regardless of the cause of the initial imbalance. Expenditures are weakly exogenous, but tax revenues are not;(ii) a rational Brazilian consumer can have a behavior consistent with Ricardian Equivalence (iii) seignorage revenues are critical to restore intertemporal budget equilibrium, since, when we exclude them from total revenues, debt is not sustainable in econometric tests.

Growth, increasing returns, and public infrastructure : time series evidence

Initial endogenous growth models emphasized the importance of external effects and increasing retums in explaining growth. Empirically, this hypothesis can be confumed if the coefficient of physical capital per hour is unity in the aggregate production function. Previous estimates using time series data rejected this hypothesis, although cross-country estimates did nol The problem lies with the techniques employed, which are unable to capture low-frequency movements of high-frequency data. Using cointegration, new time series evidence confum the theory and conform to cross-country evidence. The implied Solow residual, which takes into account externaI effects to aggregate capital, has its behavior analyzed. The hypothesis that it is explained by government expenditures on infrasttucture is confIrmed. This suggests a supply-side role for government affecting productivity.